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The last clear definite function of man - muscles 
aching to work, minds aching to create beyond the 
single need - this is man. To build a wall, to build a 
house, a dam, and in the wall and house and dam to 
put something of Manself and to Manself take back 
something of the wall, the house, the dam; to take 
hard muscles from the lifting, to take the clear lines 
and form from conceiving. For man, unlike anything 
organic or inorganic in the universe, grows beyond 
his work, walks up the stairs of his concepts, 
emerges ahead of his accomplishments. 
(J Steinbeck - T. ': -- Grapes ;,:. Wrath) 
In man creature and creator are united: in man there 
is material, fragment, excess, clay, dirt, nonsense, 
chaos; but in man there is also creator, form-giver, 
hammer hardness, spectator divinity, and seventh day: 
do you understand this contrast? 
(F Nietzsche - Bevond Good m v{ ) 
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Theme Abstract 
The following thesis offers a philosophical critique of scoicbiclo ?, 
which is identified as a recent attempt to produce a general theory of 
animal behaviour, encompassing an account of human nature. The first 
chapter examines the empirical and theoretical foundations of sociobiology, 
highlighting some of the philosophical topics regarding the relation of 
the natural and social sciences, and the attempt to offer an account of 
human nature within a largely mathematical and mechanistic theoretical 
framework. 
Chapter two looks at the major specific areas of human behaviour 
featured in sociobiological accounts, A close exüminaticn cf e*ýpirioal 
evidence, underlying theoretical assumptions, behavicural categories and 
definitions, and finally deduced conclusions reveals several weaknesses and 
examples of fallacious reasoning, The third chapter continues to e ine 
the account of human nature in relation to the broadest and most abstract 
features of social structures and interactions. The political dimension of 
sociobiology is examined - both in terms of its account of political 
behaviour, and in the theoretical opposition between sociobiology and left- 
wing ideologies. The sociobiological account of religious behaviour is 
rejected in favour of one couched in terms of social rather Than 
genetically heritable dispositions. 
Chapter four evaluates the attempt to respond to early criticisms of 
sociobiology. It is argued that the main theoretical stance regarding 
human behaviour remains little changed, and that the new theoretical 
models create even more conceptual problems, thus failing to provide a 
framework for an account of human nature. The final chapter applies some 
ideas from evolutionary theory to specific areas of philosophical 
controversy: the relation of mind to language; the ascription of Mental 
life to other species; functionalist and epiphenomenaiist accounts of 
consciousness. It is argued that empirical and theoretical considerations 
from the natural sciences may thus inform traditional areas of 
philosophical debate, creating useful interdisciplinary dialogues. 
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Ch pter Orin :A Critique of 
Sociobio1cgica1 Metricdology 
ýý TAP Scientific Origins and Aims cj Sociobiology 
The publication An 1975 of E0 Wilson's massive text Sociobiology: 
toa. Synthesis sparked off a heated dispute about the status of the so- 
called 'new science' of sociobiology. Whilst proponents of the theory such 
as Wilson defended sociobiology as capable of explaining within a strict 
scientific methodology the origins, scope and significance of social 
behaviour at the level of both individual and group displays, its critics 
accused it of glossing over the content and complexities of existing 
models of behavioural interpretation, and of reducing behavioural 
explanation to tautological statements about adaptational functions. (see 
for example: Baldwin & Baldwin, 1981; Katcher et al, 1987, especially pages 
61 - 74. ) Not content with an attack on the scientific credibility of 
sociobiology, various groups have also pursued ad bominem style arguments, 
questioning the possible sociopolitical motivations of its supporters and 
the likely results of a practical application of the theory. The suggestion 
is that sociobiology may well find favour in the minds of these eager to 
believe a potentially divisive account of genetically-based differences in 
ability between various ethnic, sexual and socioeconomic groups within 
human society, regardless of its actual scientific credentials. (For 
examples of such criticisms, see: Th& Re& York Review Elf, Bocks, Beckwith, 
J. and others, 1975 and Rose, S. et al, 1984, ) 
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The range and intensity of reaction to Wilson's work, from layman to 
specialist, was not unlike that which occurred over a century earlier in 
reaction to Darwin's publication of jb& DrigIn Qf Sp) ies and the later 
work The. Descent Qj pº In both cases the dispute focussed not on the 
author's exhaustive and meticulous observations of many varied species, but 
on the inclusion in their theories of one particular species - Homo 
Sapiens. Just as Darwin's account of the origin of the human species by 
the process of natural evolution was reviled by some as a dehumanisation 
and debasing of man's previously isolated and privileged status in the 
natural world, so Wilson's account of the origins and guiding mechanisms 
of man's social nature is seen by some as an attack on the autonomy and 
meaning of our social structures and their products. The similarity of 
reaction to the works can be explained at least in part by certain 
features which they share in common. In both cases the authors generated 
speculative and radical theories for which conclusive empirical evidence 
was lacking. They both proposed a synthesis of data and method from 
previously distinct research disciplines, overturning existing theories in 
the wake of a new, all-embracing conceptual framework. In both cases the 
new theory was to extend so far as to include our own species, which had 
previously lain outside of the existing theoretical scope. Roth theories 
posed a threat to a particular group, whose supporters quickly became the 
focal point for vehement opposition. In Darwin's case the strongest 
reaction came from (and still. comes from) the supporters of the threatened 
Creationist account of the origin of all life on this planet. For Wilson 
the main opposition is from the practitioners of the social sciences and 
humanities - those areas Wilson has suggested should and will be 
'biologicized' by the new discipline (Cf Wilson, 1975, p. 4). 
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Wilson's vision of the transformation which he claims must occur 
within the existing scientific structures is certainly not a new one. As 
one critic of sociobiology has expressed it. "Wilson's monism is the latest 
version of positivism, the contention that the cognitive aims of natural 
and social science are basically the same. " (Pickens, 1985, p. 67) . In fact 
Wilson himself seems to see his work as part of the historical line of 
development to which Pickens refers: 
A guiding principle has nevertheless reemerged from 
the combined efforts that once inspired Comte, 
Spencer and other nineteenth century visionaries 
before dying from premature birth and Social 
Darwinism: that all of the natural sciences and 
social sciences form a seamless whole, so that 
chemistry can be unified with physics, biology with 
chemistry, psychology with biology, and sociology 
with psychology - all the way across the domain of 
enquiry by means of an unbroken web of theory and 
verification. (Lumsden & Wilson, 1983, p. 171) 
This vision of a unified science incorporating all aspects of man's 
knowledge, which began during the enlightenment with the successful 
development and application of the natural scientific method, received an 
initial boost with the publication of Darwinian theory which finally 
brought our own species' origins within the bounds of natural science. 
However, as Wilson comments, the early attempts to merge the two domains 
of natural and social scientific theory were soon to be tainted by their 
incorporation into the right-wing ideologies of Social Darwinism in 
America, and the rise of Naziism in Germany (see: Gasman, 1971 and 
Stein, 1987). The more recent and rapid development of theory and 
experimental success within the biologically-based sciences over the past 
fifty years or so has once again sufficiently enthused the supporters of 
sociobiological theory to predict that a century from now the rigid 
disciplinary frontiers at present mostly respected by both natural and 
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social science practitioners will be broken down. This process is 
envisioned as a mainly one-way colonisation of the social science 
territories by the biologically-based disciplines: 
To maintain the species indefinitely we are compelled 
to drive toward total knowledge, right down to the 
levels of the neuron and gene. When we have 
progressed enough to explain ourselves in these 
mechanistic terms, and the social sciences have come 
to full flower, the result might be hard to 
accept-But we still have another hundred years. 
(Wilson, 1975, p. 571 - emphasis added) 
It is clear from the phrase I have emphasised that the changes envisioned 
are not merely in the degree of cooperation and informational exchange 
between the natural and social science disciplines: rather, they constitute 
some form of reduction of description and explanation from the present 
largely non-mechanistic terms of the social sciences to the mechanistic 
terms and models of the natural sciences. It will be one of my main 
contentions that the enthusiasm with which such changes are envisioned 
tends to produce a smoke-screen, behind which lie many unresolved 
problems of both a theoretical and empirical nature. Though specifically 
aimed at the theory and practice of sociobiology, many of my criticisms in 
this area would apply equally to any attempted merging of the natural and 
social sciences, and as such they constitute some of the problems debated 
within the philosophy of science generally. 
Given the above predictions by Wilson, coupled with sociobiology's 
sociopolitical ancestry, it is hardly surprising that the reactions from 
many quarters have been aggressive and tended to polarise interested 
parties into two strongly opposed camps. However, it is important to place 
sociobiology within a historical context, since the theories of Wilson and 
others have grown out of a body of established scientific research and 
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theory. Sociobiology was defined by Wilson himself as "the systematic 
study of the biological basis of all social behaviour" (Vilson, 1975, p. 4). 
Its scientific roots are to be found in the disciplines of ethology, 
ecology, population genetics, and the general application to animal studies 
of the Synthetic Theory of Evolution, which combines Darwinian 
evolutionary theory with the genetic mechanisms of heredity first 
discovered by Gregor Mendel. The systematic--study of animal behaviour 
(ethology) was established in this century through the observational work 
and theory of such pioneers as Konrad Lorenz and Niko Tinbergen. (See for 
example: Lorenz, 1937,1965 & 1970 and Tinbergen, 1951. ) They began to 
observe and record animal behaviour in the wild, with a view to explaining 
the forms and origin of such behaviour in the same way that the 
morphological traits of a species are explained. Just as an animal's organs 
are regarded as the products of evolution by natural selection, and 
therefore to some extent a functional adaptation to the environment, so 
the behavioural traits of animals were examined from the same theoretical 
stance. (The idea that morphology and behaviour could be equally 
approached and explained from an adaptational functionalist perspective 
was already suggested in Darwin's own work. See: Darwin, 859, especially 
Chapter 8. ) 
An example of such a theoretical approach was Tinbergen'ä observation 
of Herring Gull colonies (Tinbergen, 1953), which revealed in an apparently 
chaotic and disfunctional assemblage of individuals competing for limited 
resources a high degree of mutually-responsive behaviour. Such 'social' 
behaviour was explained as serving functionally to regulate and perpetuate 
the living conditions of individuals and of the colony as a whole. 
Territoriality, aggression, mating and rearing of chicks, role divisions, 
-6- 
reactions to predators both individually and collectively, and all 
essential aspects of the gulls' life were found upon close observation to 
be subject to very precise control by largely instinctive behavioural 
patterns. Such behaviour was coordinated throughout the group by the 
mutual exchange of instinctively recognised signals (as opposed to a 
system of learned signals). Through this system of signals individuals 
could affect and be affected by the behaviour of those around them. 
Possibly the most famous and impressive of these experiments in 
behavioural response are those performed by Tinbergen on the food-request 
behaviour of baby Herring Gulls. From the moment of hatching, the chicks 
peck at a red spot which is prominent on the tip of the parent's beak, in 
order to elicit regurgitated food. Through a series of simple but elegant 
controlled experiments, Tinbergen was able to show that this behaviour is 
species-specific and requires no learning for its manifestation, the 
behavioural response to the stimuli being wholly explicable in terms of 
genetic heritability. (For a full account of this work see Tinbergen & 
Perdeck, 1950. ) 
The importance of this approach to animal behaviour was its capacity 
to observe and explain specific features of behaviour in terms of their 
being a functional adaptation to some pertinent feature(s) of the natural 
environment. The instinctive nature of many responses to stimuli indicated 
that the behaviour was under a degree of genetic control, adding support 
to the premise that some behaviour at least is the product of evolution by 
natural selection. This theoretical stance brought together the study of 
all aspects of living organisms - both morphological and behavioural - 
and provided the foundations for the science of ethology, from which 
sociobiology has emerged as a more recent development. There were, 
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however, certain forms of behaviour which would not fit into the 
theoretical framework which viewed all behaviour as to some extent the 
adaptive product of evolution. To appreciate why this was so, it is Birst 
necessary to give a brief summary of the theory of evolution by natural 
selection, since it is this theory which underpins the arguments which I 
will go on to examine in detail later. 
Evolutionary theory states that any population will tend to increase 
its numbers by reproduction (ceteris paribus) until such expansion is 
checked by the limiting factors of the habitat. At this point, further 
increase in numbers will result in a rise in the mortality rate. This is 
due to the effects of overcrowding, such as starvation; increased spread of 
disease; build-up of toxic wastes; increased competition for necessary 
resources; changes in relations to predatory species due to increased 
numbers; etc. However, as no two individuals are likely to be equal in 
their respective ability to respond to the demands and pressures created 
by a natural environment, those individuals less suited to the particular 
demands will tend to suffer and die. This process of 'natural selection' 
will therefore tend over a number of generations to filter out the less 
'fit' or- 'able', leaving a higher proportion in the population of those who, 
by virtue of their abilities, are in relation to the specific environment 
more fit or able than others. The continued appearance in each generation 
of unique or novel individuals is assured in sexually reproducing species 
by the novel recombination of genetic material during formation of the 
zygote, and in all species by the appearance of random genetic mutations. 
(It should be noted that 'random' in this context means with respect to 
pertinent features of the environment, and not 'random' in the sense of 
being totally arbitrary or incapable of being ascribed to any cause. 
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Mutations are not causally indetermined - they are merely 'blind' to 
environmental features and the adaptive needs of the species. ) The result 
of these processes of recombination and mutation is the production of 
novel genetic types, on which are based the development of individuals 
with varying abilities which are to some greater or lesser degree gene- 
dependent and therefore genetically heritable. Over a number of generations 
the continuous elimination of those individuals less suited to the 
environment will tend to create a population of individuals whose abilities 
will show a degree of correspondence or 'adaptation' to pertinent features 
of the environment. (Just what counts as a 'pertinent feature' will vary 
from species to species, as well as over time for any particular species. ) 
It is important to note that 'natural selection' as such is an inevitable 
outcome of an ecological relation between a reproducing population and its 
habitat, 'Evolution' in the sense of a continuing process of functional 
adaptation can only occur if the following criteria are fulfilled: 
1) The existence of a breeding population consisting of individuals with 
varying abilities relevant to their prospects of survival and reproduction. 
2) Genetic heritability of at least some of those abilities - i. e. they are 
non-random with respect to the individual's genotype. 
3) The existence of competition for resources within populations with a 
tendency to increase their numbers to the carrying capacity of the 
environment, resulting in selective pressure and the differential success 
of individuals within the population due to individual abilities. 
4) A reasonably stable environment, relative to the life-span and 
reproductive cycle of the average member of the species. 
5) A sufficient number of generations for the process of natural selection 
to have a differential effect on the survival and propagation of individual 
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types within the population, and hence to change the distribution of traits 
within the population over time. 
If the above criteria are met, then not only will there be selection 
of individuals within the population, but it will be a consistent selection 
relative to the species and features of the environment, resulting 
ultimately in the evolution of a population composed of individuals who 
show a degree of adaptation relative to the environment. Of course, this is 
only if the genetic variability in 2) above is such that it includes forms 
which are 'successfully adaptive' in relation to the given environmental 
pressures and demands: where such variability is lacking, the result is 
often extinction, or in some cases migration to a new and less hostile 
environment where this is possible. 
The behaviours mentioned above which did not at first sight appear 
explicable within the theoretical framework of evolutionary theory include 
those normally designated by the term 'altruistic'. Altruism, by definition, 
is behaviour which decreases the altruist's fitness potential whilst 
increasing that of some other(s). The possibility of such behaviour being 
anything more than a freak occurrence runs counter to the logic of 
evolutionary theory. Since altruists would tend in the long run to be less 
fit than those they helped, or other non-altruists within the population, 
they would tend to be progressively eliminated from the population over a 
number of generations. Moreover, any 'genes for' altruism (i. e. a strong 
genetic basis for the behaviour) would also be eliminated in competition 
with more 'selfish' genes (i. e. genes which predispose their carriers to 
more selfish behaviour). It would thus seem impossible for altruism to 
evolve into anything like a common trait in any species. 
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Contrary to the theoretical argument from evolutionary pr; nciples, 
observation of many species had revealed time and again widespread 
displays of altruism within populations, requiring some explanation of its 
possible evolution and stability. After various proposals, an acceptable 
solution to the problem was formulated by WD Hamilton (Hamilton, 1964). 
This involved an expansion of the existing concept of 'fitness' and a 
virtual redefinition in biological terms of the concept of 'altruism'. 
Hamilton's theory was especially successful in explaining the self- 
sacrificial extremes of altruistic behaviour displayed by castes within the 
haplodiploid insects, 
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incorporation of this aspect of behaviour into a 
conventional evolutionary framework became central to the development o 
theories concerning the genetically-based evolution of social behaviour. 
(For example, the work on social relations between members of a family 
group carried out by RL Trivers is an extension and detailed application 
of Hamilton's initial theoretical insight. See for example Trivers, 1974 and 
my discussion of such theories, pp. 126-134 below, ) 
Bringing together and building upon the explanatory perspective of 
the above-mentioned theories, Wilson carried out an extensive study of 
invertebrate species behaviour, the results of which were published in 
1971 under the title L Insect Societies. In the last chapter of this work 
(entitled "The Prospect for a Unified Sociobiology") he expressed the hope 
that the principles applied to the explanation of social behaviour in the 
insect species could be expanded and applied to behaviour in the 
vertebrate species. He thus envisioned a general evolutionary science of 
social behaviour, based on the dogma that behavioural as well as 
morphological traits are to some extent genetically heritable. Being the 
product of evolution by natural selection, they could be systematically 
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observed and explained in functionalist terms of adaptations to the 
species' natural environment. 
The pervasive role of natural selection in shaping 
all classes of traits in organisms can be fairly 
called the central dogma of evolutionary biology. 
(Wilson, 1975, pp. 21/22) . 
Thus social as well as other forms of behaviour came to be seen as the 
expression of specific genotypes, selected for their adaptive value to the 
species, and explicable in functionalist terms of the relation between the 
organism's needs and abilities, and the available resources and features of 
a competitive environment. The way was clear for Wilson and others to 
apply such theories to every kind of behavioural phenomenon: from the 
herding instincts of deer on the African plains, to urban violence in the 
cities of Western Europe. 
It is, I think, clear even from such a brief and necessarily selective 
survey of the historical roots of sociobiology, that as a theory it is not 
the wayward or politically suspect brainstorm of any one individual. 
Rather, it is the culmination of progressive theoretical development in 
many distinct areas of research by leading professional academics. As a 
theory of behavioural explanation applied to all species but our own, it 
already commands a great deal of respect, and has . resulted in a 
flourishing growth of speculative research and publication. (For a brief 
list of such publications, see: Wilson, 1983, p189. ) The application of 
sociobiological theory to the study and description of human social 
behaviour cannot therefore be dismissed as nothing more than a revival of 
the Spencerian ideology of Social Darwinism (as suggested in 
Midgley, 1983). It is only through a detailed and clear discussion and 
evaluation of the statements of its supporters that sociobiology may be 
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correctly and fairly assessed as a potential theory of human social 
behaviour, and it is just such a task which will be undertaken in the rest 
of this thesis. 
12 Qual 1 tat{ ve L Quantitative Transformations 
One of the first and most obvious problems raised by sociobiology, or 
for that matter any attempt to incorporate behavioural data within a 
natural scientific framework, is how to transform the primarily qualitative 
data of observation into a form which can be subsequently analysed and 
described using the mathematics-based quantitative models of natural 
science. This is not a new problem, since it has already been confronted 
and to some extent solved by those sciences such as psychology and 
economics, which must perform similar transformations upon informational 
data. However, even the most avid supporters of such disciplines would 
recognise the inherent problems, and the divisions of opinion as to the 
success which such procedures can claim. Wilson himself recognises the 
problem posed by his own avowed task of trying to "close the famous gap 
between the two cultures" (Wilson, 1978, p. xii), and admits that the reduction 
of the social sciences to the natural sciences may in practice prove an 
unattainable goal: 
I might easily be wrong - in any particular 
conclusion, in the grander hopes for the role of the 
natural sciences, and in the trust gambled on 
scientific materialism. (ibid, p. xii). 
If the 'new synthesis' is to be anything more than an advance in 
interdisciplinary academic cooperation - an idea already dismissed (see 
above, p. 4) and hardly a matter of great theoretical controversy - it would 
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seem to depend for its success on the feasibility of reducing behavioural 
descriptions for methodological reasons to some form analogous to the 
law-like statements of the natural sciences. Roughly, this means 
transforming the data of particular behavioural observation statements 
into general statements of relations between variable terms, all of whose 
properties must be rendered mathematically quantifiable on some recognised 
scale of comparison. Furthermore, such formulations must be sufficiently 
complex and amenable to fine distinctions, so as to ensure that they do 
not over-simplify, idealise, or in any other way significantly distort the 
phenomenal data which they are attempting to describe. Such a task may 
prove relatively easy when the phenomena in question are the behavioural 
characteristics of inanimate matter such as molecular structures or 
physical forces. However, precisely- rendered mathematical descriptions may 
prove less easily achievable when the phenomena in question are a rich and 
varied range of individual behavioural responses to an equally rich and 
varied range of environmental stimuli. 
An example of just such an attempt, and one that is central to much 
sociobiological debate, is the description and explanation of altruistic 
behaviour modelled on Hamilton's theory of Kin Altruism. The behaviour in 
question is reduced to an expression of two theoretical subjects X and Y, 
who are denuded of all characteristics save that of their coefficient of 
genetic relation (e. g. R=1/8 for 1st cousins; R=1/2 for siblings or 
parent/offspring, etc. ). Plus or minus values are then assigned to the 
likely pay-off resulting from a given behaviour -a quantification of the 
resultant 'fitness value' for the protagonist. A -calculation and prediction 
Is then made, concerning the relative likelihood of certain forms of 
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behaviour, and this prediction tested against observational data to see if 
the theory conforms to and is able to account for field observations. 
The reason that Kin Altruism and similar theories form such a major 
part of sociobiological theory is precisely because they appear to succeed 
in explaining within relatively simple mathematical formulations important 
aspects of behaviour common to many different observed species. They thus 
have the appearance and law-like power of natural science formulae. 
However, in reality such models are unable to handle anything more complex 
than an idealised calculation. They propose an idealised protagonist, 
isolated in a single bipolar behavioural 'choice', all this within an 
environment whose actual multifarious features are reduced to a single 
plus or minus value on an imaginary scale of behavioural benefits drawn up 
by the teller of the story. Given such limitations, it is difficult to see 
how one could avoid almost any argument about likely behaviour being 
concocted and proven, merely by assigning appropriate values to the 
relevant variables. Vice versa, it would seem to be a problematic task to 
represent any actual state of affairs with sufficient accuracy, given such 
restrictive and limited modelling capacities. 
An example of such reasoning occurs in Genes, Mini. and Culture 
(Lumsden & Wilson, 1981). Lumsden and Wilson propose to offer a 
sociobiological account and mathematical analysis of the social phenomenon 
of village fissioning in a South American tribe called the Yanonamo. The 
phenomenon had already received an anthropological analysis by Napoleon 
Chagnon (Chagnon, 1976). Lumsden and Wilson's proposal is to incorporate 
the observations made by Chagnon within a sociobiological framework, and 
show how the observed practices of village division and new settlement are 
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explicable by positing the existence of genetically heritable psychological 
dispositions called 'epigenetic rules', which supposedly guide behavioural 
decisions in response to certain environmental parameters such as 
population density (for a fuller explanation of 'epigenetic rules', sew 
below, pp. 222-225). Lumsden and Wilson proceed to draw up graphs and derive 
mathematical formulae concerning "threshold decision logic" (Lumsden & 
Wilson, 1981, p. 160). This logic operates upon the two 'culturgens' (roughly 
definable as available options of cultural behaviour) of 'remain' and 
'depart'. As I pointed out above, such an analysis offers a greatly 
simplified model of the actual circumstances of the phenomenon under 
investigation. Individuals are treated as if their decisions were made in 
isolation from one another, rather than taking into account the possible 
and likely effect upon an individual of the decisions made by those around 
them. The choice is simplified to the two possible and con. trary outcomes 
of 'remain' or 'depart', 'rather than allowing for any intermediate stages of 
indecision, or further possible factors which might come into and affect 
the decision-making process. The only environmental factor considered 
relevant to the calculation of likely choice is that of overall population 
density, rather than allowing for more personal areas of motivation, suc: 
as family or broader social relations and stresses; the possibility of 'a 
new start'; the potential for individual betterment through higher prestige 
attainment within a new and smaller group; the differences made to 
individual choice by virtue of age, sex, marital and power status within 
the existing group. These social factors are left out of the mathematical 
calculation made by the authors, who apparently excuse this aspect of 
their work, and deny its significance to the accuracy of their models: 
Although vastly oversimplified, the gene-culture 
translation models in the two-culturgen Markov 
decision approximation acccunt for significant 
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features of the village fissioning process. 
(ibid, p. 167) . 
In a severe attack on this aspect of sociobiological reasoning, Kitcher 
(Kitcher, 1985) comments on the same example from Lumsden and Wilson's 
work, but comes to a conclusion very different from the authors' own: 
In sum, we have an implausible solution for a problem 
about the social expression of human preferences, in 
a case where there are no detailed results that could 
be used to distinguish the solution from the most 
elementary qualitative analysis of the situation. 
(ibid, p. 371). 
After a further analysis of the methods and results of Lum sden and 
Wilson's work, Kitcher once again offers scathing comments upon the 
adequacy of this aspect of sociobiological explanation, particularly when 
it is regarded as a potential substitute and improvement over existing 
techniques of 'qualitative' analysis already in employment within the 
social sciences: 
In the first and last examples, the unnecessary 
mathematical apparatus actually stands in the way of 
offering better analyses of the situation. In the 
second example, Lumsden and Wilson manage only to 
provide a conclusion that is indistinguishable from 
results that we can reach by qualitative argument, 
given the data available. (ibid, p. 376) 
In conclusion, Kitcher offers a final blow to what he caricatures in his 
chapter title as "The Emperor's New Equations", and to the attempt of 
sociobiologists to offer an account of social phenomena within the 
language and models of quantitative mathematical formulae: 
Genes, )find, and Culture is an extreme example of a 
certain type of work. Complex mathematics is employed 
to cover up very simple - often simplistic - ideas... 
What is irritating, and occasionally amusing, about 
these uses of mathematics is that they serve to 
disguise the poverty of thought. (ibid, p. 393). 
- 1.7 - 
The same problem with simplification of actual detail, in order to red;: ce 
the facts to a state in which they can be rendered within mathematical 
models, occurs in the work of Richard Dawkins (Dawkins, 1978), In a 
discussion of Kin Selection theories, and their application to explaining 
human and other species' behaviour, Dawkins admits to the need for 
simplification of models. However, he does not appear to think that such a 
procedure is in danger of rendering any calculable results invalid, by 
virtue of their disregard for what may prove to be crucial factors 
affecting behaviour. On the contrary, Dawkins thinks that much of the 
decision-making process is both governed by much simpler rules than we 
normally envisage, and that such calculations are undertaken in a way 
which has very little to do with many consciously perceived factors of the 
environment. 
So far, I have over-simplified somewhat, and it is 
now time to introduce some qualifications.... Obviously, 
in real life, animals cannot be expected to count 
exactly how many relatives they are saving, nor to 
perform Hamilton's calculations in their heads even if 
they had some way of knowing exactly who their 
brothers and cousins were.... Just as we may use a 
slide rule without appreciating that we are, in 
effect, using logarithms, so an animal may be pre- 
programmed in such a way that it behaves as 1. f it 
had made a complicated calculation. (ibid, pp. 102/103). 
The question of explaining human behaviour according to the Kin Selection 
theories of Hamilton and Trivers will be dealt with in detail later (see 
below, pp. 111-134). However, a brief excursion into the mathematical 
formulations of sociobiology reveals that there are many problems which, 
in the view of myself and at least some other commentators, are far fron 
solved within existing sociobiological theory. (See also Alper & 
Lar_ e, 1981 
on this topic. ) The behaviour of Maynard Smith's 'Hawks and Doves' 
is open 
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to exact mathematical formulation and prediction precisely because they 
have been ideally created for such a purpose, possessing only 
mathematically formulable attributes. In this respect, they bear only a 
superficial similarity to the natural species which share their name. : gor 
are they to be confused with any other species for whom they supposedly 
stand as behavioural models, but which in fact behave in ways far more 
complex and within an ever-changing natural environment. 
The success of much of sociobiology's proposed transformation of the 
existing social scientific description and explanation of behaviour would 
therefore seen to depend on the as-yet unresolved problems of devising 
methods for translating qualitative properties into quantitative variables. 
These must then be related within formulae which do not simplify and 
abstract out all the relevant information present in the original 
observations, since such a process achieves success at the expense of 
realistic description (see, for example, my discussion of the 
sociobiological treatment of human homosexuality and incest, pp. 134-150 
below). This problem, which is a general one for any kind of behavioural 
description, is made even more acute in the specific case of human 
behavioural description, by the above said desire to "explain ourselves in 
these mechanistic terms" -a methodological stance which runs counter to 
the view of human behaviour and its necessary explanation held by many 
practising social scientists and philosophers. It is to this topic that the 
discussion will therefore turn in the following section. 
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1, 
_ 
Behavioural Explanation 
Sociobiology adopts a theoretical stance towards behavioural 
explanation whose origin I have attributed to researchers such as Lorenz. 
That is, behaviour is regarded - like morphological traits - as the 
functionally adaptive product of a process of evolution by natural 
selection. The 'central dogma' of sociobiology thus justifies the observer 
in regarding behaviour not merely as related to proximal effects of the 
immediate environment affecting the organism's responses, but also as 
related to distal or ultimate effects which have shaped the organism's 
phylogenetic (I. e. species-ancestral) development. From such a theoretical 
standpoint, phylogeny and ontogeny become inseparably related elements of 
any complete behavioural explanation. It is the traditional lack of concern 
for the phylogenetic aspect of behavioural development and subsequent 
explanation within the existing social science models which socicbiology 
attacks and seeks to redress. 
One of the prime areas of controversy in the sociobiology debate 
concerns the relative emphasis given to proximate and distal factors when 
offering an explanation of any particular behavioural phenomenon. In the 
opening pages of his book, Wilson emphasises how these two elements 
operate on very different time scales, and yet remain inseparably linked 
in the overall process of individual development. 
How is ultimate causation linked to proximate 
causation? Ultimate causation consists of the 
necessities created by the environment... . The species 
responds to environmental exigencies by genetic 
evolution through natural selection, inadvertantly 
shaping the anatomy, physiology, and behaviour of the 
individual organisms.... These prime movers of 
evolution are the ultimate biological causes, but they 
operate only over long spans of time. The anatomical, 
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physiological, and behavioural machinery they create 
constitutes the proximate causation of the functional 
biologist. Operating within the lifetimes of 
organisms, and sometimes even within milliseconds, this machinery carries out the commands of the genes 
on a time scale so remote from that of ultimate 
causation that the two processes sometimes seem to be wholly decoupled. (Wilson, 1975, p. 16 ) 
Although Wilson is ostensibly pointing to the difference in time-scale 
between the effects on an organism of distal and proximate factors 
respectively, I believe that the language he uses is very revealing of his 
general theoretical stance in this matter. He talks of the distal causes as 
the 'prime movers' of behaviour. Proximate causation is seen as an 
'activation' of the 'machinery' embodied in the organism's physiological 
and behavioural structures. Through this, the 'commands of the genes' are 
carried out. I do not think it unfair to suggest that Wilson's language 
betrays a definite bias in his view as to the relative operational and 
consequent explanatory role of the two elements of behavioural 
development. It would appear that the reactions of the organism to 
proximate factors of the environment are almost of a passive nature; in 
the sense that they are a mere playing out of dispositions and structural 
capacities laid down during the phylogenetic ancestry of the species. 
Though I might agree with Wilson that previous behavioural explanatory 
models have tended to ignore the phylogenetic aspect of behaviour, I fear 
that his determination to redress this balance carries him too far in the 
opposite direction of emphasis. The result is a concentration on aspects 
of ultimate causation, which suggests to the reader that this is by far 
the more significant factor in a proper assessment of behavioural causes. 
This differential emphasis on the factors involved in behavioural 
causation and explanation is even more prominent in the chosen vocabulary 
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of Richard Dawkins. In Dawkins' account of the evolution of life an this 
planet, he begins with the now-familiar vision of the simplest proto- 
organisms replicating mitotically in the primaeval soup. As their 
environment changed, they adapted by becoming more complex. We are told 
that they "built survival machines for themselves to live in. " 
(Dawkins, 1978, p. 21) . Millions of years of adaptive evolution by natural 
selection has placed the descendants of these earliest replicators "safe 
inside gigantic lumbering robots, sealed off from the outside world, 
communicating with it by tortuous indirect routes, manipulating it by 
remote control.... Now they go by the name of genes, and we are their 
survival machines. " (ibid, p. 21). 
Dawkins' choice of language here - albeit colourful - is hardly 
neutral. Once again, the images are of machinery And robots under remote 
control. More than that, the machines appear rather lifeless or stupid, in 
comparison with the genes which inhabit and manipulate their movements to 
their own ends. The overall picture is one of behaviour which is to be 
understood in terms of the ultimate ends of the genes and therefore of the 
phylogenetic ancestry, rather than in terms of more immediate relations 
between the organism and the surrounding environment. Such an approach to 
behavioural explanation tends to play down the fact that a balanced 
behavioural explanation must include both elements, but that the relative 
weighting assigned to each element will vary from one case to another, 
according to the behaviour in question and the complexity of the 
organism's responsive capacities. With respect to a particular genotype, 
therefore, and depending on the particular behavioural trait in question, 
the organism may display a greater or lesser degree of 'flexibility' in its 
development and response to environmental features. All that can be 
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properly said of any given genotype is that lt delimits a possible range 
of phenotypic development. This point was made by the eminent biologist 
Theodosius Dobzhansky in a review of another work on evolution. 
Genes determine not "constant characters" but the 
norm of reaction of the developing organism in 
different environments. Grasse ignores the 
interactions of different genes and environments and 
also interactions of different genes. 
(Dobzhansky, 1975) 
The tendency of sociobiological explanations of behaviour to ignore 
or underplay the role of proximal factors affecting ontogenetic 
development and the complexity of the genotype/phenotype relation, is 
nowhere mor e controversial than in the application of sociobiology to 
explanation of behaviour in our own species. The ability of the human 
organism to respond to a wide range of immediate environmental factors, 
affecting morphological as well as behavioural development, means that in 
Homo Sapiens more than in any other observed species, the relation of 
genotype to phenotype is 'open'. Any account of behaviour which is couched 
solely in terms of proximate factors of the immediate environment may 
well satisfy many kinds of questions, but it is not a complete account in 
the eyes of the behavioural scientist. Likewise, however, an account which 
emphasises the ultimate factors and effects on the phylogenetic 
developmental history of an individual, to the detriment or even total 
exclusion of proximate factors, is equally inaccurate, since it suggests 
that the relation of genetically heritable structures and the ongoing 
relation of the organism to factors of the immediate environment is closed 
rather than open. This much-criticised aspect of sociobiological theorising 
is played down as being an inconsequential question of degree or emphasis 
in a book by Tennant and von Schilcher: 
-23- 
The differences between open and closed programmes 
are basically only quantitative. They stem from 
varying contributions from the genetic and 
environmental sources respectively to the total 
information required for the development of a trait. 
(Tennant & von Schilcher, 1984, p. 36). 
What Tennant and von Schilcher regard as only a quantitative difference 
within the process of individual development, however, can make all the 
difference when it comes to constructing and implementing a framework for 
explanation of the various forms and stages of that organism's 
development. Such 'basically only quantitative' differences can, as the same 
authors apparently go on to recognise, result in vastly different potential 
for behavioural development, and the assimilation and subsequent need for 
explanatory inclusion of immediate environmental factors in any proper 
account of behaviour. In short, the more open to developmental change due 
to immediate environmental factors the organism is, the more a complete 
account of behaviour will have to take such factors into consideration, 
rather than concentrating on known or inferred elements in the organism's 
phylogenetic history. This relative dependence upon a continued interaction 
with the environment for the subsequent . 
development of individual 
behavioural traits is, despite the previous quote, in fact recognised by 
the same authors quoted above: 
The decisive difference, as Lorenz saw clearly, is 
that Drosophilas, cicadas and crickets brought up in 
isolation will sing their ancestral roles perfectly, 
whereas a Kaspar Hauser prima donna would be 
somewhat disappointing in her debut as Madame 
Butterfly. (ibid, p. 55). 
Though the general aim of sociobiology may have some substance in its 
criticism of the shortcomings of many traditional 
behavioural explanatory 
models, I would argue that in the writings of sociobiologists, 
there is 
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often a tendency to commit an equal though opposite crime of over- 
emphasis. This may well lead to the reader gaining the image that much if 
not the vast majority of all animal behaviours can be explained in terms 
of genetically heritable traits, which have been laid down over the course 
of the species' phylogenetic history, and which override any more 
immediate factors of proximate environmental influence. Such a criticism 
of the general theoretical and subsequent methodological stance of 
sociobiology is , in my opinion, very damaging to the project, and will 
appear in many of the later sections of this thesis. 
The above criticism is of an area of theorising which could perhaps 
be improved upon, if the writers concerned would present a more 'balanced' 
view of the issues involved. However, there are elements of sociobiological 
reasoning which do not appear to be so open to possible resolution and the 
satisfaction of critics. One of these is the already- mentioned concern of 
sociobiology to couch all behavioural explanations within some form of 
'mechanistic' framework (see above, p. 18). Such a theoretical and 
methodological stance would seem to make sociobiology a natural ally of 
the Behaviourist school of psychology. The methodology of Behaviourism, 
advocated most notably by BF Skinner, attempts to formulate all 
behavioural explanations within a neutral language of third-person 
observation of overt action in response to some identified stimulus. The 
logic behind such a procedure is to ensure as much as possible a 
maintenance of scientific objectivity on the part of the observer. Any 
reference to 'internal' psychological states of the subject under 
examination are held to be invalid or meaningless, since they are taken to 
be a matter of conjecture or inference, not accessible to direct 
verification by observation, which is the basis of methodology in other 
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areas of the natural sciences. In opposition to this, there are those who 
insist that in the case of at least some instances of behaviour (normally 
within our own species) explanations can only be given if observed 
behaviour is related to inferred psychological states of the subject, these 
states providing the necessary explanatory link between the given stimuli 
of the environment, and the production of the behavioural response in 
question. Such 'mental-dependent' explanations of behaviour are the norm 
rather than the exception within such areas as Philosophy of Action, 
Ethics and the social sciences. The strictures of a behaviourist 
methodology are seen to place impossible and radical demands upon the 
traditional explanations of human behaviour, couched in terms of motives, 
intentions, feelings, reasons and other such 'internal' states of the 
subject. As one defender of the non- mechanistic, non-Behaviourist school 
of human behavioural explanation has put it: "to see something as an 
actiön is to see it as something done with a purpose. " (Wilkes, 1978, p. 21. 
For further philosophical literature on the same point, see for example: 
Peters, 1969; Winch, 1958; Melden, 1961). The difference of opinion concerning 
the underlying theory and resulting explanatory terminology of human 
behaviour is one of the major issues within the Philosophy of Science and 
the Philosophy of Mind. It is not clear, however, from the writings of the 
sociobiologists that they always appreciate the complexity which their 
position involves, and the nature of the conceptual issues inevitably 
raised. For example, Wilson often uses the language of intentional 
behavioural descriptions with reference to internal mental states of the 
subject when explaining human behaviour. Such psychological terminology 
would appear to occupy only a temporary place within sociobiological 
theory, however, since one of the further predicted transformations of the 
social sciences consists in the systematic translation of existing 'folk 
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psychological' terminology into the presumably more accurate and objective 
terminology of neurological science, and the description of brain states 
and events occurring within a fully-mapped brain structure. Such a move is 
seen by Wilson as the essential step toward understanding and ultimately 
coming to control the present and possible future state of our own social 
existence: 
The transition from purely phenomenological to 
fundamental theory in sociology must await a full 
neuronal explanation of the human brain. Only when 
the machinery can be torn down on paper at the level 
of the cell and put together again will the 
properties of emotion and ethical judgement come 
clear .... With our present inadequate understanding of 
the human brain, we do not know how many of the most 
valued qualities are linked genetically to more 
obsolete, destructive ones. (Wilson, 1975, p. 571). 
The projected move which Wilson envisages and regards as a necessary 
element of his project - from the phenomenological observations and 
terminology of 'folk psychology' to the objectively verifiable observations 
of the new 'neuropsychology' - is very much in its infancy and a topic of 
heated dispute amongst practitioners and theorists within the relevant 
disciplines. Within philosophical circles, the level of debate on this very 
topic has recently been raised by the production of a series of articles 
and a book by Patricia Churchiand, which argue against the views of 
writers such as Wilkes or Melden, and support the sane transformational 
programme which Wilson envisages (See: Churchland, P. S., 1986 & 1980 for 
example). Attempting to bring these two opposing parties together are 
writers such as Donald Davidson, who argues that explanations in terms of 
reasons or other psychological states are compatible with talk of 
behavioural 'causes' (Davidson, 1963). Without wishing to enter into a full 
discussion of the issues involved on both sides of this debate, I think it 
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still relevant to point to some general aspects of the present situation 
which raise doubts as to the feasibility of the sociobiological position. 
Firstly, the equation or reduction of mental phenomena to 
neurophysio logical states does not yet exist in practice, and it is far 
from clear (contrary to Wilson's apparent view of the matter) that such a 
theoretical move could be made at all. Secondly, even if such a 'new 
psychology' were to emerge from the wedding of existing psychology and 
neural science, it is not clear that ýt would necessarily replace 
altogether existing explanations of behaviour, couched in terms of the 
subject's intentions, reasons for or feelings towards doing something. 
These are arguably just as well-qualified candidates for inclusion in 
behavioural explanations as anything which may be subsequently identified 
as occurring in the subject's brain. Thirdly (as I will argue more 
expansively in the final chapter), it is not clear that one can relate 
behaviour to the physical states and events occurring within a subject's 
brain and CNS, without explaining at least some of these states and events 
by further reference to consciously perceived psychological phenomena, and 
the intentional aspect such phenomena have for the subject. In other words, 
psycho-physical reduction may not necessarily eradicate all references to 
psychological states, because of the relations of meaning such states have 
for the subject by virtue of their phenomenal properties. 
The above arguments are in obvious need of further elaboration, but 
they do begin to point out some of the ways in which the sociobiological 
project might overlook some of the theoretical problems it raises, 
concerning the relation of the natural and the social sciences. It is in 
just such areas of discussion that the sociobiological commitment to a 
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thoroughgoing mechanistic scheme of behavioural explanation - leaving no 
'nomological danglers' as it were - leads to an over-ambitious and over- 
simplified vision of the problems entailed and the likely path to their 
resolution. Having cast doubt upon the practicality (or even desirability) 
of a post-Skinnerian psychological methodology, and lacking as yet 
anything like the promised neuroscience which will replace existing 
psychology, it would appear that for the present at least, sociobiology's 
proposed objectification of existing social science methodology and 
terminology is without an alternative framework in which to express its 
observations. Until such time as a framework is found and shown to be an 
improvement over existing methods, Wilson's promised transformations would 
appear to be held back for practical and possibly more fundamental 
theoretical reasons. 
1, 
_ý 
Metaphor 
A criticism levelled at much of the sociobiological writing which is 
more stylistic than methodological is the abundant use of metaphorical 
language. This is in itself no cause for criticism, but it is an aspect of 
writing which is open to abuse, and can lead to confusion and the reader 
being misled - intentionally or otherwise. The point was highlighted by 
the philosopher Mary Midgley in a paper aimed at the work of Richard 
Dawkins. Midgley comments: 
Foremost among the snags of this sociobiologicäl 
language is the equivocal use of words like 'selfish', 
'altruistic', 'spite', and 'manipulate', a use which not 
only suggests psychological egoism to the surrounding 
peasants, but clearly at times misleads the writers 
themselves. (Midgley, 1983, p. 368). 
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Nidgley's criticism is concerned with Dawkins' practice of using certain 
words or expressions in a 'biological' sense, in order to explain more 
easily or graphically some aspect of the non-intentional, unconscious 
mechanisms of evolutionary genetics. This would be permissible, if he did 
not then go on to use the same words or expresssions in their normal 
context, without indicating that there has occurred a significant change of 
meaning between the two uses. The following quotation from Dawkins 
exemplifies the kind of invalid reasoning which may result from a careless 
or misleading use of certain words. 
Like successful Chicago gangsters, our genes have 
survived, in some cases for millions of years, in a 
highly competitive world. This entitles us to expect 
certain qualities in our genes. I shall argue that a 
predominant quality to be expected in a successful 
gene is ruthless selfishness. This gene selfishness 
will usually give rise to selfishness in Individual 
behaviour. -My own feeling is that a human society 
based simply on the gene's law of universal ruthless 
selfishness would be a very nasty society in which to 
live. Let us try to teach generosity and altruism, 
because we are born selfish. (Dawkins, 1978, pp. 2/3 - 
emphasis added). 
Na sooner are the words 'selfish' and 'selfishness' stripped of their 
normal connotations of intentional behaviour on the part of a conscious 
agent (if this can be done), than they reappear within the same quote in 
the context of their normal meaning. Dawkins seems to suggest by this 
that one can draw a direct implication from the unconsciously 'selfish' 
mechanisms of the genes, to either conscious or unconscious selfish 
behaviour by individuals. The implication made explicitly here and 
implicitly throughout the rest of Dawkins' work is that 'selfish genes = 
selfish individuals'. It is no wonder that Midgley feels impelled to 
criticise such linguistic conjuring so strongly. The obvious fallaciousness 
of the above argument is apparently realised in later passages, where 
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Dawkins argues that on occasions the best strategy for a selfish g_ne may 
well be to live inside an altruistic, cooperative individual. Even if his 
reasoning concerning the evolutionary strategies of genes is correct., one 
cannot go on to draw direct inferences about human behaviour in the way 
his language above suggests. Dawkins' use of such key words and phrases 
throughout his work builds up the impression that there exists a simple 
continuity of behavioural properties from the genes to the individual 
organism, and in the human case to society as a whole. Any apparent 
examples of altruism are therefore denied as being a priori impcssible, 
and in the light of this initial judgement reinterpreted in some way that 
permits them to be incorporated into the 'selfish behaviour' explanatory 
framework. (Just how this is done will become clearer in the sections 
dealing with Kin and Reciprocal Altruism. See below, pp. 111-126 & 151-167. ) 
The metaphorical use of certain words and expressions is therefore a 
dangerous and misleading tool, since it can give the reader the impression 
of continuity of some form or other, where there is in fact no continuity, 
or at least not of the simple form suggested by the continuity of language 
used in the description. 
A further example of confusion caused by linguistic misuse is 
Dawkins' use of the word 'deceit' in his description of some adaptations 
which occur in predator/prey relationships. Dawkins introduces a special 
use of the word by way of an anecdote which would appear to be aimed at 
just the philosophical concerns expressed by Midgley. It Is necessary to 
quote Dawkins at some length: 
The notion of an animal telling a lie is open to 
misunderstanding, so I must try to forestall this. I 
remember attending a lecture given' by Beatrice and 
Allen Gardner about their famous 'talking' chimpanzee 
Washoe.... There were some philosophers in the 
audience, and in the discussion after the lecture they 
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were such exercised by the question of whether 
Washoe could tell a lie. I suspected that the Gardners 
thought there were more interesting things to talk 
about, and I agreed with them. In this book I am 
using words like 'deceive' and 'lie' In a much Dore 
stralght. forward sense than those philosophers. They 
were interested in conscious intention to deceive. 
(ibid, p. 68 - emphasis added) 
It is interesting to note that Dawkins suggests his own use of the terms 
to -- be more 'straightforward' - thereby imputing any perversion of the 
normal meaning of the terms to 'those philosophers' busy with their 
annoying and irrelevant hecklings! I would argue, however, that it is 
Dawkins who is using terms in a non-normal sense, and that 'deceive' is 
normally understood to contain a sense of conscious intention. To confuse 
the situation further, Dawkins goes on to use the same terms to explain 
the evolution of 'deceptive' mimickry patterns in butterflies, the false 
bait of the Angler fish, and the seductive sexual displays of Bee Orchids. 
Then, with no pause or indication of changed meaning he speaks of the 
clearly conscious and intentional behaviour of human beings: 
As we shall see, we must even expect that children 
will deceive their parents, that husbands will cheat 
on wives, and that brother will lie to brother. 
(ibid, p? 0 ) 
It could be argued that Dawkins regards such cases of deceit as non- 
intentional, since the behaviours are thought to be under the influence of 
genes controlling unconscious mechanisms, but such an argument would be 
irrelevant since this view has been neither fully explained nor supported 
at this point of his work. What is masked by an ambiguous use of a single 
term to cover two different kinds of phenomena is precisely the difference 
between them which would normally demand two sets of descriptive 
vocabulary to capture their features. The butterfly 'deceives' its predators 
by the evolution of certain markings on its wings. This is a non- 
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intentional product of adaptive forces over which the butterfly has no 
control whatsoever, resulting in a capacity for misinformation by a 
process of chance mutational changes and their natural selection. In the 
case of human individuals lying and cheating, it is the intentional 
practice of misinformation brought about not by chance, but by conscious 
decisions to behave in certain ways with a view to the future consequences 
of such behaviour. The brother's decision to lie to his brother is a 
conscious choice; the butterfly's 'deceit' of its predator does not involve 
any kind of choice at all. The fact that Dawkins himself says he finds 
such distinctions 'uninteresting' may explain his apparent reluctance or 
inability to observe and reflect such distinctions in his choice of 
language. Unfortunately for Dawkins, a lack of interest in something does 
not constitute a refutation of that thing's existence, or grounds for 
ignoring the linguistic conventions upon which others rely for drawing 
distinctions. 
Apart from such specific misuses of language, there is a more general 
objection to the prevalence of metaphorical and analogical language to be 
found in sociobiological writings. If the proponents of sociobiology are 
indeed claiming to bring existing methods of behavioural explanation 
closer to the practices of the natural sciences, then they must support 
their arguments with the combination of empirical evidence and theory 
found in other scientific disciplines. This is not to say that the use of 
metaphor is outlawed, since in many cases it may help to convey complex 
notions in a more visualisable fashion. But it should not be expected to 
form a large part of the argument in support of the overall thesis. In 
reply to the charge of excessive use of metaphor, Dawkins defended his 
position: 
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the lines he quotes were not intended as metaphor at 
all. With certain qualifications, I think of these 
statements as literal truth.... Similarly "survival 
machines" and "robot vehicles" economically compress 
several important ideas .... I say again, these are not 
metaphors. An animal Is a robot vehicle, and DNA does 
work in mysterious ways. I of course use true 
metaphors as well - the very title of my book is one 
- but I hope this is in all cases either obvious or 
carefully explained in the text. (Dawkins, Fix & 
Greene, 1976, pp. 709/710> 
In the light of such explanations, I find it very difficult to apply the 
categories of 'metaphorical' and 'literal' use at all to Dawkins' language. 
One even begins to wonder if 'true metaphors' are to be distinguished in 
some way from metaphors simpliciter. I would suggest that such confusing 
use of linguistic conventions is liable to mislead the reader; for example 
by playing down the distinction normally made between intentional and 
non-intentional kinds of behaviour. This reinforces Dawkins' general thesis 
that behaviour in the human case as well owes more to the blind and 
unconscious machinations of insensible particles of DNA than to the 
conscious deliberations of individuals in society. 
A final example of altered linguistic use may be found in the 
sociobiological explanation of communication. It is defined by Wilson as: 
action on the part of one organism (or cell) that 
alters the probability pattern of behaviour in 
another organism (or cell) in an adaptive fashion. 
(Wilson, l9'75, p. 9 ) 
Dawkins' definition is similar: 
A survival machine may be said to have communicated 
with another when it influences its behaviour or the 
state of its nervous system .... A great number of 
survival machines promote their genes' welfare 
indirectly by influencing the behaviour of other 
survival machines. (Dawkins, 1978, p. 67) 
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The picture once again is of an aspect of social behaviour which is seen 
wholly in terms of the selfishly advantageous manipulation of others via 
some aspect of interaction. Wilson goes on to say that his definition 
"conforms both well to our intuitive understanding of communication and to 
the procedure by which the process is mathematically analyzed. " 
(Vilson, 1975, p. 9). Though I may agree with the latter half of his 
statement, I must disagree with the former. Both authors define and 
explain communication solely in terms of the advantage it confers on 
individual genes, and since this is the special dogma of sociobiology 
rather than an everyday appreciation of social intercourse, I consider it 
wrong to suggest that it forms a part of the lay person's 'intuitive 
understanding of communication'. 
Communication, according to the sociobiologists, is a form of gene- 
directed behaviour geared to increasing the individual's capacity to obtain 
an optimum share of available resources via the advantageous manipulation 
of others. (This applies equally to communication amongst conspecifics as 
part of their range of social behaviour, as it does to members of 
different species engaged in competition for resources, or in predator/prey 
relationships such as the example of Angler fish above. ) The same general 
definition and functional analysis of communication is supposed to hold 
for human society as well. For example, the relative prevalence of honesty 
and deceit displayed by individuals or society as a whole would not be 
regarded by sociobiologists as a reflection of social factors of morality 
and other forms of social conditioning upon individuals. Rather, such 
social factors would in turn be explained by reference to the need for 
individuals to compete within a predominantly selfish environment, thus 
relating all communication ultimately to the model of individuals as 
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necessarily involved in selfish competitive struggle with each other. This 
is clearly stated in Wilson's analysis of what he takes to be the general 
and necessary componeDts of human social communication: 
Deception and hypocrisy are neither absolute evils 
that virtuous men suppress to a minimum level nor 
residual animal traits waiting to be erased by 
further social evolution. They are very human devices 
for conducting the complex daily business of social 
life. The level in each particular society may 
represent a compromise that reflects the size and 
complexity of the society. If the level is too low, 
others will seize the advantage and win. If it is too 
high, ostracism will result. Complete honesty on all 
sides is not the answer. (lbid, p. 552) 
Once again, a key feature of human behaviour - in this case communication 
- is virtually redefined in its portrayal, by its link to the underlying 
dogma of sociobiology that all aspects of social behaviour are ultimately 
geared to the selfish advantage of the genes (and possibly that of the 
individual protagonist as well). From a consideration of the high premium 
paid to successful manipulation of others by skillful communication, 
aspects of the high-level structures regulating human social behaviour are 
explained in terms of the adaptive advantages supposedly operating at the 
level of selfish genes, with the result that the image of behaviour as 
'selfish' permeates all levels and aspects of behaviour, from the gene to 
the individual and the social group as a whole. 
To summarise, there is a tendency in sociobiological writing to 
emphasise certain supposed features of behaviour by the use of 
metaphorical and other persuasive linguistic devices. Though this may in 
some cases be excused by the need to introduce the reader to novel 
concepts and images, it is a practice open to abuse, with the result that 
important distinctions normally made became overlooked, and aspects of 
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behaviour imputed to one level of description become invalidly generalised, 
colouring one's appreciation of some other level of description, Such 
misleading factors have done much to arouse anger on the part of 
sociobiology's critics, and to detract from whatever truth there might be 
in the sociobiological project. 
ý5 Cross-Species and Cross-Cultures 
Much of the empirical evidence offered in support of the 
sociobiological thesis comes from the relative comparison of the behaviour 
of different species. In the case of humans, this cross-species data is 
augmented by cross-cultural comparisons, to assess which aspects of human 
social behaviour show evidence of being universal to the species. For 
example, species might be compared in respect of their communication 
capacities, to see which sensory channels (chemical, visual, auditory, 
tactile) are being utilised and in what ways. The point of such 
comparisons is both to shed light on the particular behaviour under 
examination, and to see if the observed behaviours can be correlated with 
other aspects of the organisms in order to construct a phylogenetic tree 
of the given behaviour's ancestry. The logic of such 'phylogenetic 
analysis' in the case of our own species is given by Wilson: 
By comparing an with other primate species, it might 
be possible to identify basic primate traits that lie 
beneath the surface and help to determine the 
configuration of man's higher social behaviour. 
(Wilson, 1975, p. 55 1) 
The behaviours which Wilson believes to be homologous between our own and 
other species of primate are: 
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aggressive dominance systems, with males generally 
dominant over females; scaling in the intensity of 
responses, especially during aggressive interactions; 
intensive and prolonged maternal care, with a 
pronounced degree of socialization in the young; and 
matrilineal social organization. (ibid, p. 551) 
Despite the frequent occurrence in sociobiological literature of such 
behavioural comparisons, Wilson goes on to admit that the method of 
cross-species comparison is far from foolproof: 
The possibility remains that some labile traits are 
homologous between man and, say, chimpanzee. And, 
conversely, some traits conservative throughout the 
rest of the primates might nevertheless have changed 
during the origin of man.... Finally, it is worth 
special note that the comparative ethological 
approach does not in any way predict man's unique 
traits. (ibid, p. 551) 
In the light of such an admission, one might think that the method of 
cross-species comparisons has little in its favour - at least as far as 
gaining insight as to our own species' behavioural origins is concerned. 
As mentioned above, however, it is one of the key elements of 
sociobiological methodology. For example, in his work Qr Aggression Konrad 
Lorenz offers an analysis of human aggressive behaviour which predates but 
serves as a theoretical precursor to sociobiology's own pronouncements on 
the same subject. 
human social behaviour, far from being determined by 
reason and cultural tradition alone, is still subject 
to all the laws prevailing in all phylogenetically 
adapted instinctive behaviour. Of these laws we 
possess a fair amount of knowledge from studying the 
instincts of animals. (Lorenz, 1966, p. 204) 
The method does raise some problems, however. Whereas a limb or an organ 
such as an eye recognisably perform the same general function in many 
species, and can be traced back across species through a history of 
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phylogenetic development, it is not prima facie obvious that the same can 
be done in the case of behavioural traits. Though it may make sense to 
identify and analyse -the function of some morphological feature of an 
organism in abstraction from other features, it does not seem to be so 
simple in the case of behaviour. Is the 'aggressive territoriality' 
displayed in Lorenz's fighting fish experiments really comparable with 
aggressive behaviours in other species, such as birds, apes and even 
humans, in the same way that all of these species can be said to possess 
some form of morphologically and functionally comparable form of visual 
sensory organ? Lorenz and others clearly think that such comparisons, at 
least in the case of some species, are both fair and revealing of the 
historical origins and the functional purpose of behavioural traits. This 
is underlined when he states that an extraterrestrial observer would 
conclude that: 
man's social organization is very similar to that of 
rats which, like humans, are social and peaceful 
beings within their clans, but veritable devils 
towards all fellow-members of their species not 
belonging to their own community. (ibid, p. 204) 
Wilson is a little more cautious, but equally supportive of the method of 
cross-species comparisons, stating that "The correct approach using 
comparative ethology is to base a rigorous phylogeny of closely related 
species on many biological traits. " (Wilson, 1975, p. 551). Despite this note 
of caution, sociobiological literature in general continues to be replete 
with cross-species comparisons of humans with every aspect of primate and 
non-primate species' behaviour. The overall aim is to convince the reader 
that much of what we take for distinctively 'human' behaviour, ascribable 
to elements of our rationality and unique social nature, is in fact a 
phylogenetic inheritance of evolutionarily tried and tested behavioural 
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strategies, held in common with many other species. Such a view must be 
open to question, however, since it can also be argued (as the quote from 
Wilson himself above suggests) that any particular behaviour is the 
function of both the unique physiological attributes of the species in 
question, and the environmental features obtaining at the time. If 
behaviour is the product of a complex nexus of forces operating on 
individuals who in some cases - because of their capacity for learning - 
are unique and distinct from one another in their responsive capacities, 
then the question of meaningful ethological comparison becomes far more 
debatäble than that of comparative morphology. In the case of human 
behaviour one has to add to the level of 'instinctive drives' which we 
supposedly share with many other species the effects of self-conscious 
thought, linguistic and other symbolic forms of conceptual reasoning, and 
the influence through imitation and conditioning of specific social and 
general environmental factors impinging on the individual. Of course, 
insistence on such factors and their irreducibility to 'drives' or 
'biological functions' is precisely the paint of difference between the 
social scientists and the sociobiologists. However, I feel that the onus is 
on the sociobiologists to prove that such factors are either irrelevant to 
assessment of human behaviour, or else are reducible in the way suggested 
to 'biological' factors, and thus explicable within a framework which makes 
no reference to the categories and models of traditional social science 
explanation. 
The method of cross-species analysis of behaviour is only one of the 
techniques proposed by sociobiologists as a means to assessing the likely 
heritable component of some behavioural trait. The other main avenue is 
that of comparative anthropology: the comparison of individual and 
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collective behavioural traits across different geographical and historical 
human cultural groups. Of particular interest to sociobiologists is 
evidence of the lifestyle of our distant ancestors. The argument is that 
any similarities which can be identified between our own cultures and 
those of our Pleistocene forefathers - since they persist in spite of 
environmental, technological and every kind of cultural difference - are 
strong candidates for behaviours which are under a high degree of genetic 
control (i. e. 'closed' as opposed to 'open' behavioural patterns). That is, 
they are passed on through genetic inheritance mechanisms, and remain 
relatively unaffected by factors of environmental conditions and the 
effects on individual development of learning. Underlying this method, 
however, is a further assumption from evolutionary theory, which is that 
human culture is a relative newcomer on the evolutionary scene, and that 
we owe most of our behavioural patterns to the time preceeding culture, 
when behaviours were being selected for through natural selection of 
genes. 
We can be fairly certain that most of the genetic 
evolution of human social behaviour occurred over the 
five million years prior to civilization, when the 
species consisted of sparse, relatively immobile 
populations of hunter-gatherers. On the other hand, 
by far the greater part of cultural evolution has 
occurred since the origin of agriculture and cities 
approximately 10,000 years ago. Although genetic 
evolution of some kind continued during this latter, 
historical sprint, lt cannot have fashioned more than 
a tiny fraction of the traits of human nature. 
(Wilson, 1978, p. 35 - emphasis added) 
From the above quote I believe that the underlying assumption already 
pointed out becomes clear. What the sociobiologist does is to begin the 
whole project by assuming that most of 'human nature' is in fact fixed by 
genetic inheritance, and then go on to deduce that this process of fixing 
by natural selection must necessarily have occurred during the era of our 
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species' history prior to the rise of civilisation, which is a relatively 
recent event. It may well be true that 'most of the genetic evolution' of 
the species occurred prior to the rise of civilisation. What does not 
necessarily follow from this is that the social nature of humans was fixed 
during this period, or is fixed in such a way at any period. What the 
sociobiological viewpoint leaves out of the picture is the alternative and, 
in the absence of further argument or evidence, equally viable viewpoint 
that sees human social behaviour as something far more flexible, and 
dependent not on genetic factors of inheritance, but rather on social 
learning and conditioning processes inexplicable except by reference to 
prevalent social factors. 
It is this underlying assumption of the sociobiological project which 
explains the amount of effort expended on examining and discussing the 
social life of extant hunter-gatherer societies. Unable to infer anything 
more than a very rudimentary and fragmentary picture of the lives of our 
ancient ancestors from archaeological evidence, the prime focus for debate 
has become the few remaining hunter-gatherer groups, whose lifestyle has 
remained as yet untouched by contemporary influences of social and 
technological life. As Wilson says: 
The best procedure to follow .... is to extrapolate 
backward from living hunter-gatherer societies. 
(Wilson, 1975, p. 565 ) 
Such societies stand at a pivotal point for ethological researchers: they 
share the same place as Western technological society on the scale of 
biological evolution, and yet they represent a form of cultural 
organisation which marks the starting point of the cultural history of 
modern technological society -a point from which such societies departed 
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some 10,000 years ago. Any cultural traits which the two forms of society 
are found to share in common are therefore taken to serve some useful and 
essential function in human society, regardless of specific environmental 
factors. They are taken to be 'human cultural universals'. Once again, 
however, this fact is taken as proof of something further, when assessed 
from the sociobiological standpoint. It is seen as providing evidence for 
the existence of genetically heritable biopsychological drives towards 
certain kinds of social behaviour. This is in my view another example of a 
false deduction from the existing evidence. 
It may be true that there are discernable factors of social 
organisation which are universal or nearly so in our species, but the 
reason for this does not necessarily have to be a 'biological' one in the 
sense intended by sociobiologists. It may be-that the culturally universal 
traits constitute the best, easiest, most economical, manageable or obvious 
solution to a given organisational problem, and are therefore arrived at 
over a period of time by all societies who face such a problem. Some 
aspects of life such as gathering of resources; protection from hostile 
forces and environmental dangers; distribution of goods and tasks; care of 
the young and helpless; discipline and allegiance to the group as a whole, 
etc. are factors intrinsic to every social group, and demand resolution. It 
is hardly surprising, in my opinion, that similar groups find similar 
forms of coping with such problems, and that dissimilar groups still have 
solutions which are recognisably based on the same principles. Such basic 
problems, in the absence of a very generous environment and a wholly 
heterogeneous range of individual skills and capacities (by which I mean 
to the extent of being based upon a heterogeneous range of morphological 
features) are bound to exert forces and create demands which only admit of 
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a fairly restricted range of solutions in the form of group behavioural 
organistion. 
What does not follow - as sociobiology insists - is that similar 
social organisation necessarily constitutes evidence for the operation in 
individuals of 'biological' mechanisms (i. e. genetically heritable) affecting 
rational decisions and ultimate social behaviouraý organisation. To give an 
absurd example, you don't have to be 'genetically wired for bridge-building 
behaviour' in order to adopt bridge-building as a solution to the problem 
posed by impassable ravines in one's path. What such behaviour does imply 
is the perhaps less interesting fact that humans are 'genetically wired 
for' the capacity to conceptualise and construct bridges as one possible 
solution to the problem posed by otherwise impassable ravines, The 
existence of cultural universals is a pointer to the range of human 
capacities, ultimately in some way' limited by our biological heritage and 
species-specific abilities: but the mere universality of a trait is only 
evidence of a capacity - not a biological cause in the socicbiological 
sense. (The invalid nature of this aspect of sociobiological reasoning will 
be shown in more detail in the sections of this thesis dealing with 
Dawkins' and Wilsons' later attempts to combine early sociobiological 
theory with factors of existing social theory, to produce a more balanced 
'coevolutionary theory'. See below, pp. 194-217 & 218-248. ) 
It is interesting to note that Wilson seems unsure as to his view on 
how much post-cultural society has affected or can affect the so-called 
'heritage' of genetically heritable tendencies evolved during the 
Pleistocene era of human development. Having stressed the importance of 
the five million years of our species' biological development as being the 
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dominant factor in present-day behavioural capacities, he states in 
another of his works: 
There is no reason to believe that during this final 
sprint [of 10,000 years of culture] there has been a 
cessation in the evolution of either mental capacity 
or the predilection toward special social behaviours. 
(Wilson, 1975, p. 567) 
His proposal following this quote that "substantial changes can occur in 
the span of less than 100 generations" and that it would therefore "be 
false to assume that modern civilizations have been built entirely on 
capital accumulated during the long haul of the Pleistocene" (ibid, p. 567) 
would appear to be in opposition to the argument put forward in the 
initial quote from 1978. Equivocation on such a central issue in the 
sociobiological thesis is evidence of doubts as to the precise relation of 
biological to cultural change. It is this problem (already alluded to 
above) which resulted in the later attempts to adopt a biocultural 
coevolutionary model of behavioural adaptation, to be examined later. The 
underlying assumption still appears to be that all cultural change or 
stasis must be explained in terms of underlying factors of genetic change 
or stasis. In contrast to this, I would argue that evidence of convergent 
social organisation between distinct cultural groups may point to the 
operation upon human behavioural capacities of similar processes of 
cultural evolution. This may operate in such a way as tc produce results 
suggestive of convergence due to underlying genetic similarity and 
resultant effects on behaviour. However, in the absence of independent 
evidence to support the genetic explanation, the opposing explanations 
remain equal contenders. To claim - as sociobiology does - that cultural 
similarity is in fact evidence for genetically heritable behavioural 
predispositions is to be guilty of an invalid form of inference, and once 
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again points to a flaw within the basic methodological approach to human 
behavioural studies. 
1, 
_6 
Units j Selection 
" As mentioned in my brief survey of the historical roots of 
sociobiology, one of the main areas of discussion within evolutionary 
biology has been the details of the process of natural selection (see 
above, pp. 9/10). At the centre of this debate has been the question of what 
exactly is being selected - i. e. what is 'the unit of selection' which is 
the object or target of the process of evolution by natural selection. 
The traditional Darwinian view was that the process of evolution by 
natural selection operated upon individuals within breeding populations, 
Those individuals that displayed the most 'suitable' characteristics as 
regards the struggle for survival within their natural habitat would 
(ceteris paribus) survive and reproduce in greater numbers. Those less 
suitably endowed by nature would tend over time to decrease as a 
percentage of the total population. (It was to capture this 'sorting' or 
'selective' aspect of the process of evolution that Darwin borrowed the now 
notorious phrase "the survival of the fittest" from his contemporary 
Spencer, who had coined it to describe a law of economic development. ) 
Provided the traits which made certain individuals more suited or 'fit' in 
respect of their environment were genetically heritable, the process of 
natural selection coupled with reproduction over many generations within a 
relatively stable environment would result in evolutionary adaptation of 
the species to its habitat. 
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As I pointed out, this account appeared to be inadequate in respect 
of certain forms of behaviour commonly labelled 'altruistic' observed in 
many species. A slightly altered theory of the selective process was 
therefore suggested to explain the evolution of altruistic behaviour. This 
was the theory of 'group selection', based upon an insight by Darwin 
himself concerning the group behaviour of humans, and further debated and 
developed at the beginning of this century by evolutionary theorists. The 
position found its most forceful and complete expression in a book 
entitled Animal Dispersion ja Relation t. Social Behaviour written by VC 
Wynne-Edwards (Wynne-Edwards, 1962). In this book it was argued that some 
behaviours are selected not because they enhance the fitness of any 
individual, but rather because they enhance the fitness of the group of 
organisms as a whole, though detrimental to particular individuals. Wynne- 
Edwards argued that such behaviours as flocking in birds was a- means 
(albeit unconscious) of carrying out a form of population census, as a 
result of which future population size would be controlled via hormonal 
control of clutch size. Thus it was argued that individuals would forego 
higher rates of reproduction so as to relieve the overall strain which the 
group placed on available resources, thus benefitting the group as a whole. 
Other examples of 'altruism' were the warning cries emitted by some 
species of birds in response to predators which gave the rest of the flock 
a greater chance of fleeing, even though it increased the chances of the 
crying individual being caught by revealing its location to the predator. 
The explanation was that a flock of birds with some 'altruists' or a 
shared degree of 'altruistic' behaviour in all members would as a group 
have a greater fitness potential than a flock consisting entirely of 
'selfish' individuals. Thus selection could operate at the level of the 
group, where certain forms of behaviour - though unfit for certain 
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individuals - were advantageous for the group as a whole, relative to 
non-altruistic groups. 
These assumptions of the group selectionist view were attacked by 
critics who saw it as theoretically unorthodox in its detraction from the 
individual as the focus of the evolutionary process. One of the main 
critics of group selection theory was GC Williams (Williams, 1966), who 
questioned both the observations and reasoning of Wynne-Edwards' work. 
Williams argued, for example, that rather than increasing the individual 
risk of predation, the alarm cries emitted by individuals might in fact 
confuse the predator, or cause panic in the flock drawing attention away 
from the individual and thus actually enhancing their fitness potential. In 
a little over a hundred pages Williams argues that the apparent cases of 
group-directed altruistic behaviour are easily explained as "occasional 
malfunctions, examples of kin and therefore genic selection, misplaced 
parental behaviour, incidental statistical consequences of individual 
activities, spurious or inconclusive" (Cf. Williams, 1966 chapts. 5-8, from 
which the above quotes are chapter headings). The most important feature 
of Williams' counter to the theory of group selection was that the true 
unit of selection was neither the individual nor the group, but the gene. 
Drawing on the arguments of theorists such as JB Haldane and especially 
the recently published work of WD Hamilton (Cf. Hamilton, 1964), Williams 
argued that social aspects of group behaviour could be explained by 
reference to 'kin altruism' brought about by the process of 'kin selection'. 
The forms of behaviour described by group selectionists as being for the 
good of the group as a whole could be redescribed as enhancing the fitness 
potential of the individual, once it is seen that it is in the individual's 
interest not just to promote their own welfare but also that of their 
-48- 
genetic relatives. The idea of 'individual fitness' as the potential of the 
individual to survive and reproduce, thus passing an to future generations 
some percentage of their genetic endowment, is replaced by that of 
'inclusive fitness'. Under this new theory, an individual may increase their 
own fitness potential by behaving in such a way as to benefit a relative - 
even at some personal cost - since by helping a relative they help someone 
who has at least some genes identical to their own. The shift of focus 
from individuals to their genes therefore alters the evaluation of what is 
or isn't a potentially advantageous trait, just as the group selectionist 
theory did before. 
The new theory of kin selection was thus seen to be an extension of 
the original Darwinian perspective, since it still saw the individual's 
behaviour as being geared towards some kind of 'self-propagation' - even 
if this was actually achieved via the promotion of relatives' welfare. 
Appeals to group selection theory were regarded as positing a new form of 
evolutionary selective mechanism altogether, and dismissed on grounds of 
parsimony as unnecessarily complicated explanations of the observed 
phenomena. The mathematical games-theory models of theorists such as 
Maynard-Smith (Cf. 1(aynard-Smith, 1974 & 1983) consolidated the theoretical 
advantage of the genic selectionist perspective, and appeared to show that 
group selection would require such extreme and unlikely environmental 
conditions for its occurrence that it probably never occurred at all in 
nature. (For a further discussion of this debate within biological science, 
see J Cassidy, 1978. ) 
Despite the acceptance of the genic selectionist perspective, there 
continued to appear attempts to resolve the question of whether group 
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selection ever occurs at all, or could have played a significant part in 
the history of biological evolution. More recently the debate has reemerged 
due to an increase in speculation on both sides: a debate in which the 
emergence of sociobiological theorising has played a substantial part. The 
initial rejection of the group selectionist perspective has been reassessed 
by Michael Wade (Wade, 1978), who argues that many of the theoretical 
models used against the -group--selection theory were inherently biased, and 
that the unlikely environmental parameters which they suggested were 
necessary for group selection to occur were inaccurately calculated. 
these theoretical conclusions and the assumptions 
from which they have been derived can be reevaluated 
in the light of recent empirical studies of group 
selection with laboratory populations of the flour 
beetle, Tribolium.... It will be shown that, in addition 
to the many assumptions which are unique to any 
specific model, the models in general have a number 
of assumptions in common which are inherently 
unfavourable to the operation of group selection. 
Alternative assumptions derived from the empirical 
studies are suggested. (Wade, 1978, p. 102) 
In addition to Wade's empirical evidence from the flour beetle, there 
are two more examples of supposed group selection commonly cited in the 
relevant literature. These are the selection of the segregator distorter t- 
allele in the house mouse (Xus musculus) and the changing characteristics 
of the Myxoma virus which infects the Australian rabbit (Oryctolagus 
cuniculus). Both of these are cited in an important paper on the unit of 
selection debate by RC Lewontin (Lewontin, 1970). 
The arguments are complex, but may be summarised as follows. The t- 
allele has a distorting effect on the process of meiotic division, such 
that it is represented in a higher perecentage of the male's sperm than 
normally expected (at around 80-95% as opposed to the normal probability 
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of around 50%> . However, males that are homozygous for the t-allele are 
sterile -a factor which obviously places limits on the spread of the 
allele throughout the population. The mice's sexual behavicur is such that 
they live in small, isolated breeding groups of several females dominated 
by one or two males. There is therefore a high probability that some 
groups will consist of females and only sterile males, and the group's 
overall fitness potential will therefore be equal to zero, since fitness is 
a measure of reproductive potential. The fitness value of the females in 
such groups is therefore also zero, being a factor not of individual 
fitness related to respective genotypes, but a factor of belonging to a 
certain group and its overall properties. 
The second example is that of the Myxoma virus. This virus infects 
the body of the host rabbit, finally causing death. It is spread from one 
rabbit to another by mosquitoes. However, the mosquitoes will only bite 
live rabbits: once the virus has killed its host it has therefore 
effectively destroyed the means by which it may be further propagated. It 
was observed that the virus had over time evolved to a less virulent form. 
Since virulence equals the rate of viral reproduction, and this measurement 
is also that by which the organism's 'fitness' is evaluated, evolution 
towards avirulence appeared to run contrary to the logic of competitive 
evolution. Less virulent strains of the virus should by definition be less 
'fit' than their more virulent counterparts and therefore be progressively 
eliminated over time -a prediction opposite to the observed phenomena. 
The explanation offered was once again in terms of group selection, 
summarized in a review of Lewontin and others' arguments by Elliott Sober: 
According to this story, viral strains of lower 
virulence are altruists in the crucial sense described 
above. They are less reproductively successful within 
each group. But since a group has a better chance of 
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colonizing and of avoiding extinction if its average 
virulence is low, relatively avirulent strains may be 
overall more fit than strains of higher virulence. 
(Sober, 1984a, p. 332) 
Once again, it would appear that properties of the group overrule 
properties of individual organisms, resulting in selection for the group 
which runs counter to the normal process of maximisation of individual 
fitness potential, The examples are not without problems, since there is 
discussion by various commentators as to the correct definitions of what 
constitutes a 'group' or a 'deme' and even - as Sober points out - how one 
defines 'altruist' (for example, see Sober, 1984, p. 330) . The same examples 
are also discussed in a recent work by the eminent biologist Ernst Kayr 
(Mayr, 1988). Mayr sides with an interpretation of the Myxoma example, in 
which it was argued that it was in fact a case of individual rather than 
group selection (Cf. Futuyma, 1979). His argument is that selection is not 
acting upon the overall properties of the collective virus strains present 
within any single infected rabbit, but only on the most virulent strain. 
This is the one which is the deciding factor as to the length of time 
until the host's death, and therefore also of the probability of the virus 
being spread via the mosquito to another host. Selection is therefore 
taking place between infected rabbits, according to the relative virulence 
of one strain in each case. It is not taking place within rabbits, between 
the various strains present. The evolution of avirulence is therefore 
disadvantageous only if considered at the 'local' level of competing 
strains within a host, but clearly advantageous if considered in the 
context of competition between particular viral strains at the level of the 
whole viral population, coupled to the particular details of the means of 
further infection of hosts and propagation. Mayr thus criticises Lewontin 
and Sober for characterising avirulence as conferring 11 'a complete lack of 
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selective advantage' " on the organism, since it is in this case clearly 
the opposite (Xayr, 1988, p, 121 - quoting Lewontin, 1970). Mayr concludes his 
discussion of the units of selection debate by citing what appears to me 
to be a far more plausible example of group selection - namely that of 
cultural group selection within human populations. It seems to me that 
human populations often undergo quantitative and resultant qualitative 
change as a result of competition between culturally defined. groups, whose 
membership and group characteristics have little or nothing to do with 
individual genetic constitution and resultant behavioural properties. An 
obvious example would be the outbreak of warring on any level between 
cultural groups, which often results in an overall change in population 
structures, though there would appear to be no direct or necessary 
connection between individual genetic constitution and relative fitness 
potential. Mayr thus concludes that "Such cultural groups are found only in 
man and supply, in my view, the only well-established cases of group 
selection. " (ibid, p. 122) . 
It would seem that much of the debate still depends on further 
empirical observation of actual species in nature, but that there are also 
problems of conceptual and definitional origin to be solved. I cannot see 
any purely conceptual objection to the possibility of group selection 
occurring, so the question would appear to be rather that of how one 
defines it, and under what kinds of circumstances it would be more or less 
likely to occur. Having said this, there are in my opinion conceptual 
reasons for thinking that evolution via selection of entities larger than 
the individual organism has not played a very substantial role in the 
natural history of life on this planet - contrary to the claim made by 
Wynne-Edwards in his original characterisation of the group selection 
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theory. The reason for this is given by Lewontin in his summary of the 
unit of selection debate, quoted at length below: 
consequences from the point of view of comparison 
between levels of selection. First, the rapidity of 
response to selection depends upon the heritability 
of differences in fitness between units. The 
heritability is highest in units where no internal 
adjustment or reassortment is possible since such 
units will pass on to their descendent units an 
unchanged set of information. Thus, cell organelles, 
haploid organisms, and gametes are levels of 
selection with a higher heritability than diploid 
sexual genotypes, since the latter do not perfectly 
reproduce themselves, but undergo segregation and 
recombination in the course of their reproduction. In 
the same way, individuals have a greater heritability 
than populations and assemblages of species. 
(Lewontin, 1970, p. 8, emphasis added) 
In general one could say that the most controversial aspect of the 
whole unit of selection debate has been the theoretical changes of 
perspective suggested by the genic selectionist views of Hamilton and 
Williams. This has formed the basis for the more recent work of Richard 
Dawkins, and in particular has led to the swarm of controversy surrounding 
Dawkins' 'selfish gene' interpretation of human and other examples of 
social behaviour. Dawkins' theoretical justification for claiming that it is 
the gene rather than the individual which is the unit of selection is 
threefold. Dawkins argues that for something to be the object of the 
selection process it must have a certain kind of 'stability'. This quality 
of stability is further defined in terms of three essential properties: 
longevity, fecundity and fidelity. (Cf. Dawkins, 19? 8, pp. 18/19. ) 
The first property is essential since a replicating entity that 
doesn't last long enough in some fixed form will become outnumbered by 
others-that do, and will not have as long to reproduce itself. The second 
property is essential, since if it does not reproduce itself at least as 
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fast as its competitors, it will become outnumbered and represent a 
decreasing percentage of the overall population in the competition for 
survival. The third property is essential since if it reproduces inaccurate 
copies of itself, it will very quickly become something else in future 
generations. (This is essentially the same point made by Lewontin in his 
summary concerning the relative 'heritability' of different entities in 
evolution. See the emphasised passage of the last quote. ) Dawkins thus 
sees these three properties as essential for anything that is going to be 
successfully selected for in the process of evolution. They are deduced 
from the logic and dynamics of the process of competition and selection, 
rather than being based on any particular empirical observations or 
reasoning. They are then used as defining characteristics, and applied to 
the realm of natural objects to see which kinds of things possess them, 
and are therefore likely candidates to be units of selection. 
Dawkins' conclusion is that the only things which do in fact qualify 
as units of selection are determinable sections of DNA - the genes. 
(Strictly speaking it should be said that the above view leads to the 
conclusion that competing alleles are the units of selection, but I will 
follow Dawkins in referring to 'genes' rather than 'alleles' in this case. ) 
Any entity larger and more complex than the gene fails to possess the 
requisite triad of properties. Using the same line of argument as Lewontin 
above, Dawkins argues that the effects of segregation and recombination in 
sexual reproduction disqualifies the individual as a potential unit of 
selection, since it does not last long enough or reproduce sufficiently 
accurate copies of itself. Needless to say, any entities larger than the 
individual are disqualified for the same reasons. 
In sexually reproducing species, the individual is too 
large and too temporary a genetic unit to qualify as 
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a significant unit of natural selection. The group of 
individuals is an even larger u---. lt .... They are not 
stable enough through evolutionary time .... Each 
individual is unique. You cannot get evolution by 
selecting between entities when there is only one 
copy of each entity! Sexual reproduction is not 
replication .... Individuals are not stable things, they 
are fleeting.... When we have served our purpose we are 
cast aside. But genes are denizens of geological time: 
genes are forever. (Dawkins, 1978, pp. 36/37) 
Without the existence of such long-lasting, self-replicating entities 
anything more than localised, temporary evolutionary change would not be 
possible, since the process of selection would have no focus on which to 
bear consistently over time. Since it is the genes which are the apparent 
focus of selection, all living organisms become in Dawkins' view mere 
'vehicles' through which the genes develop further methods for competing 
with one another. It is this theoretical point which unites Dawkins, Wilson 
and all those writers. who insist that social behaviour can be described 
and explained through a thorough grasp and application of biological 
principles. 
But the individual organism is only their [the genes') 
vehicle, part of an elaborate device to preserve and 
spread them with the least possible biochemical 
perturbation. (Wilson, I9'5, p. 3) 
Replicators began not merely to exist, but to 
construct for themselves containers, vehicles for 
their continued existence. The replicators which 
survived were the ones which built survival machines 
for themselves to live in. (Dawkins, 1978, p. 21) 
It can thus be seen that in essence, the whole sociobiological perspective 
on animal behaviour is reached by means of two major theoretical stages. 
The first - already mentioned as 'the central dogma' - is that all 
behaviour is the product of evolution by natural selection. The second is 
in the definition of the process of evolution by natural selection. Though 
leaving it an open question as to whether selection ever in fact occurs 
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at levels taxonomically higher than that of the gene, the sociobiologists 
all maintain an explanatory perspective which views the gene as the 
fundamental focus of the selection process. Everything else becomes a 
'vehicle' or 'extension' of the intergenetic struggle for resources and 
competitive reproduction, and must be described in suitable terms. This 
applies equally to all forms and complexities of behaviour - from the 
apparent 'altruism' of drone bees to familial strife and global political 
strategies in our own species. At this point I would therefore like to look 
at this other side of the unit of selection debate, and finally to relate 
the consequences of such a view to the overall project of sociobiological 
theorising. 
The debate between the genic and the individual selectionists has 
been examined recently in a paper by Sandra Mitchell, in which she 
attempts to resolve the dispute between the two parties (Mitchell, 1987). 
Mitchell argues that the whole question of identifying the unit of 
selection is ill-formed. The causal process of evolution by natural 
selection consists of two stages. Firstly, there is the process of 
'interaction' between entities which are competing with one another in a 
given environmental context. As a result of differing individual properties 
or traits possessed by these entities, they will be more or less 
successful at surviving this competition and reaching the stage of 
reproduction. This is the second stage of the process, since for evolution 
to occur there must be differential reproductive success resulting in the 
replication of entities which will in turn determine to some extent the 
characteristics of the future generation. When viewed in this way, one can 
distinguish two kinds of entity within the overall process. The first is 
the entity involved in the struggle for survival to reproduction - the 
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'interactor' or 'vehicle' in sociobiological terminology. The second is the 
entity which is copied and thus survives in replicated form into future 
generations - the 'replicator'. Mitchell summarises her own account of the 
process of evolution, showing. its relevance to the controversy: 
Given the necessity of both transmission and 
interaction for a process to qualify as evolution by 
natural selection, an ambiguity arises concerning the 
unit of selection. Is the unit of selection the entity 
involved in transmission or the entity involved in 
interaction? (Mitchell, 1987, p. 358 ) 
Mitchell, DL Hull and other commentators on this topic consider that the 
above characterisation of the process as involving two stages shows how 
the whole question of the unit of selection is therefore ill-formed in the 
first place, since it fails to make sufficiently fine distinctions in its 
search for a single entity. 
the phrase 'unit of selection' is inherently 
ambiguous. Sometimes it means those entities which 
differentially replicate themselves, -sometimes those 
which interact with their environments in ways which 
are responsible for this replication being 
differential. (Hull, 1981, p. 26: cited in Mitchell) 
The surprising thing is that bath Dawkins and many of the defenders of 
the individual selectionist thesis recognise the two stages involved in the 
evolutionary process, and yet they continue to dispute which is the unit of 
selection after having admitted the ambiguity of the very expression. 
Mitchell goes on to examine Dawkins' insistence that the gene is the 
only viable candidate for the unit of selection. Longevity is discounted by 
Mitchell as a distinctive criterion, since genes themselves do not actually 
survive. In fact, they normally fare a lot worse in this respect than 
individual organisms. 'What does survive is 'copies' of the genes. Mitchell 
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therefore invokes the type/token distinction against Dawkins, concluding 
that just as individual organisms are subject to mortality, so are 
individual genes. Longevity cannot therefore be used aa defining criterion ' 
to distinguish replicators and vehicles in the way Dawkins requires. 
Though I agree entirely with Mitchell's point here, I feel bound to 
defend Dawkins to some extent. In the passage immediately following my 
own quotation from Dawkins (see above, pp. 54/55) he goes on to admit 
precisely the point about replication resulting in 'copies' which Mitchell 
accuses him of missing. All that is in fact missing in Dawkins' own 
account is the use of the philosophical vocabulary of type/token 
distinctions. 
Genes, like diamonds, are forever, but not quite in 
the same way as diamonds. It is an individual diamond 
crystal which lasts, as an unaltered pattern of 
atoms. DNA molecules don't have that kind of ° 
permanence.... But a DNA molecule could theoretically 
live in the form of copies of itself for a hundred 
million years.... What I am doing is emphasizing the 
potential near-immortality of a gene, in the form of 
copies, as its defining property. (Dawkins, 1978, p. 37) 
It would appear from this that Dawkins is not in fact resting his case 
for 
the gene on the literal survival of individual bits of DNA. 
Since Dawkins 
recognises that longevity simpliciter cannot be invoked to 
distinguish 
genes from individuals, I would suggest that it is longevity 
in the sense 
of successfully producing future generations of copies which 
is important. 
The question therefore becomes that of what constitutes reproduction of a 
'copy', which would seem to bring the focus of the argument 
to another of 
Dawkins' triad of criteria for the unit of selection - that of fidelity. 
Dawkins argues that in sexually-reproducing species at 
least, the degree 
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of fidelity in reproduction of entities larger than the gene is too low for 
it to be the focus of consistent forces of selection: 
Your children are only half you, your grandchildren 
only a quarter you. In a few generations the most you 
can hope for is a large number of descendants, each 
of whom bears only a tiny portion of you -a few 
genes - even if a few do bear your surname as well. 
(Dawkins, 1978, p. 37 ) 
This geometrically progressive 'watering-down' of one's total hereditary 
traits through future generations again leads Dawkins to insist that the 
gene is the only viable candidate for the unit of selection. Only the gene 
is reproduced with sufficient fidelity in future generations for it to be 
the focus of selection and make evolution and adaptation to the 
environment , possible. However, Mitchell again claims that Dawkins is only 
telling a part of the story: 
Whereas genes operate as coherent entities in 
transmission, organisms, or groups or some other 
entity may operate as integral wholes in interaction 
witb the environment... . Whatever fidelity in 
transmission a replicator has, to fulfill the destiny 
of survival, appropriate events have to occur to its 
corresponding interactor. Coherence in interaction 
with the environment is just as clearly 
characteristic of interactors. (Mitchell, 1987, p. 361) 
In this case I must agree with Mitchell's criticism. Dawkins rests his 
argument on the importance of fidelity, which he only considers as 
applying to the transmission of hereditary traits via the copying of DNA 
structures. However, these structures are only differentially selected in 
the first place, and can only undergo quantitative changes of 
representation in the population over time if there is a corresponding 
'fidelity' of interaction between entities and their environment. This side 
of the evolutionary process thus focusses on causal processes not 
involving genetic replication but behavioural interaction of individual 
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organisms (and possibly larger entities such as groups of organisms, 
populations, species, etc. ). Clearly, if there were no fidelity or coherence 
at the level of interaction, then selection' would cease to be consistent. 
The differential success of individual genes in replicating themselves 
would cease to be due to 'selection' as that process is normally understood 
in the context of evolution. Without the processes involved in the 
interaction of entities, there would be no consistency in the resultant 
differential 'fecundity' of competing genes. The property of 'fidelity' is 
thus seen to be inextricably linked to the process of evolutionary change 
as a whole - involving both interactors and replicators. 
It would thus seem that, despite Dawkins' own acceptance of the 
characterisation of evolution by natural selection as a two-stage process, 
and despite his own avowal of at least one of the critical points of which 
he is accused by Mitchell, he still fails to see that his own criteria for 
identifying a single class of entities as 'the units of selection' fails to 
serve that purpose. The defender of the individual organism as the unit of 
selection fares no better in the debate. Mitchell's example in this case is 
R Brandon, though the arguments apply equally to anyone defending such a 
position against the genic selectionist view (Cf. Brandon, 1985). 
The individual select ionistIs argument is based on the fact that 
selection can only occur amongst interacting entities displaying variable 
traits - i. e. it is on the strengths and weaknesses of their phenotypic 
properties that entities (individuals or groups) are selected. Now it is 
possible for two entities to be genotypically identical, and yet differ 
phenotypically (due to differential ontogenetic development, or perhaps 
polymorphism for a particular trait). Conversely, two organisms could be 
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genotypically different, and yet phenotypically identical (again, 
phenotypic convergence could be due to ontogenetic factors of 
development). In both cases selective forces will act upon the phenotypic 
traits irrespective of the particular genotypic differences or similarities. 
This leads the individual selectionist to state that it is the 
characteristics of individuals (or groups) which are the focal point of 
evolutionary forces of selection, since they affect differential 
reproductive success regardless of specific genetic properties. The latter 
are 'screened off' by the properties displayed phenotypically. This form of 
argument is used by the biologist Stephen Gould in his rejection of the 
genic selection view: 
Selection simply cannot see genes and pick among 
them directly. It must use bodies as an intermediary. 
A gene is a bit of DNA hidden within a cell. 
Selection views bodies.... Parts are not translated 
genes, and selection doesn't even work directly on 
parts. It accepts or rejects entire organisms because 
suites of parts, interacting in complex ways, confer 
advantages. The image of individual genes, platting 
the course of their own survival, bears little 
relationship to developmental genetics as we 
understand it. (Gould, 1984, p. 123) 
However, as Mitchell points out, the gene selectionist could use the same 
form of argument in support of their own perspective on the issue. In the 
case of gene-linkage (the 'hitch-hiker' effect) some replicators increase 
their probability of representation in future generations by attaching 
themselves to another part of the chromosome. (The above-mentioned t- 
allele in the house mouse is an example of just such an effect. ) Genes can 
thereby increase their fitness potential with a degree of independence of 
their actual phenotypic expression, since their reproduction is linked 
to 
the fitness potential of the part of the chromosome to which they are 
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attached. In such cases it can be argued that the replicators are 
'screening off' the interactors during the selection process. 
It would therefore appear that neither of the two sides in the debate 
have sufficient grounds to claim that they can identify exclusively 'tbe 
unit of selection' and apply that definition to every case of evolution by 
na-tura1 selection. I therefore agree with Mitchell when she says: 
Brandon asks what effect adaptation has on the 
differential reproduction of organisms, while Dawkins 
asks what effect adaptation has on the differential 
transmission of genetic replicators. The point is that 
when we identify a trait as being an adaptation, both 
effects are necessary.... Debates on the unit of 
selection shift attention away from the dual nature 
of the process of evolution by natural selection. By 
instead committing oneself wholeheartedly to 
accepting the necessity and importance of both 
processes of transmission and interaction, not only 
can the distinctions elicited by each of the steps be 
drawn, but the symbiotic relationship -between the 
steps can be discerned. (Mitchell, 1987, pp. 364/365) 
Though the above analysis of the unit of selection debate must go 
some way at least to resolving the controversy, I believe that it can be 
still further clarified by linking it directly to the context of 
sociobiological reasoning, and appreciating the part which the genic 
selection view has to play there. This may reveal why, in spite of their 
apparent agreement on the important points of the issue, there is still a 
fundamental opposition between the respective supporters of each of the 
two contending views. 
The whole question of how the selection process operates came to 
prominence because of the puzzle created by the explanation of so-called 
'altruistic' behaviour. In the face of cut-throat competition between 
individuals struggling against one another in the state of nature it would 
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appear impossible for altruism to evolve. Certainly, a group with at least 
some degree of altruistic behaviour occurring within it would have an 
advantage over a competing group composed entirely of non-a-Itruists. But 
all change must occur initially at the level of point mutations or genetic 
changes due to recombination affecting individual behaviour patterns. Any 
altruist daring to rear its head within a group would run the almost 
certain risk of seriously diminishing its individual fitness. The most 
controversial aspect of sociobiology is in its application of this 
argument about the process of evolution to human social behaviour. It is 
here that the genic selectionist view has its most important and far- 
reaching consequences for behavioural explanation. 
As already pointed out in my discussion of Dawkins' use and abuse of 
metaphor and other aspects of language, sociobiology suggests that since 
the genes are necessarily 'selfish', then we must also be necessarily 
selfish in all our social interactions. What other possible kinds of 
behaviour could we achieve after so many millions of years being moulded 
by the evolutionary process? I would argue, however, that there are crucial 
differences between the behavioural context of genes or non-intentional 
organisms, and that of intentional organisms such as human beings. I must 
therefore clarify this by explaining just how such kinds of behaviour 
differ and why. The behaviour of a non-intentional organism occurs firstly 
through a random process of mutation, and is 'valued' by a process of 
selection in an environmental context, the full informational description 
of which is unavailable to the organism's information-bearing structures 
prior to its genesis. In short, the 'adaptation' of the organism to the 
environment is achieved (if at all) via a process of blind trial and error, 
in which - due to the absence of a direct informational link from 
the 
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environment to the genes - there can be no possibility of pre-adaptation. 
(Except in very rare cases where a species just happens by chance to 
Possess traits which are suitable to some emerging feature of the 
environment. ) This model governs the description and explanatory framework 
of all behaviour due to evolution by natural selection. 
If one then turns to human social behaviour, it becomes clear that 
there are important differences, Firstly, behaviour is not 'isolated' as in 
the case of organisms dependent upon point mutations/reconbination for 
behavioural novelty. Humans can normally communicate their intentions, 
desires, hopes, etc. and thereby achieve a degree of coordination of 
behaviour at a group level. Secondly, this communication can occur prior to 
actual action, thereby reducing the risk of any individual behaving 'out on 
a limb' in a way so different from the rest of the group that they 
seriously diminish their own fitness potential. Thirdly, information of the 
actual or likely state of the environment can be assimilated also in 
advance of action, thus giving human behaviour at least its 'intentional' 
aspect of being pre-adapted toward some future state of affairs and 
intended goal. The net result of these abilities is that group behaviour of 
a genuinely cooperative and altruistic kind can be agreed upon and carried 
out by all concerned with some certainty of success. The isolated 
organisms of the sociobiological models of genetic evolution do not have 
the means to achieve such a state of behavioural coordination. Dawkins and 
others would no doubt counter the above claim by stating that our patterns 
of reasoning and behavioural inclinations are also the products of 
evolution, and must therefore be necessarily tied to the 'selfish' dynamics 
which has governed the millions of years of our ancestry. 
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In reply I would say that this argument only follows if one accepts 
the further hidden premise that our conscious thought is very strongly and 
directly tied to the behavioural dynamics which govern the historically 
earlier epochs of evolution, and which still governs much of the Jiving 
world, Sociobiology precludes genuine altruism to man because it is 
precluded to other species; but the strength of the behavioural continuity 
implied by such reasoning is in need of further support, since it does not 
agree with the prima facie characteristics of human behaviour and with the 
capacities unique to man which I have pointed out above. 
Given the above analysis, I believe one can see why the unit of 
selection and the 'genes-eye view' arguments play such an important role 
in sociobiological reasoning, and why - despite arguments to the contrary 
- they are so heavily defended. By ettablishing the gene as the 'focus' or 
'target' of the whole evolutionary dynamics, and attributing certain 
definitive characteristics to this process and the entities involved, it is 
a simple step to explain all further forms cf biological phenomena from 
within the same explanatory perspective. As the title of one of Dawkins' 
books suggests (T], Extended Phenotype) all further instances of 
behavioural interaction then become mere extensions of the dynamics and 
properties functioning at the level of the gene. In so doing, however, 
sociobialogists in effect deny the possibility of evolution ever producing 
genuine novelty or different forms of behavioural interaction or 
development. The theoretical stage is thus set for a one-act play which 
begins and ends with the genes taking all the principle roles. 
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1. Complexity and Behavioural Laws 
The fundamental methodology of the physical sciences is that of 
atomistic analysis. Phenomena are investigated, and their behavioural 
properties hopefully explained by their actual or theoretical decomposition 
into their constituent elemental parts. These parts are then theoretically 
reconstructed into the original whole with the aid of mathematically-based 
models and formulae, in which elements, their relations and other 
properties are abstractly represented by descriptive laws. The fundamental 
premise behind such a procedure is that the whole to begin with is no 
more nor less than the sum of its constituent parts, plus the relations 
existing between those parts and any emergent properties which arise from 
levels of structural complexity. Such theoretical assumptions and resultant 
methodological procedures have already established themselves within those 
sciences which deal with structures and phenomena in the inanimate world. 
In the animate world of biological organisms and structures, however, the 
level of complexity in terms of combinations of elemental parts, their 
resultant relations and properties is many orders of magnitude higher than 
in the world of inorganic phenomena. Since the biological world is 
primarily one of growth and change, the properties of entities and their 
forms are continually shifting, and the changes they undergo are often 
revisable at future stages in response to a range of factors affecting 
their development. Generally, one can capture the differences between the 
two areas of phenomena by imagining a scale of entities rising in 
complexity of internal structure and resultant properties and relations to 
the external world, beginning with the most elemental of posited entities 
- the sub-atomic particles of matter - and rising through atoms, 
molecules, organic molecules, cells, organs, organisms, populations, 
jy 
-67- 
ecosystems, and possibly further. As one moves along the scale, the 
individual entities become more differentiated from one another, in the 
sense that two atoms of hydrogen resemble each other more than two cells 
from an animal's skin tissue. Likewise, the latter resemble each other more 
than two individual organisms even belonging to the same species, such as 
two orchids. Moving along such an imagined scale, there is not only an 
increase in complexity of the entity (though the precis"ef nation of 
'complexity' is in itself open to question), but a corresponding increase 
in 'individuality' or 'uniqueness'. This feature of the organic world has, in 
my opinion, serious consequences for the avowed aim of sociobiology to 
render descriptive explanations of behaviour within law-like statements 
and models. 
Firstly, there is the problem posed by complexity itself. Given the 
nature of the phenomena under investigation, it may turn out that - though 
there are deterministic factors involved in producing the events concerned 
- they are so complex and subject to such a degree of sensitivity to any 
number of factors, that in principle the precise outcome of any event is 
unpredictable. This is not to say that its occurrence is random: merely 
that its outcome is unpredictable within existing or foreseeable methods 
of observation, since these are incapable of ascertaining or bringing 
within a simple formulation the totality of factors involved. The events 
may well be determined, but their explanation involves factors which to 
the observer are indeterminable. Wilson does admit the relevance of this 
kind of objection to the proposed project of sociobiology: 
The mind is too complicated a structure, and human 
social relations affect its decisions in too intricate 
and variable a manner, for the detailed history of 
human beings to be predicted in advance by the 
individuals affected or by other human beings. You 
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and I are consequently free and responsible persons 
in this fundamental sense. <Wilson, 1978, p. 80) 
Though I would credit Wilson for his honesty in recognising a considerable 
objection to his proposed unification of the natural and social sciences, I 
would take him to task over the quasi-philosophical conclusion of his 
statement. As I have made clear above, the question of whether an observer 
has knowledge of determining factors is separate frcm the question of 
whether certain events are or are not in fact determined. The former is an 
epistemological question whilst the latter is metaphysical. Such a 
distinction does not appear in Wilson's discussion of the matter, who I 
suspect is eager to allay the fears and accusations of critics who accuse 
sociobiology of implying some form of 'genetic determinism'. It is perhaps 
for this reason that he mistakenly equates indeterminability with 
indeterminism. 
Wilson goes on from this admission to emphasise that all is not lost: 
despite our inability to predict specific cases of individual behaviour, 
more general or broader categories of behaviour can be successfully 
predicted. The predictive power of such law-like formulations - unlike 
those of chemistry or physics - is in inverse proportion to their degree 
of specificity. Thus, behavioural 'laws' if possible at all will be 
necessarily stochastic in form. 
Moreover, the statistical properties of populations of 
individuals can be specified.... cultural change is the 
statistical product of the separate behavioural 
responses of large numbers of human beings who cope 
as best they can with social existence. (ibid, p. 81) 
Such a statement raises at least two important points of interest. Firstly, 
it clearly implies an approach to behavioural explanation which is 
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modelled on the methodological assumptions of the 'hard' sciences (i. e. 
physics and chemistry). It implies that descriptions and even predictions 
of 'cultural change' can be given through knowledge of individual 
propensities to behaviour, and thus that social behaviour is merely a 
summing or aggregate of individual tendencies. Such an individualist 
stance as regards the explanation of social phenomena is not an 
uncontested approach to this area of knowledge, and once again takes for 
granted the idea that heritable tendencies of individuals are explanatorily 
prior to the effect of being part of an existing social group. Secondly, it 
leaves open the question of how much informational detail must be lost, 
and how much retained, in order to reach the descriptive level at which 
the supposed statistical laws of human behaviour can be reliably 
formulated. If the new science is to offer any more than those areas of 
knowledge it claims to replace, then it must display a greater degree of 
accuracy, detail, explanatory power, or some other recognisable quality of 
distinction. It is not clear from talk of 'statistical properties' that it 
has anything more to offer than folk-sociological predictions such as that 
the combination of fine weather and a bank holiday weekend normally leads 
to high volumes of traffic heading for holiday resorts! 
Despite such open-ended doubts, Wilson and others envision a time 
when behavioural scientists, with the aid of comparative techniques and a 
rigorous scientific methodology, will be able to 'map the human biogram'. 
By this he means that they will be able to give a full account of the 
human behavioural range and the most typical responses within that range. 
Once again, however, this vision conceals a large unspoken premise. The 
premise is that human nature is in some way 'fixed' and 'static' and 
thereby incapable of significant future change. Only if this were so could 
I 
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Wilson claim the possibility of such certain and complete knowledge of the 
bounds and predictability of human behaviour. In contrast to such a view, 
I would suggest that there is no reason to think that human Behaviour is 
in any. respect 'fixed' and amenable to such prediction. There is no reason 
to think that from a biologically evolutionary point of view our species 
has ceased to undergo further genetic change, or will cease to do so in 
the future. Moreover, such 'predictions' as present-day observation of 
human behavioural reaction makes possible carry no necessary implications 
for the future, since behaviour is always manifested in response to a 
given social context, and Wilson cannot guarantee knowledge of future 
social developments, or of the effects these may have even on existing 
behavioural propensities. The most therefore that sociobiology's supporters 
can claim for it is that it might be able to explain and to an extent 
predict human behaviour as it has been and perhaps now is: but it cannot 
develop the kind of a priori forms of knowledge which would give it the 
predictive power and corresponding role in future social planning which 
its supporters claim on its behalf. An awareness of such problems and 
limitations to knowledge and predictive power is, however, far from 
evident in the sociobiological texts: 
Pure knowledge is the ultimate emancipator.. . But I do 
not believe it can change the ground rules of human 
behavior or alter the main course of history's 
predictable trajectory. (ibid, p. 100) 
There are some channels into which the tide of human 
history cannot be swept; and there are evolutionary 
cul-de-sacs we must navigate past. (Tennant & von 
Schilcher, 1984, p. 136) 
The message appears to be that human behaviour is fairly well fixed in its 
main characteristics, but that - rather paradoxically -a knowledge of 
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such controlling factors will enable future social planners to turn the 
relentless tide of history to their own favour: 
With pacifism as a goal, scholars and political 
leaders will find it useful to deepen studies in 
anthropology and social psychology, and to express 
this technical knowledge openly as part of political 
science and daily diplomatic procedure. (Wilson, 1978, 
p. 123 ) 
Apart from the obvious inherent tension in such a combination of views, I 
believe that the doubts I have raised above show that the whole question 
of a scientific approach to the analysis and possible prediction of social 
behaviour is frought with conceptual and practical problems largely 
ignored by sociobiology's supporters. 
As mentioned above, the phenomena of animate life appear to have a 
different structure from those of the inanimate world, since behavioural 
properties and the precise nature of forms appear to be more open-ended, 
and dependent upon a much wider range of factors to which developmental 
stages are in turn sensitive. The subject matter of the so-called 'hard 
sciences' tends to be elemental and repetitive in most cases, whereas that 
of biology - let alone the social sciences - is by nature more complex, 
developmental and dynamic in form. This is nowhere more so than in the 
study of human behaviour. It is in this sense that the study of social 
change and development is seen by many to be the study of 'historical' 
processes, since the changes and future developments are seen to be the 
product of highly complex and thereby largely unique events and forces, 
rather than the repetition of relatively widespread and stable structures 
and events. The production of genuine novelty which imbues an event with a 
sense of history is something which does not occur at the level of physics 
or chemistry, and it is this which differentiates biology from the rest of 
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the scientific world, and also provides the rationale for denying a natural 
scientific historicist account of human nature. One can argue, of course, 
that the historically unique events appearing at one level in nature are 
dependent upon the law-like predictability and repetition of events 
occurring at other levels, but even such an admission does not justify a 
programme of reductive explanations from the macro- to the micro-level, 
with the expectation that such a programme will in fact be explanatorily 
more efficacious. In some cases there may indeed be reason to believe that 
a behavioural manifestation at one level is explicable in terms of some 
other level. Freudian psychology is based upon such interchanging of 
levels of phenomena and their explanation - e. g. apparently conscious 
behaviour in terms of unconscious motivations or autonomic reflexes, and 
vice versa. Such schemes are not necessarily suitable for every kind of 
phenomenon, however, and at the present stage of knowledge it is not even 
clear what the proper description and explanation of phenomena is even 
within different scientific disciplines, let alone to suggest 
'transformational' or 'reductive' laws of some kind to bring all phenomena 
within some vast general synthetic scheine as sociobiology seems to 
envision. 
The above criticisms aimed at some of the more general 
methodological issues raised by sociobiological theorising are, in my view, 
largely ignored or brushed aside by its supporters. They reveal a certain 
lack of depth on the part of the theorists, who fail to consider the 
further implications of their thesis, or else the necessary foundational 
assumptions to which their views commit them. However, there are also 
problems of a more specific nature even within the sociobiological 
framework of analysis. It is to these specific questions that the rest of 
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this thesis will now turn, concentrating more on the supposed application 
of biological principles to the explanation of various aspects of human 
social behaviour. During the course of this critique, it is hoped that the 
points already made will serve both as a general foundation, and will 
reappear in more specific examples of what I have been at pains to point 
out as serious weaknesses within the theoretical structure of the 
sociobiological project. 
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Chapter- Two: Individual and the 
Fain i 1y Group 
2-, 
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Sexual Differentiation 
The first question which a sociobiological account of sexual 
differentiation must address is that of the evolution of sex itself. Why 
should there be two sexes in some species'? Asexually-reproducing species 
have an advantage in terms of not having to undergo the process of 
somehow encountering and then successfully mating with another individual. 
In addition, asexuality would seem to confer a further benefit, since any 
genetic mutations occurring which result in phenotypically advantageous 
traits will be passed on to the next generation 'intact', whereas in 
sexually-reproducing species any favourable allelic mutation will have to 
face the 'diluting' effects of meiotic segregation and recombination. It 
would seem that by far the 'better' of the two processes is that of 
asexual reproduction (in the sense of being advantageous for the genetic 
replicators involved). However, sexual reproduction does confer one 
potentially advantageous property absent in asexual reproduction: it 
ensures a higher rate of genetic diversity and novelty in successive 
generations. It is precisely the shuffling and recombination of genes, plus 
the possibilities for further changes due to mutation and other effects 
such as sequence reversal which make sexual reproduction an evolutionarily 
advantageous process. Since it is less 'accurate' in terms of copying whole 
genetic sequences from generation to generation, it leads to greater 
individual diversity, and the possibility of a faster rate of genetic 
change across generations, thus favouring more rapid forms of species and 
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individual evolution. If the ecosphere were totally stable, then there 
might be an evolutionary advantage to be had from an equally stable form 
of reproduction, but in the face of changing habitats, and the need to 
evolve in response, a form of reproduction which combines the two elements 
of reproductive fidelity with a degree of continual novelty and potential 
diversity is more likely to be selected for. Thus the evolution of sex in 
its most fundamental sense can be shown to be explicable within the 
evolutionary perspective. 
However, the evolutionary perspective can go much further than merely 
offering an account of the causal origins of sex. It can also draw more 
detailed conclusions as to the likely further development of sexual 
differences, and their effects on the morphological and behavioural 
characteristics of different species. The first point to be noted is that 
in all sexually-reproducing species the male is identified as the producer 
of the smaller gamete - the sperm - whilst the female is the producer of 
a relatively larger gamete - the ovum. (For a possible evolutionary 
explanation of sexually-relative gamete dimorphism, see Dawkins, 1978, 
pp. 153/154. ) Being many times larger (in the case of our own species, many 
thousand times larger), the female gamete requires a greater initial energy 
investment by the female for its production. Since the ova are not 
produced in anything like the quantity that sperm are, their maturation 
represents a far greater proportion of the female's life-span than in the 
case of the production of sperm. In mammalian and many other species, this 
initial expenditure by the female prior to fertilisation is followed by an 
even longer period of energy investment, due to the need to incubate the 
developing zygote - either internally or externally of the female body. 
Again, in many species, hatching or birth of the young initiates a period 
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of further energy expenditure, during which the female may be involved in 
greater energy expenditure than the male in order to feed, train and care 
for the offspring, though this is by no means an exclusively female 
burden. These further differences in behaviour may, according to 
sociobiology, be traced back to the original dimorphism of the sexes in 
terms of the production of the gametes. 
The consequences of this gametic dimorphism ramify 
throughout the biology and psychology of human sex. 
(Wiison, 1978, pp. 128 /129 ) 
As we shall see, it is possible to interpret all the 
other differences between the sexes as stemming from 
this one basic difference. (Dawkins, 1978, p152) 
The reasoning behind these statements is based on the genic selectionist 
view of evolution. Since it is taken to be in the interests of every 
individual (or rather of every individual's genes) to increase their 
fitness potential by producing as many offspring as possible, the male of 
a sexually-reproducing species begins the whole process of reproduction at 
an advantage over the female, since his relative energy investment in 
producing a gamete is much lower. He need do no more than the minimum 
necessary to give his genes access to the female gamete during 
fertilisation, From this, one can deduce that males are potentially capable 
of parenting many more offspring than females, and that there will be a 
corresponding evolutionary advantage to be had by the male that gains 
mating access to as many females as possible. The genes of such males 
would gain a higher than average representation in the gene-pool of future 
generations. There will thus be an evolutionary drive or tendency for 
males to evolve morphological and behavioural characteristics which will 
aid them in their competition with rival males for access to females, and 
p 
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- as will be seen below - to compete in various ways with the females as 
well. 
Females, on the other hand, may be expected to evolve capacities 
enabling them to 'select' or 'assess' to some extent the competing males, 
with a view to only engaging in sex with males who have desirable genetic 
attributes, and who are perhaps likely to share some of the subsequent 
burden of rearing offspring. Since the males can fertilise any number of 
females, whilst a female can only be fertilised once, and must then (in 
some species at least) undergo a term of pregnancy, the females are the 
limiting resource in the 'Battle of the Sexes' as it is dubbed by Richard 
Dawkins. However, the males do not have it all their own way in this 
competitive arena. One advantage that the female has over the male is that 
she can normally be sure of identifying her own offspring. (This is not 
necessarily the case in species such as fish, where fertilistaion takes 
place outside the female body. ) The male is therefore often in the position 
of being a potential cuckold, and this may be expected to affect the 
behaviour of the male prior to committing himself to any form of pre- or 
post-coital investment of energy, such as the gathering of nesting 
materials or the provision of food for the developing offspring. The 
combination of the above factors results in typical sexual differentiation 
as regards physical attributes and behaviour. The female will tend to be 
passive, waiting for a display from the competing males to indicate which 
of them has the best genes to pair with her own in producing offspring, 
The female is therefore not in need of morphological attributes evolved to 
attract the opposite sex - hence the characteristic 'dowdiness' of many 
females of various species. The male, on the other hand, has to convince 
the females that he is superior to the other males around him, and perhars 
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that he is willing and ready to commit himself to some form of pre- or 
post-coital investment in the offspring. He will therefore tend to be 
aggressively competitive and eager to mate with any available female. He 
must, however, also make sure that he is not about to mate pointlessly 
with an already-carrying female, and be cuckolded into investing energy 
into the rearing of someone else's offspring. (In species where the male 
energy expenditure prior to and after mating is negligible, one would 
expect this to be reflected by indiscriminate attempts to mate with any 
available female, since the male in this case has nothing or very little to 
lose in terms of investment, and a great deal to gain in terms of future 
representation in the population. ) 
The result of what Dawkins terms a "relationship of mutual mistrust 
and mutual exploitation" (lbid, p. 151) is the complex behavioural strategies 
involved in pre-mating displays and eventual pairing, and the subsequent 
division of labour according to sex during the subsequent rearing of 
offspring. The best strategy for the female is coyness, thus forcing the 
male to invest time and energy in order to woo her, and in some cases to 
provide resources which will be essential to the survival of the eventual 
offspring. The male response must ensure the defeat of potential rivals, 
successful conquest of the female, and the above-mentioned caution as to 
being cuckolded: 
he can wait and see whether she is harbouring any 
little step-children in her womb, and desert her if 
so.... Providing he can isolate her from all contact 
with other males, it helps to avoid being the 
unwitting benefactor of another male's children. 
(ibid, p. 159) 
(One way to test the truth of this evolutionary deduction about male 
behaviour would be a cross-species comparison of the respective courtship 
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durations and male behaviour in relation to the incubation period of 
fertilised eggs in a range of species. I know of no such data in support 
of Dawkins' behavioural prediction. ) Further sociobic ogical explanations 
of behaviour cover such phenomena as the 'Bruce effect' in mice. In this 
and other species, males have been observed killing the young offspring of 
a deserted fenaie, thus freeing her from parental responsibilities and 
speeding her return to sexual receptivity for his own advantage. In most 
species, once successful mating has occurred, the male is under some onus 
to remain with the female, both because of the decreased likelihood of 
successfully mating with another available female, and because desertion 
could mean the death of the offspring. After a certain period of time, 
desertion by either partner might be an optimal strategy, though such a 
period would tend to coincide (again for reasons which one can deduce from 
evolutionary logic) with the growing independence of the offspring and the 
corresponding lack of demand on either parent. 
The possible permutations of cost/benefit to each of the sexes in 
every species are clearly more complex than the rudimentary analysis 
offered in the simplified sociobiological models. Accurate evolutionary 
explanations would have to take into account the specific details of each 
individual species, in order to show the 'logic' behind the particular 
forms of behaviour. It would appear though even from such a simplified 
analysis that evolutionary considerations both confirm existing 
observations, and place them within a context where morphology and 
behaviour once again appear to be deducible from a knowledge of the 
competing forces within the evolutionary process. Dawkins admits the 
somewhat idealised nature of his own portrayal of sexual evolution: 
For simplicity, I have talked as though a male were 
either purely honest or thoroughly deceitful. In 
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reality it is more probable that all males, indeed all 
individuals, are a little bit deceitful, in that they 
are programmed to take advantage of opportunities to 
exploit their mates. (ibid, p. 167) 
According to Dawkins' view then, the evolution of sexual reproduction and 
the initial difference in size of gametes leads to the further evolution of 
a whole range of morphological traits and behavioural 'strategies', all 
geared towards the maximisation--uf fitre`ss potential in competition with 
rivals and even the sexual partner. The same view is expressed by Wilson 
and other sociobiologists, who then apply the same form of reasoning to 
assess and predict the effects of such biological mechanisms an the arena 
of human behaviour. Wilson believes that the deductions concerning the 
behaviour of other sexually-reproducing species hold true for the human 
species as well: 
It pays males to be aggressive, hasty, fickle and 
undiscriminating. In theory it is more profitable for 
females to be coy, to hold back until they can 
identify males with the best genes. In species that 
rear their young, it is also important for the 
females to select males who are more likely to stay 
with them after insemination. 
Human beings obey this biological principle 
faithfully. (Wilson, 1978, p. 129 - emphasis added) 
Wilson goes on to explain how he thinks these initial differences 
become ramified and transformed into further differences at the more 
abstract levels of human society. This leads to the supposed universal 
phenomenon of male dominance in all important spheres of social life and 
organisation: 
The physical and temperamental differences between 
men and women have been amplified by culture into 
universal male dominance. History records not a 
single society in which women have controlled the 
political and economic lives of men.... Here is what I 
believe the evidence shows: modest genetic differences 
between the sexes; the behavioral genes interact with 
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virtually all existing environments to create a 
noticeable divergence in early psychological 
development; and the divergence is almost always 
widened in later psychological development by 
cultural sanctions and training. (ibid, p. 133) 
The sociobiological analysis is clear: initial morphological differences 
put a premium on certain forms of behaviour, which result in further 
differentiation - the end product of which is the reale/female stereotype. 
The stereotyped qualities are assertiveness versus passivity; 
competitiveness versus coyness; aggressiveness versus docility; etc. Such 
differences, we are told, are the product of millions of years of evolution 
which has selected genes affecting both sexes, but is ultimately explicable 
in terms of reproductive dimorphism. 
Much of the evidence cited in support of the sociobiological thesis 
concerning sexual differentiation in human society has come from studies 
of the Kibbutz society in the modern state of Israel. Sociological 
researchers have pointed out that this location offers unique opportunities 
for observations into sexual roles: 
The kibbutz, with its deep ideological commitment to 
the equality of all human beings, and, of course, 
equality of the sexes, also offers women the 
independence prerequisite to equality. All in all, the 
kibbutz is perhaps the most likely place for the 
development of equality of the sexes. (Tiger & 
Shepher, 1975, p. 260 ) 
According to the sociological accounts, the programme of equality of 
participation in all areas of life - regardless of sex - appeared to 
meet with a degree of success initially. However, by the second and third 
generations a change was noted towards the kind of sex-based role 
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divisions prevalent in most other societies. Tiger and Shepher recorded 
the change at the end of their study of the kibbutz: 
the sexual division of labour has reached about 80% 
of maximum.... women are less active in the General 
Assembly than men.... At the highest level of the 
kibbutz, women make up only 14% of the 
personnel.... Women are overrepresented in higher 
nonacademic education leading to such jobs as 
elementary school teaching, kindergarten teaching and 
medical nursing. Men are overrepresented in higher 
academic education leading to such jabs as 
agriculture, engineering, economics and management. 
(ibid, p. 262 ) 
The same phenomena are cited by Wilson in his discussion of sexual 
differentiation within human society (Cf. Wilson, 1978, p. 139). Tiger and 
Shepher go on to consider and reject various possible explanations of the 
apparent return to sex-based labour and social division within the 
kibbutzim, all of which attempt to explain the phenomena as a result of 
sociopolitical factors. They are: the argument from insufficient revolution; 
the socialisation argument; the male conspiracy argument; the retreat 
argument, and the external influence argument (Cf Tiger & 
Shepher, 1975, pp. 263-269 for a full account of these arguments). They 
conclude their summary of the sociological explanations negatively: 
The five arguments we have presented all have some 
point to them, yet none can sufficiently explain why, 
despite structural advantages and ideological fervor, 
the kibbutz has not lived up to its goal of 
abolishing sexual. division of labor. (ibid, p. 269) 
This is followed by a final statement which reveals what is emerging from 
their analysis of the changes in the kibbutzim: "It should be clear that we 
regard any formal sociological explanation for what we have described as 
partial and, by itself, inadequate. " tibid, p. 269). Tiger and Sbepher 
anticipate the publication of sociobiological views of such phenomena by 
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concluding that in the human species, as in all others, behavioural range 
and propensity is confined by genetically heritable tendencies and 
capacities. Taken together, these form the 'biogram' of the human species, 
defining the outer limits and the norms of human social behaviour. This 
view is contrasted with the 'tabula rasa' theory of individual development, 
which they reject as an inadequate model for either human linguistic or 
general behavioural development. Just as Wilson was to maintain in his 
work published in the same year, Tiger and Shepher propose that human 
social development is under the limiting control of genetically hereditary 
factors which are pre-social in their origins. That is, they are to be 
traced back to the genetic heritage of the individual as a member of the 
species, and not to any experiential factors within the individual's 
lifetime - or at least not exclusively so. This is the theory which, in 
their view, provides the final solution to the puzzling phenonena of sex- 
based role division which their work has uncovered. 
Our biogrammatical assertion is that the behavior of 
these mothers is ethologically probable: they are 
seeking an association with their own offspring, 
which reflects a species-wide attraction between 
mothers and their young. (ibid, p. 272) 
The sociobiological basis of their conclusion is made even more explicit a 
few pages further on: 
If the predisposition of mothers to be with their 
offspring is a positive attraction, not a negative 
retreat, it is because of our mammalian and primate 
origins and the long, formative hunter-gatherer 
period of our evolutionary past. (ibid, p. 276) 
The statement is identical in its theoretical underpinnings to the 
conclusion of Wilson regarding sex-based differentiation of roles in human 
society. It supposedly provides the missing element to the explanation of 
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the persistence in the kibbutzim - despite attempts to alter it - of the 
male/female division of labour and the nuclear family as the basic unit of 
social organisation and reference. 
It is to the advantage of each woman of the hunter- 
gatherer band to secure the allegiance of men who 
will contribute meat and hides while sharing the 
labor of child-rearing. It is to the reciprocal 
advantage of each man to obtain exclusive sexual 
rights to women and to monopolise their economic 
productivity. (Wilson, 1978, p. 145) 
The hunter-gatherer reference is made because this was supposedly the 
state of social organisation prevalent for the two million years or more 
of our pre-culturally developed past. It was during this period that we 
evolved the basic behavioural traits which, in the view of Wilson and 
others like Tiger and Shepher, still dominate and explain human social 
organisation and individual behavioural tendencies. The final conclusion is 
that, as the evidence of the kibbutzim experiment in social reorganisation 
supposedly shows, changes in social organisation at the level of conscious 
planning cannot be effected if they go against the genetically heritable 
and therefore 'innate' behavioural dictates of individual and group 
biopsychology. 
There are three main points which I would like to raise in opposition 
to the conclusion of Wilson, Tiger and Shepher regarding human sexual role 
differences, and the supposed deductions to be drawn from the example of 
the Israeli kibbutzim. The first is a reiteration of a criticism I made 
within the analysis of general sociobiological methodology (see 
above, pp. 41-43). The universality of a behavioural trait is not necessarily 
evidence of underlying biological tendencies, operating with equal force on 
every individual within society. The most that can be said is that it is 
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evidence of behavioural capacities, but whether universal convergence on a 
particular behaviour implies that this is the only one possible for 
members of the species, or whether it can be attributed to the effect of 
cultural factors in similar environments upon what is actually a wide 
behavioural range, is a question whose answer cannot be unequivocably 
deduced from the evidence presented above. I will in fact go on to suggest 
an alternative explanation of the observed phenomena, which I believe 
will show that the deductions made by the sociobiologists are, to say the 
least, premature in their claims to explanatory exclusivity. 
Secondly, the sociobiological explanation is based on the assumption 
that our behavioural responses have been and are 'fixed' by our 
evolutionary past, when we lived in small groups as hunter-gatherers. Not 
only that, but the genetically heritable tendencies layed down then, under 
very different social circumstances, continue to reveal themselves through 
phenotypic behavioural responses in precisely the same way, despite the 
obvious changes in society. Supposing there were some form of genetic 
control over our sex-based social behaviour; wouldn't it be surprising if 
it underwent no changes whatsoever in response to a changing set of 
social circumstances, and if it continued to reveal itself phenotypically 
in the same way, despite a different set of social factors impinging 
environmentally on every developing individual? Again, this criticism is 
aimed at a specific example of what is in fact a general tendency within 
sociobiology to make certain kinds of rather important and largely 
undefended assumptions . (see above, pp. 69/70). My third objection will 
constitute what is hopefully a viable alternative explanation of the 
kibbutzim example, and a general explanation of the appearance within many 
if not all societies of sex-based role differences. 
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I take it not to be a disputed fact that there are physiological 
differences between the sexes in human beings. One such difference of 
importance is that of the relative physical involvement of the two sexes 
during pregnancy and birth. This is one area where I believe that there is 
good reason to expect a link between the morphological and resultant 
emotional and behavioural characteristics, relative to the two sexes. The 
physical processes of pregnancy and birth must result in a differential 
feeling of intimacy between mother and child and father and child 
respectively. However, as far as the further parental behaviours of 
everyday child-care and familial responsibilities are concerned (the 
'cooking, sewing, washing, etc. ' mentioned in such discussions), I see no 
reason to think that genetically heritable tendencies towards or against 
such activities should be expected to evolve within the species at any 
stage. 
In a society whose survival depends on some degree of individual 
specialisation - for its maintenance, it is only to be expected that the 
precise division of roles will reflect to some extent the physiological 
capacities of the individuals concerned. In an agrarian and largely non- 
mechanised society, where hunting for food or difficult cultivation of 
essential resources is largely dependent on attributes of sheer physical 
strength, there will in my view be an obvious tendency towards male 
domination of such tasks, the male being on average more physically suited 
to them. This is not to say that there is a 'genetic' tendency towards such 
sex-based role division, in any sense stronger than the observation that 
the male of the species is on average more suitably physically equipped 
for such tasks than the average female. The initial intimacy of mother and 
child mentioned above, facilitated by the further physical contact and 
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bond of suckling, would seem to lead naturally to the near-universal 
adoption in such non-mechanised societies of a sex-based division of 
roles. This seems to fall naturally along the dividing line of males 
dominating tasks of the production and control of raw materials, and 
females equally dominant in the areas of transformation of raw materials 
into goods, and other domestic tasks essential to the continuance of the 
stable family unit and thus the stability of the basic economic unit of 
the society. The fact that some tasks are necessarily or more easily 
carried out within or close to the dwelling site, and some necessarily 
away from it, leads to further divisions of labour and responsibility 
naturally falling into particular universal patterns. Such universal 
division of roles within the species requires no more of a 'biological' 
element to its explanation than the already-made observations concerning 
the relative physical strength of the sexes, psycho-physiological 
differences connected with childbirth and the earliest stages of 
parenthood, and the physical nature of the natural environment. It is in 
my view a common characteristic of sociobiological accounts of role 
division in human society, that they tend to over-emphasise the importance 
of the male role, because of its supposed dominant features, and under- 
emphasise the corresponding role of the female. Many writers on the 
subject of hunter-gatherer societies have more recently stressed that the 
role of the female in such conditions is at least of equal importance to 
that of the male, since the regular supply of food is got from the process 
of gathering, with the occasional addition of meat from a successful 
hunting party. Surely if the family is the basic unit of the society, then 
the role of guaranteeing domestic stability and related responsibilities is 
every bit as important as any other, and within this sphere the female has 
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just as much right to be spoken of as 'dominant' as the much-publicised 
male. 
What would appear at first sight more difficult to explain is the way 
in which such initial divisions in physical tasks lead to the differences 
at higher and more abstract levels of social organisation, such as the 
male domination of social and political decision-making bodies, and the 
conspicuous absence of a female voice in most of such general policy- 
making. Again arguing against any theory of innate psychological 
dispositions, I would raise the question whether it is at all surprising, 
given the initial role divisions and the central importance of resource 
production to the society's life, that the male dominance of resource 
production and acquisition carries over into the controlling bodies 
responsible for its maintenance and regulation. This aspect of male 
domination is stressed in all discussions of the topic: what receives less 
emphasis is the above-noted female equivalent of domination in other 
areas. Perhaps because these areas are more individual by nature, rather 
than being coordinated under any central policy-making bodies (i. e. each 
household is, in most respects, a law unto itself), the feature of female 
control does not appear so large or important a factor in social 
organisation and stability. I would however stress the idea that females 
carry just the same degree of responsibility in domestic matters and in 
some related areas of production as males, and that they differ perhaps 
only in the required degree of coordination and group representation. I 
grant the fact that in social groups larger than the tribe or small 
village community it is the institutional bodies at the level of national 
or international economic and political relations which wield the most 
significant power, affecting in many ways the lives of every individual 
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within the community. The male domination in such areas is therefore seen 
as an overall domination of the society's structure. But even within such 
societies, the female half of the population continues to play an equally 
dominant role in other areas more directly associated with the individual 
lives of family groups. This fact is recognised at the level of economics 
and manipulated in western society by the practitioners of consumer- 
targeted advertising, as well as by the many political campaigning groups, 
even if still not recognised by those who debate the relative status of 
male and female in human society. (To put it in rather a cliched fashion: 
the father may regard himself as the bread-winner, but who has hold of 
the purse-strings? ) 
Once the initial kind of social organisation that 1 have suggested 
above begins to operate within a social group, it will inevitably become 
precedental, leading to historical constraints affecting further areas of 
social develcpnent. In opposition to this force, as the society develops 
degrees of independence of factors in the natural environment, via the 
harnessing of resources through techniques of husbandry and technological 
means of production, there will arise a concomitant capacity for social 
change. The decreased need for individual physical strength and the call 
for a broader range of skills tends to break down the ultimate biological 
basis suggested above for the male/female division of social roles. Such 
factors may be accompanied by the release of women from their need to 
pursue traditional domestic duties, by the introduction of such things as 
birth control, economic independence and changes in legal rights, the state 
provision of welfare in areas such as care of infants (creches and 
kindergartens) and educational reforms. One would expect such changes to 
result in or accompany other social changes, signalling a growing demand 
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by and participation of warnen in areas of social activity previously held 
to be male preserves. These would cover everything from the male-dominated 
labour areas (e. g. factory work now requiring skills no longer geared to 
sheer physical strength), to business management, political and social 
positions of standing within the community, and a growing emphasis an a 
sexually egalitarian society. This is, in my opinion, precisely the kind of 
change which one can observe occurring in post-industrialised western 
societies, particularly since attitudes towards work were changed rapidly 
by such events as the second world war. It may be true that the general 
vision of male and female roles and capacities is deeply entrenched in the 
history and education of every member of society, and that this 
entrenchment therefore causes an inertia to change which slows the rate 
except in times of dire need and general social turmoil. The image of the 
traditional female role is enshrined in the deep-rooted symbolism of 
organised religion, for example in the image of the Diadonna and child of 
the Catholic faith. However, one need not seek further than this level of 
social explanation to account for the prevalence of sex-based role 
divisions. If it were true that sexual differentiation in society is based 
upon an underlying 'biopsychological' mechanism revealing itself through 
the behaviour of every individual, then the kinds of changes which have 
occurred since the turn of the century in respective male and female roles 
would simply not have been possible. 
Tiger and Shepher actually accept that social changes of the kind I 
have suggested do occur in many western societies, but turn my argument 
on its head by suggesting that it is further evidence of (or at least not 
incompatible with) the existence of an underlying biopsychological element 
affecting male/female roles: 
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it appears to be a rule of biogrammar that as part of 
the broad reproductive process, the sexes tend to 
create distinctions between themselves, and sometimes 
in ways that are not directly or indirectly 
reproductive.... Indeed, one may ask whether the current 
feminist perturbation, its legal, moral and economic 
thrust aside, is a cognitive expression of a hidden 
biological process -a species reacting to 
overpopulation. Meanwhile men and women in the 
kibbutz have no qualms about bearing children; 
perhaps that is the reason they divide the sexes and 
increase their birth rates, acting against the trends 
of the socially progressive elements of Euro-American 
society, with which they otherwise often align 
themselves. (Tiger & Shepher, 1975, p. 278) 
There are at least two revealing points within this quote. The first is 
that the authors appear to be suggesting the operation of scme sort of 
Wynne-Edwards type group selection mechanism within human society. The 
suggestion is that on the conscious level there is the phenomenon of 
female emancipation, which the authors seem to equate with a necessary 
drop in the birth rate (though I fail to see how this follows of 
necessity). What is really going on, however, is the operation at some 
unconscious level ultimately under the control of the genes, of behavioural 
mechanisms which are reacting to signs of overpopulation, and affecting 
individual female behaviour in such a way that it effectively reduces 
individual fitnesses, but thereby also reduces scarcity of resources and 
other problems for the population as a whole. This process is mirrored in 
the kibbutzim, where sexual egalitarianism is being reversed, and sexual 
divisions are (again, apparently with some degree of causal necessity not 
fully articulated) resulting in a rise in the birth rate. Apart from the 
problems raised by the apparent group selectionist thesis, which stands 
with no evidential support whatsoever, and very little to commend it in 
the way of theoretical argument, I fail to see why the authors think that 
any of the data they have so far mentioned reveals any kind of necessary 
connection between sexual social division and the birth rate. And yet a 
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direct connection between the two is stated in the opening sentence of the 
quote, and implied throughout. Quite simply, I find such a line of 
'reasoning' hard to accept, and can only interpret it as a statement of 
personal belief rather than as a coherent part of some presented argument. 
To argue that phenomena which would normally count as evidence against 
their thesis is in fact - under some possible interpretation - evidence in 
support of the very same thesis, merely by adding further unfounded 
suggestions to the original lire of argument, is an unacceptable line of 
reasoning. It renders their thesis unfalsifiable, since they can always 
accommodate further contrary evidence, 
To return to the example of the kibbutzim I would therefore suggest 
that, far from constituting evidence for a general resistance to change 
ultimately explicable in terms of our species' 'biogram', the behaviour of 
the kibbutzniks is an exception when viewed against comparative changes 
in western society. Viewed in this broader context I would suggest that 
firstly it does not therefore constitute the kind of hard evidence needed 
to support the sociobiological thesis of genetically-fixed behaviour 
regarding sexual differentiation in human society. Secondly, the dismissal 
of 'purely social' explanations of the kibbutz phenomena is therefore 
premature, and a misleading appraisal of the possible range and power of 
sociological argument. I conclude that for various reasons given above, the 
thesis that sexual differentiation in human society is due to biological 
factors in the sense meant in the term 'sociobiological' is not proven. An 
alternative and perhaps more viable explanation can be formulated in 
purely sociological terms, taking into account the historical dimension of 
traditional and entrenched ideas of the sexes arising from physiological 
differences, and the prevalence of entrenched religious, historical and 
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sociopolitical ideologies, In my view, none of this points towards or 
stands in need of further explanation in terms of bicpsychological forces, 
and the phenomenon of sexual differentiation has neither the significance 
nor the permanence which sociobiology suggests. 
2-, 2 Human Agaressi on 
Another of the central issues in sociobiological explanations of 
human behaviour is that of aggression. Once again, as with the discussion 
of sexual differentiation, the argument begins with considerations about 
the role of aggressive behaviour in nature generally, and the likely course 
of its evolution. Since it is presumed that every population will be 
competing to some extent both inter- and intra-specifically for a limited 
supply of available necessary resources, an essential element of every 
organism's behavioural repertoire will be the capacity for some form of 
either aggressive or protective behaviour, in response to those around it. 
Aggression is not normally an end in itself, but often leads to the 
acquisition or loss of essential resources such as territory, food, 
supplies, or rank in a dominance hierarchy leading to access to mates. 
Aggression is therefore one element of an organism's behaviour by which it 
can further its fitness potential. The display of aggression is often (but 
not exclusively) more prevalent in the male of the species, who must 
compete for access to a limited number of receptive females, sometimes 
indirectly via competition for resources. Like many other features of 
animal behaviour, the phenomenon of aggression as something which could 
be systematically analysed and explained was first brought to the 
attention of a wide audience by the pioneering ethologist Konrad Lorenz 
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(Lorenz, 1963 - translated into English 1966). In the work Qn Aggression 
Lorenz chronicles his observations of aggressive behaviour in many 
species, in order to address the question of the nature of specifically 
human forms of aggression, their causes and their possible means of 
reduction. In reaching his conclusions about the nature of man's aggressive 
behaviour, Lorenz employs the same methodology and kinds of evolutionary 
deductions as the later sociobiological writers have done, and his work 
serves as the starting point for what was to follow. 
One of the earliest observations made by Lorenz and others such as 
Niko Tinbergen was that aggressive behaviour appeared to show some 
relation to the possible costs and advantages involved in any particular 
encounter. Far from resulting in high rates of mutilation or fatality, 
encounters often consisted of no more than an exchange of ritualised 
signalling and response, often falling short of or replacing the act of 
physical combat. Though initially a surprising fact for some, this feature 
of animal behaviour is in fact predictable from a sociobiological 
consideration of the likely evolution of aggression. Such a point is made 
by both Wilson and Dawkins in their discussion of aggressive behaviour: 
The answer is probably that for each species.... there 
exists some optimal level of aggressiveness above 
which individual fitness is lowered. (Wilson, 1975, 
p. 121) 
Why is it that animals do not go all out to kill 
rival members of their species at every opportunity? 
The general answer to this is that there are costs as 
well as benefits resulting from outright pugnacity, 
and not only the obvious costs in time and energy. 
(Dawkins, 1978, p. 73 ) 
Disputes between conspecifics are thus settled with the minimum of energy 
expenditure, and the maximum avoidance of risk to all parties. Aggression, 
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like other forms of social interaction, therefore involves a degree of 
behavioural 'adaptation'. An optimum level of fitness is achieved via the 
advantageous manipulation of the environment - in this case the social 
environment of interacting conspecifics - involving the sending and 
receiving of signals. Many 'fights' consist of no more than a show of 
strength on both sides, escalating through stages of determination and 
risk, but often sufficient to settle the dispute short of all-out combat. It 
is therefore postulated on the strength of such evidence, that aggressive 
behaviour in observed species is subject to fairly strong genetically- 
heritable forms of control. Unless this were so, there could be no 
explanation for the sending and receipt of formalised signal patterns, the 
production of and reaction to which is largely if not wholly innate. Once 
again, then, an area of significant animal social behaviour appears to be 
explicable within the confines of evolutionary theory. The logic once again 
conforms to general deductions which can be made from evolutionary 
premises. An individual organism whose behavioural responses caused them 
to become involved in situations of great personal risk and energy 
expenditure, far in excess of the likely rewards, is not the kind of 
individual likely to survive and pass on the genes responsible for such 
behaviour to future generations. On the other hand, the individual whose 
instinct is 'to have a go, but recognises the signs that mean he is likely 
to take a serious beating, the consequences of which outweigh the disputed 
prize, is an individual who lives to fight another day. (And, of course, 
whose genes live to fight another day and possibly many more days in 
future generations. ) Such an individual may in future meet lesser 
adversaries whom he can in turn conquer, or become better equipped to 
challenge the original one on more equal terms. 
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The precise logic behind such explanations of the evolution of 
aggression as offered above was given greater plausibility by the 
application of Game Theory models developed by J Maynard Smith (Maynard 
Smith, 1973,1976a & 1976b). From such models, Smith developed the concept 
of an 'Evolutionary Stable Strategy' (ESS). An ESS is that strategy which, 
if adopted by most members of the population, cannot be bettered or 
replaced over time by any alternative strategy. An example in negative 
terms would be genuine altruism: this is definitely not an ESS, since it 
would soon be overcome within a population consisting initially of even a 
few relatively non-altruistic individuals. (This is why, as will be seen in 
later sections, the question of genuine altruism in our own species has 
become a topic of heated dispute between sociobiologists and other 
parties. ) The concept of an ESS allowed Smith and others to construct 
mathematical models of hypothetical encounters between organisms, from 
which they could predict the likely behaviour within the parameters of the 
model. The number of variables such models can handle is low in 
comparison with those operating in the state of nature for any actual 
species, but some of the more general predictions they produce do seem to 
match up to observed behavioural strategies in some species. 
One such general prediction is that the more heavily 'armed' and 
therefore potentially lethal a species, the more likelihood that the 
individuals in it will have strong inhibitions against engaging in all-out 
combat. Being in the interests of every individual to avoid high-risk 
engagements, one can predict the evolution of formalised aggressive rituals 
preceeding or wholly replacing actual combat. Such a general prediction is 
supported by evidence from many species; for example the submissive 
posture adopted by losers in combat, which triggers a response in the 
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victor causing them to stop short of actually killing the defeated 
adversary. 
The human species is, in comparison with many others, very poorly 
equipped for combat: lacking sharp teeth, claws, bulk or protection for use 
in aggressive encounters. However, our greater intelligence and manual 
dexterity (which are a much later product of our evolutionary history than 
our other morphological and behavioural features) give us the ability to 
manufacture tools and weapons which more than make up for any lack of 
natural armament. This point was expanded by Lorenz, who believed that it 
provided the key to understanding the bloody nature of man's recorded 
past. Lorenz argued that man's move from pre- to past-cultural life and 
the consequent changes in social organisation and forces was in some ways 
premature. Man was launched into a complex, novel environment for which - 
instinctively at least - he was and is poorly equipped: 
Knowledge springing from conceptual thought robbed 
man of the security provided by his well-adapted 
instincts long, long before it was sufficient to 
provide him with an equally safe adaptation.... Small 
wonder indeed if the evolution of social instincts 
and, what is even more important, social inhibitions 
could not keep pace with the rapid development forced 
on human society by the growth of traditional 
culture, particularly material culture. (Lorenz, 1966, 
p. 205) 
The same view is taken .; p 
by Wilson and other sociobiologists in their 
account of man's aggressive behaviour. They argue that since such weapons 
as we have are products of relatively recent technical skill, one can 
predict from sociobiological theory that we will lack the corresponding 
instinctive inhibitory controls which in other species have evolved side- 
by-side with the use of arms in aggressive encounters. In our own case, 
the instinctive emotional controls inhibiting aggressive behaviour are 
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commensurate to our pre-cultural aggressive capacities. These bear no 
relation to our present aggressive capabilities, which have advanced as a 
result of cultural development. 
Part of man's problem is that his intergroup 
responses are still crude and primitive, and 
inadequate for the extended extraterritorial 
relationships that civilization has thrust upon 
him.... History is replete with the escalation of this 
process to the point that the society breaks down or 
goes to war. No nation has been completely immune. 
(Wilson, 1975, p. 563) 
The argument is that our crude and inadequate genetically-heritable 
responses to the demands of contemporary social existence are responsible 
for the deterioration in personal, group and international relations, 
resulting in unrest and the threat of global warfare and mutual 
destruction. Lorenz posited a 'drive-release' mechanism In the psychology 
of all species alike, whereby aggressive urges would build up pressure 
over time like a boiling kettle, to be finally released in response to an 
appropriate stimulus. He stated that the drive and its inevitable build-up 
were independent of the releasing stimuli, so that there was always the 
possibility that aggressive displays would occur even in the absence of 
the appropriate stimuli. The result would be cathartic but gratuitous 
outbursts of aggressive behaviour in inappropriate circumstances. This is 
the underlying premise of Lorenz's contention that man has become in 
effect a 'sick animal' in respect of his present environment, unable to 
function properly in his social relations as he once did: 
in pre-historic times intra-specific selection bred 
into man a measure of aggression drive for which in 
the social order of today he finds no adequate outlet. 
(Lorenz, 1966, p. 209 ) 
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In the absence of an adequate outlet for many of our evolved beha c iou: -al 
dispositions, drives such as that posited for aggression are discharged 
inappropriately under the control of "instinctive behav{oural mechanisms 
much older than reason and not directly accessible to rational self- 
observation. " (ibid, p. 213). The ultimate explanation for supposedly high 
levels of aggression in contemporary human society is what was once in 
our evolutionary past a usefully adaptive element of our behaviour. The 
proximate cause for the triggering of this drive is identified by Lorenz 
as the present state of overcrowding, and the lack of personal space or 
territory caused by the changes in population distributions and densities 
since the advent of husbandry, and more recently the advent of mass 
urbanisation in post-industrial society. 
The increase in number of individuals belonging to 
the same community is in itself sufficient to upset 
tha balance between the personal bonds and the 
aggressive drive. (ibid, p, 217) 
Thus on the local scale, the evolved aggressive response is triggered by 
intrusion into one's perceived territory, and the minimisation of any sense 
of territorial rights extending beyond one's house walls. On the level of 
international relations, it is triggered by disputes over boundaries, and 
the tendency to classify unfamiliar peoples as 'out-groups', to whom one 
owes very different allegiances and reacts very differently in comparison 
with those one classifies as belonging to one's own 'in-group' (or 
further discussion of sociobiological explanations of inter13ticnal 
relations, see below, pp. 168-181). This explanation of contemporary levels 
of intra- and international aggression in terms of an instinctive drive to 
protect one's territory was taken up and made the basis of another 
sociobiological theory of human nature in a book entitled The rr tý_ia' 
Imperative by Robert Ardrey (Ardrey, 1967). Although not --mf Er-ring 
1 
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explicitly to the drive-release mechanisms of Lorenzian theory, Ardrey 
does explain many of the structures and features of human society in terms 
of the genetically-heritable need to define and defend a territorial area, 
which as a psychological motivating force may be traced in its origins to 
the days of our evolutionary ancestors. Thus, we are encouraged to believe, 
all forms of aggressive behaviour - from work-place squabbling to the 
nuclear arms race - are seen equally as explicable on the level of 
genetically inherited and strongly controlled drives towards territorial 
acquisition and defensive behaviours. 
Where contemporary sociobiology parts from the theories of Lorenz 
and Ardrey is that it is no longer held to be true that there is an 
aggressive drive within every individual, building up and demanding 
release even in the absence of appropriate stimuli. An evolutionary 
argument against the existence of such a mechanism would simply be that 
individuals indulging in aggressive and potentially dangerous behaviour in 
an inappropriate and gratuitous fashion will simply be at a disadvantage, 
in comparison with those who display aggression only when provoked by the 
appropriate stimuli. Apart from this theoretical consideration, 
experimentation on many species including humans has shown that an 
increase in aggressive stimuli lowers the individual's threshold for 
aggressive behaviour (i. e. they themselves become more aggressive), but 
that prolonged absence of aggressive stimuli decreases aggressive displays 
by the individual. In other words, contrary to Lorenz's hydraulic catharsis 
theory of aggressive outburst, in the absence of stimuli there is a 
corresponding drop in aggressive displays, rather than their continuance 
in inappropriate situations. 
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However, although sociobiologists differ on this point, they still 
posit the same genetically-heritable tendencies to assert and protect some 
notion of perceived territory as the ultimate cause and explanation of the 
prevalence of aggressive behaviour within contemporary society and between 
nations. 
War can be defined as the violent rupture of the 
intricate and powerful fabric of the territorial 
taboos observed by social groups. (Wilson, 1978, p. 113) 
As with the earlier theorists quoted above, sociobiologists do not merely 
point to the possibility of aggressive encounters, but give it the air of 
inevitability contained in Lorenz's now defunct drive-discharge model: 
The channels of formalized aggression are deep; 
culture is likely to turn into one or the other but 
not to avoid them completely. (ibid, p. 118 - emphasis 
added) 
The quote captures Wilson's view that one can go beyond asserting the 
trivially true fact that as a biological species we have the capacity for 
aggressive behaviour. Rather, it proclaims the stronger thesis that some 
unspecified level of aggression is an inevitable component of all possible 
social relations, no matter what the specific environmental conditions 
influencing individual development and prevalent social structures. Such 
rationality as we possess is capable of no more than determining to an 
extent the precise appropriateness of aggressive behaviour and its form: 
it is not capable of diverting or controlling such genetically-hereditary 
behavioural traits altogether. Like the famous statement of David Hume, in 
Wilson's view our rationality is and always will be a slave to our 
passions, those passions being the somewhat outdated but firmly fixed 
product of our pre-cultural ancestry. 
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Although the evidence suggests that the biological 
nature of humankind launched the evolution of 
organised aggression and roughly directed its early 
history across many societies, the eventual outcome 
of that evolution will be determined by cultural 
processes brought increasingly under the control of 
rational thought. The practice of war is a 
straightforward example of a hypertrophied biological 
predisposition. (ibid, p. 119) 
By 'hypertrophied' Wilson means that we have as a species a genetically- 
heritable disposition towards certain modes of behaviour which, coupled to 
our ability to rationalise about the means to achieving these instinctive 
goals, results in evolutionarily unforeseen consequences of the original 
instinct. Thus the ultimate cause of - say - the nuclear arms race, is the 
institutionalised use of technology in the service of large organised 
groups of individuals, who are expressing on a collective level their 
individual and instinctive tendency towards territoriality. Whether it be 
guarded threats, cold war tactics or open hostility involving periods of 
armed combat, though the specific nature of the aggression depends upon 
choices made by groups on the level of rational appraisal, the driving 
force and hence ultimate explanation of such action is the non- or pre- 
rational instinct of territoriality. As one critic has summarised such a 
view of human behaviour: 
they extend the concept of farms or suburban lots to 
the nation, claiming that men fight to preserve or 
expand their national boundaries almost as 
involuntarily as they would their homes. They fight 
the soldiers of other nations because their remote 
ancestors once instinctively fought for nesting site, 
burrow, hunting range or the space which encircles a 
female. (Carrighar, 1967, p . 125 ) 
There are several aspects of the sociobiological account of 
aggressive behaviour in humans which I find inadequately supported by 
argument or evidence, or else plain misleading. The first is the 
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simplification of the notion of 'aggression' itself to some unitary form of 
behaviour. This permits the sociobiological account (invalidly in my 
opinion) to proceed to make cross-species comparisons of various 
behavioural manifestations, claiming that they are all expressions of the 
same basic genetically-fixed behavioural function of aggressiveness - no 
matter what the particular details of the species or the behaviour in 
question. This over-simplification of the definition of aggression is 
coupled to that of 'territoriality', such that anything from a greylag 
goose spitting at an intruder near the nest site, to human global warfare 
are explained as equivalent expressions of the instinctive 'territorial' 
response found in all species. It is not clear that territoriality is such 
a unitary behaviour, capable of being covered in all instances by a single 
function-naming term, and then compared across various species. One writer 
on the subject lists a diverse range of behaviours in many species which 
defy any attempt to gather them all under a single function-naming term 
such as 'territoriality'. He concludes: 
The very diversity of these mammalian and avian 
types suggests that any simple statement about the 
function of territorialism in general is almost bound 
to be inadequate.... The condensation of this range of 
possibilities into abstract principles such as 
identity, security and stimulation not only appears 
premature but neglects the diversity of the 
phenomena; in different. species territories may 
certainly have functions of widely differing kinds. 
(Crook, 1968, pp. 200/201) 
It is questionable if a single aspect of a species' behavioural range can 
be taken in isolation, and used in such a way for cross-species 
comparisons, without also taking into account the overall behavioural 
characteristics of the species, which must have some effect on individual 
behavioural elements. The specific conditions which provoke aggressive 
territorial responses vary from species to species, and across time within 
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species according to their particular life cycles and environments. For 
example, if the species has a particular mating or breeding season, this is 
likely to be a time of increased aggressive activity, especially between 
males competing for access to females. Pregnant females or parents with 
young and vulnerable offspring may also tend towards higher levels of 
aggression at such times, from a hormonally controlled instinctive 
response to shield and protect their young from predators and other 
dangers. At other times the same species may tolerate territorial 
encounters in a far more relaxed fashion, since there is no concomitant 
pressure an the individual to compete for or protect a particular resource. 
It would appear from such an elementary consideration that the blanket-use 
of terms such as 'aggression' and 'territoriality' is therefore misleading: 
it only succeeds (if at all) in building up an isage of behavioural 
continuity and ultimate causal and therefore explanatory continuity by 
glossing over what would otherwise be important distinctions - both 
within and between species' behaviours. 
The second criticism of the sociobiological account of human 
aggressive behaviour concerns the supposed 'instinctive' nature of its 
manifestation. As Lorenz, Tinbergen, Wilson and others have observed, the 
majority of aggressive encounters between conspecifics of species other 
than our own do not result in combat: they consist of a mutual exchange of 
ritualised signals which often suffice to settle the dispute in the absence 
of actual combat. The sending and receiving of these signals, and the 
sequence of behavioural responses surrounding them are products of 
evolution, in the same way as other signal-response modes of behaviour 
such as recognition of conspecifics. In man, however, the mediation between 
individuals during encounters does not rely on the instinctive recognition, 
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exchange and response to ritualised signals, in the way that this occurs 
in other species. It depends instead on a complex and elaborate system of 
customs and exchange of true symbols in she form of language and other 
gestures. These go together to form the rituals which constitute human 
communication, and which are the product of a culture's idiosyncratic 
history and the individual's training and awareness of this cultural 
context. This point is stressed by several critics of the work of Ardrey: 
Man is the one species whose social behaviour (except 
in infancy) does not depend on a uniform set of 
social signals: all our customs, including language, 
depend on the training we receive in our own family 
or community. (Barnett, 1968, p. 8 1) 
What are the critical sign stimuli for the human, 
which act to release stereotypical adaptive 
responses? What are the invariances of the cue 
functions in the human environment which help to 
release specific motor patterns built up through 
evolution by natural selection? (Holloway, 1968, p. 179) 
The manifestation and form of aggression in other species is explicable as 
a response to a set of instinctively recognised signals. If you look at a 
gorilla 'the wrong way' it will take it as a sign of threat or challenge - 
no matter what your intentions, and it will respond accordingly. But how 
does one define looking at a human 'the wrong way' or acting in a way that 
constitutes 'threatening behaviour'? There is no simple answer to that, 
since the whole question of the interpretation and meaning of human 
behaviour is context-relative, and this context is largely the product of a 
given cultural training and tradition. A famous experiment by Niko 
Tinbergen succeeded in getting a particular bird to attack a washing-up 
liquid bottle by associative conditioning of the bird's instinctive 
aggressive responses to another species. It may well be possible to affect 
human behaviour in the same way, and obtain equally bizarre results 
through techniques such as hypnosis and unconscious suggestion, producing 
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behaviour which is triggered by some aspect of the environment, but which 
bears no 'meaningful' relation to that environment as it would be 
considered by most other people. Part of the success of Freudian 
psychoanalytic method depends on the uncovering of just such forms of 
apparently 'meaningless' but uncontrollable behavioural associations, which 
nevertheless reveal a strange logic of their own exposing some form of 
stimulus-response type link between the circumstances of the behaviour and 
its involuntary manifestation. However, it would be fallacious to deduce 
from this that the occurrence of human aggression (and perhaps other 
forms of behaviour) is under the same control of instinctive disposition 
to certain stimulus-response mechanisms evolved and genetically inherited 
by every member of the species, and unaffected by any aspect of 
culturally-relative socialisation processes. Given this crucial difference 
in the way that encounters are mediated, it is difficult to see how 
sociobiology can claim that the occurrence and specific form of aggressive 
encounters is essentially the same in its origin and explanation for every 
species, including our own. 
Even the empirical side of the sociobiologists' cross-species 
comparisons seems to come into doubt when looked at more critically. As 
far as the phylogenetic ancestry of man is concerned, it would seem to 
point to a diminution of aggressive tendencies, especially as one reaches 
the level of mammalian and primate species. As one commentator observes, 
"the peacefulness of gorillas within their troop and between different 
troops is impressive. " (Helmuth, 1968, p. 9? ). As Crook goes on to point out 
in the article referred to above, "Man's nearest relatives among primates 
are singularly lacking in simple territorial behaviour. " (Crook, 1968, p. 21 ). 
Carrighar lists Caribou, Elephants, Sea Otters, Whales, Lemmings and 
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Gophers as mammalian species who show little or no signs of territorial 
behaviour, living in an open and communal style of shared resources. 
Similarly, many primate species display little evidence of the kind of 
fixed territoriality suggested by sociobiology to be their and cur 
evolutionary lot, and rarely reach the 'red in tooth and claw' stage of 
aggression often attributed to them in over-simplified behavioural 
accounts. It would seen that an over-emphasis on the behaviour of a few 
species phylogenetically distant from our own can have a very distorting 
effect on the consideration of the origins and form of human behaviour. 
Coupled to this emphasis upon the ancestry of human behaviour, and 
its supposed 'bloodiness' is the suggestion by Wilson and others that 
there is no hope of changing our basic behavioural instincts. As with 
sexual differentiation, we are told that aggressive behaviour is an aspect 
of our nature that we can divert in some ways, but which we cannot hope 
to avoid altogether. 
There is reasonable hope that our moral 
responsibility may gain control over the primeval 
drive, but our only hope of it ever doing so rests on 
the humble recognition of the fact that militant 
enthusiasm is an instinctive response with a 
phylogenetically determined releasing mechanism, and 
that the only point at which intelligent and 
responsible supervision can get control is in the 
conditioning of the response to an object which 
proves to be a genuine value under the scrutiny of 
the categorical question. (Lorenz, 19(56, pp. 233/234 - 
compare with quote from Wilson, 1978, p. 118 - above, 
p. 101. ) 
Unable to eradicate such supposedly fixed behaviours altc&ether, our best 
hope is to create social conditions which will divert them into a more 
positive function. Sociobiological analysis of behaviour therefore becomes 
an essential element in understanding certain social ills, and in 
I 
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redirecting the 'hypertrophied' forms of behaviour which have become 
maladaptive in contemporary conditions of social existence. As an example 
of the way in which such knowledge of our instinctive drives can be put to 
a practical use, Lorenz cites the promotion of such international sporting 
events as The Olympic Games as occasions when "the anthem of one nation 
can be played without arousing any hostility against another. " 
(Lorenz, 1966, p. 242).. This statement was of course before the staging of 
Black Power demonstrations, the assassination of members of the Israeli 
team, and massive boycotts of the games following the USSR's invasion of 
Afghanistan and South African intransigence over the apartheid system. It 
would seem that, far from providing a possible occasion for the defusion 
of international tensions built up in other areas of diplomatic relations, 
such sporting events merely become a further staging ground for the 
publicising of national and international grievances. The hopeful proposals 
of Lorenz, Wilson and others might work if our species reacted in a known 
stimulus-response type fashion to certain behavioural cues, and if these 
could then be introduced appropriately to counter the effects of 
undesirable social phenomena. Whether such a form of mass manipulation is 
morally justifiable or desirable I leave an open question. However, it 
would appear from the arguments presented above that it is not in fact 
possible, as they suggest, to reduce the occurrence of complex social 
phenomena to such simple mechanistic principles, and to seek solutions to 
national and international problems in terms of controlling instinctive 
feelings such as 'territoriality'. To suggest that human behaviour in fact 
operates in such a fashion, and that problems such as levels of violence 
in inner cities should be tackled accordingly goes no way at all to 
understanding the real framework of conditions within which human 
behaviour is manifested. As the example of The Olympic Games perhaps 
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illustrates, whatever 'instinctive' feelings are aroused by joint 
participation in harmless competitive sport, they are not enough to change 
the overall sociopolitical climate in which such events take place, and 
which provides the broader scenario of cultural history, ideology and 
identity within which the thoughts and actions of individuals take on 
meaning. 
In the same way, to draw easy parallels between the behaviour of 
overcrowded rats and statistics for violence within urban human 
communities is to ignore the whole range of social and other factors which 
may not be relevant to the behaviour of a rat, but which if denied or 
ignored in the human case result in a simplification of explanatory models 
and solutions that renders their informational content useless in any but 
a propagandist context. Even if there were evidence and reason to support 
the idea that the greater part of what appears as 'aggressive' behaviour is 
in fact instinctive and some evolutionary consequence of our territorial 
ancestry, it would still not follow that there is no hope of ever changing 
such tendencies, or that their occurrence can be predicted in any sure way 
given a knowledge of present environmental conditions. Since all behaviour 
is manifested in response to some given set of environmental conditions, 
upon which it depends for its precise form, it would appear that accurate 
prediction of the future responses even of 'instinctive' behavioural 
patterns is a matter of a posteriori induction, and not a prior! 
prediction. I therefore conclude that as far as the sociobiological 
explanation of human aggressive behaviour is concerned, the theory and 
empirical evidence are inadequate, and insufficient to support the proposed 
thesis. The alternative to such a programme of explanation and possible 
social reform would appear to lie within what is traditionally regarded as 
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areas of 'social' science, which are perhaps more able to accommodate the 
range and complexity of information and theory needed to deal adequately 
with such phenomena. 
Incidentally, both Wilson and Lorenz suggest that their theories of 
aggressive territorial behaviour are not merely sufficient to explain man's 
aggressive interactions, but sail close to the winds of Social Darwinism 
by suggesting that the same instinctive biological drives are responsible 
for the general adoption of forms of modern free-market economies: 
The biological formula of territorialism translates 
easily into the rituals of modern property ownership. 
(Wilson, 1978, p. 112) 
It is self-evident that intra-specific selection is 
still working in an undesirable direction. There is a 
high positive selection premium on the instinctive 
foundation conducive to such traits as the amassing 
of property, self-assertion, etc, etc. (Lorenz, 1966, p. 211) 
The full title of Ardrey's work -'Tha Territorial Imperative: A, personal 
inquiry into the animal or dins Q1 property ar-cL nations' - also suggests 
that modern capitalist economies and the desire to accumulate wealth and 
property within a competitive market are also hypertrophies of a 
genetically heritable behaviour pattern. As such they are to some extent 
inevitable and constitute a shared behavioural tendency across the whole 
species, regardless of social circumstances and cultural history. This was 
precisely the formulation which Herbert Spencer and his eager followers in 
the late nineteenth century derived from their crude interpretations of 
Darwin's evolutionary theory. Needless to say, such reasoning as Wilson 
and others have used to support this view of the 'instinctive' nature of 
man's economic life stands or falls against the criticisms already offered 
above, and as another example of the application of biological principles 
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to explaining human social behaviour I do not think it merits further 
discussion in its own right. 
Kam, Altruism 
The question of 'altruistic behaviour' has never been far from the 
centre of evolutionary theoretical debate. Darwin himself wrestled with the 
question of why some members of the haplodiploid social insects (the 
sterile worker castes) could evolve such specialised morphological traits 
and self-sacrificial behavioural roles for the good of the colony, whilst 
foregoing individual reproduction. More recently, new theories or 
expansions of original suggestions have reopened the topic to discussion, 
especially in the light of sociobiology's own analysis of the supposed 
evolutionary roots and significance of altruism amongst humans. Since it 
is the theory of 'kin altruism' which provides the theoretical basis for 
the sociobiological theories of family behavioural relations, which will be 
examined in detail in the following sections, one must begin by examining 
the theory in general, before considering its specific application to 
explaining various forms of familial relationships. 
'Altruism' is normally understood in a biological sense as behaviour 
which, whilst raising the fitness potential of some conspecific, has the 
effect of lowering (or leaving unaltered) that of the altruist, as a 
consequence of the behaviour in question. It is to 'do someone a favour' at 
one's own expense. The problem posed by such behaviour was how it could 
ever evolve in the first place, since selection would always appear to be 
against any altruists within a population. After initial attempts to 
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explain it by invoking theories of group selection (see above, pp. 45-46), a 
solution was provided by the genic selectionist theory of altruism 
formulated by WD Hamilton (Hamilton, 1964) . 
Hamilton argued that since, under a genic selectionist view, 
individual behaviour becomes adapted by natural selection towards 
enhancing the survival and replication of the genes, and genealogically 
related individuals (kin) share some of the same genes, behaviour could be 
expected to evolve which would enhance the fitness potential of one's kin. 
A gene which causes its possessor to behave in some way beneficial to its 
kin is going to increase its chances of survival and replication in future 
generations more than a gene whose possessor behaves consistently 
selfishly to all. Thus, though deserving the name 'altruism' when regarded 
from the point of view of individual behaviour, under the genic 
selectionist interpretation such behaviour is ultimately 'selfish' from the 
point of view of the replicating genes. Where kin help each other, the 
genes help themselves! Thus the terms 'altruism' and 'selfishness' can be 
applied by sociobiology to the same process, depending upon whether it is 
being described from the point of view of the individual organism or its 
genes. 
The key point of this chapter is that a gene might be 
able to assist replicas of itself which are sitting in 
other bodies. If so,. this would appear as individual 
altruism but it would be brought about by gene 
selfishness. (Dawkins, 1976, p . 95 ) 
The importance of the theory of kin altruism was in its ability to explain 
how social relations involving apparently self-sacrificing behaviour could 
exist in a natural world where cut-throat competition was the rule of 
survival. One of the most recent theorists to develop the work of Hamilton 
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and apply it to all areas of animal social behaviour emphasises the 
breakthrough which this theory represented: 
This turned out to be the most important advance in 
evolutionary theory since the work of Charles Darwin 
and Gregor Mendel. (Trivers, 1985, p. 47) 
However, as with much of the application of evolutionary theory to 
behavioural explanation, there is a price to be paid for such a theoretical 
breakthrough. It is in the apparent effect which such an explanatory 
schema has on the evaluation and explanation of human behaviour. Travers 
considers Hamilton's work to be of outstanding philosophical import, 
stretching beyond the bounds of evolutionary theory as a purely scientific 
discipline: 
If Copernicus dethroned us from the center of the 
universe and. Darwin from the center of organic 
creation, then work on the evolution of altruism has 
dethroned us once again, making altruism more general 
than we had appreciated and more deeply self-serving. 
(Trivers, 1985 , pp . 46 /47) 
One must therefore examine such a theory closely, to see if it does indeed 
carry the quasi-metaphysical and rather paradoxical conceptual 
consequences attributed to it by Travers. 
The theory of kin altruism suggests that in Ho2o Sapiens, as in other 
species, one can expect on average a higher degree of unselfish, 
cooperative behaviour between blood relations than between non-relatives. 
In fact, if one applies evolutionary considerations rigorously, the 
conclusion is that one should only expect and find cooperation and 
unselfish behaviour amongst relatives - the rest of social intercourse 
consisting of attempts at mutual manipulation for selfish benefit. (I am 
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excluding for the moment the possibility of reciprocal altruism, which will 
be dealt with in a later section covering broader patterns of social 
interaction. See below, pp, 151-167. ) Such an interpretation resounds 
throughout the pages of sociobiological texts: 
Individual behavior, including seemingly altruistic 
acts bestowed on tribe and nation, are directed, 
sometimes very circuitously, toward the Darwinian 
advantage of the solitary human being and his closest 
relatives. The most elaborate forms of social 
organization, despite their outward appearance, serve 
ultimately as the vehicle of individual welfare. 
(Wilscn, 1978, p. 165) 
So what we are in fact being told is that - appearances notwithstanding - 
all behaviour is ultimately 'selfish` in origin, and when not overtly so is, 
under the current analysis, seen to be covertly so. One is reminded of 
Dawkins' introductory statement of his views on human nature: 
Be warned that if you wish, as I do, to build a 
society in which individuals cooperate generously and 
unselfishly towards a common good, you can expect 
little help from biological nature. Let us try to 
teach generosity and altruism, because we are born 
selfish. (Dawkins, 1976, p. 3) 
The evolutionary story runs along the following lines: evolution has 
equipped us all with 'inclusive-fitness calculators', -such that whenever we 
have to make some behavioural decision, we always in fact choose to do the 
thing which will propagate our genes - either directly (i. e. selfishly) or 
indirectly (i. e. by helping others in order to help genes identical to our 
own). According to sociobiology, no other kinds of behaviour could have 
evolved, since alternative behavioural strategies would have beer- beaten by 
more selfish and therefore evolutionarily stable strategies. Such a theory 
raises several questions in need of further elaboration. 
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Firstly, it presumes the ability of individual organisms to recognise 
relatives via some morphological or behavioural cue. The simplest would be 
spatial proximity -a factor open to abuse by parasitic species such as 
the Cuckoo, which successfully manipulates the behavioural instincts of 
other avian species in order to save itself the task of raising its own 
young. Various mechanisms have been suggested as possible ways in which 
different organisms might have evolved a form of 'kin detection' device: 
The most intriguing of [ kin recognition abilities I 
suggests that many animals, including perhaps 
ourselves, may literally be able to smell kinship, 
that is, detect it directly by measuring some feature 
of the other creature and comparing this to a 
standard that has been learned.... Subsequent 
experiments showed that recognition was achieved by 
a form of phenotypic matching, in which the 
appearance of each bee was compared to some learned 
standard of appearance (in this case sisters). 
(Trivers, 1985, p. 129/130) 
There is at least one important point to be noted in this quote. The 
mechanism of kin recognition in species other than our own is, like much 
behaviour, dependent upon an evolved instinctive response to certain 
stimuli. In this case, the suggestion is that certain chemosensory cues 
trigger a response, eliciting altruistic behaviour between conspecifics 
within a hive of bees. What is interesting is Trivers' suggestion - 
unbacked by further empirical evidence or argument - that the same system 
may in fact be operating on a presumably unconscious level in humans. The 
reason this is interesting is because it specifically helps Travers to 
make cases of human kin recognition look as if they depend on some kind 
of mechanistic reaction to others, as they do in the case of other species. 
However, as I will go on to argue in more detail below, one of the 
important factors which distinguishes human behaviour from other species' 
is that the recognition and definition of 'kin' cannot be separated from 
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cultural factors and attitudes of individuals coloured by personal 
experiences throughout their lives. If there is a distinction to be made 
between human behaviour towards kin and towards non-kin, then the criteria 
on which such a distinction and subsequent behaviour is based differs from 
the mechanical process of 'phenotypic matching' or whatever occurs in 
other species. 
However, let us take it for now that there is some truth in the old 
addage 'Blood is thicker than water', and that we are normally more 
willing to behave altruistically towards kin than towards non-kin. How 
does this realisation affect our evaluation of ourselves and altruistic 
acts? There would appear to be two possible interpretations of the 
sociobiological perspective. The first comes close to what is known in 
philosophy as 'psychological egoism', which is the theory that - whatever 
appears on the surface - when an individual does something for someone 
else's benefit, they are always getting something out of it for themselves, 
and this is the real motivation for the act and its explanation. The 
individual that saves the relatives from the burning house is really only 
doing it for their own satisfaction in some way. 
The first response to such a view is to try and clarify exactly what 
is being claimed. The claim could be that, though the individual genuinely 
wants to save the other person at some personal risk, nevertheless this is 
their own desire, and the satisfaction of that desire is therefore what 
motivates them to action. Ultimately, then, the individual is acting 'for 
their own good' in that the action satifies their desires. The answer to 
such an argument is to say that obviously the individual is satisfying 
their own desire, but that the desire is not to help themselves in any 
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way, but to help someone else, moreover at some personal risk. In the 
sense that they are 'satisfying their own desire', all freely undertaken 
actions could be thus designated. However, one can still distinguish 
between those desires which are self-centred, and those which have the 
welfare of others as their aim. 
In reply, it might be claimed that what is really happening is that 
the hero carries out the act not from genuinely altruistic motivations, but 
because they could not live with the guilt afterwards if they failed to 
act, or perhaps they even harbour hopes of the acclaim which such a deed 
will bring. Such interpretations of behaviour appeal to a sense of post- 
Freudian sophistication, which has encouraged us to probe beneath the 
surface of conscious motivation, to the concealed and often less 
commendable side of our characters. However, there is surely a limit to the 
range of such interpretations. Supposing that the imaginary individual 
above shows no signs of harbouring hopes of. personal glory from his 
courageous deed, and only genuine and modest happiness at having saved 
his companions' lives. Is it still valid to deny that this is the end of 
the story, and to insist that, despite any and all forms of possible 
investigation and estimation of his motives, there must be some level of 
motivation at which he is fulfilling a selfish desire? One could take any 
example of the most selfless behaviour carried out ostensibly for the good 
of others (Mother Theresa is the most common example in such 
discussions), and under some logically possible interpretation show it to 
be the supposed outcome of selfish motives - these motives being posited 
without the support of any evidence from the subject or from behavioural 
evidence available to onlookers. But such a behavioural theory fails by 
being too inclusive: it is capable of constructing theoretical counter- 
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arguments to any further evidence, and therefore is incapable of 
refutation. Such a theory is discounted from being a true theory, on the 
grounds that a true theory must imply counterfactual cases by which it 
could be proven wrong. If, on all available evidence, it appears that 
Mother Theresa carries out deeds which are undertaken for the benefit of 
others, why should I or anyone become convinced on theoretical grounds 
alone that she is really motivated by selfishness, though no evidence from 
her own testament or that of others who know her could ever be produced 
{n support of such an interpretation? The proof of Freudian 
interpretations of unconscious motivations is their eventual recognition on 
a conscious level by the patient, and the hopeful eradication of the 
psychological disorder associated with them. It is possible to be mistaken 
about one's motives for acting, or about the apparent motives of someone 
else: but one cannot deduce from this that one must always be wrong in 
some very fundamental way. (It will be my further contention below that 
the sociobiological interpretation of behaviour is mistakenly committed to 
an a priori view of human behaviour, such that whatever the evidence for 
behavioural motivation, the explanation must be couched in terms of 
selfishness. Their radical reinterpretation of human behaviour is thus 
posited upon a further theoretical premise suposedly deduced from 
evolutionary considerations. ) I therefore conclude from an analysis of the 
above two lines of argument that neither of them show that genuine 
altruism is not possible in human behaviour, and that in the absence of 
contrary evidence, there are many instances of action which we are correct 
to interpret as being genuinely motivated by care for the welfare of 
others. 
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However, there is a further line of argument available to the 
sociobiologist. This is to argue that there are indeed occasions on which 
individuals act from purely selfless motives for the good of others, but 
that the rational and emotional processes involved in such behaviour have 
evolved because they served to further the inclusive fitness of 
individuals, and are therefore 'ultimately' selfish in their origins. The 
motives, on this account, are genuine enough: no amount of Freudian soul- 
searching would reveal any unconscious elements of selfishness lying 
beneath those which we take to be the genuine ones on the surface. 
However, these motives are only possible for us because they have served 
the 'selfish' ends of the genes in our evolutionary past. So, all behaviour 
is ultimately selfish. 
The answer to such an argument is simply to say 'So what? '. All of 
our behaviour is the product in an ultimate sense of evolutionary forces 
(if one accepts a naturalistic account of human life). All of it must 
therefore have some link with survival functions - though not as strongly 
as might be thought, since traits which in themselves are not advantageous 
(or are positively disadvantageous) may nevertheless survive the selection 
process. Because all behaviour is ultimately subject to the assortative 
process of natural selection, does this mean that we should suddenly cease 
to draw distinctions between Mother Theresa and a criminal pursuing a life 
of crime for personal advantage, merely because both kinds of behaviour 
are 'the result of evolution' ? This line of argument seems to end in 
stating an empty fact, which has no necessary relevance to our non- 
biological ways of classifying and evaluating behaviour in everyday 
situations. If we are told that altruism is only possible for us because it 
furthered the struggle for survival in our phylogenetic past, and perhaps 
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still does so in some cases, I do not see that this is a reason to 
suddenly cease to draw the distinctions which existed prior to such 
information. 
Perhaps, after all, the sociobiological account is pursuing a harder 
line than that suggested above. Perhaps we are in fact being told not just 
that such rationality and emotions as we have are ultimately the product 
of evolutionary processes which involved kin selection, but that our 
behaviour is still necessarily geared in a very narrow fashion towards the 
behavioural logic of kin selection. This stronger interpretation of the 
sociobiological thesis concerning the possibility and limits of altruism in 
humans is suggested by the sociobiological interpretation of the Japanese 
kamikaze pilots during the second world war. David Barash mentions their 
behaviour as an apparent example of extreme self-sacrificial behaviour 
motivated by altruism, but then goes on to suggest how the real 
explanation might be in very different terms (Barash, 19'9, p. 168). Barash 
speculates that apart from expecting a reward in an afterlife, the 
individuals stood to gain possible sexual privileges, their families gained 
prestige, and a refusal to go through with the mission meant execution. 
Thus Barash reinterprets the apparent act of altruism in terms of gains to 
be made on the personal level, and also by the pilot's kin. The suggestion 
is that - far from our species having evolved the capacity for genuine 
altruism - we are sti. ll in the firm grip of the relentless evolutionary 
logic of personal gain, or gain for those with whom we share some of our 
genetic endowment. The same example is given an even clearer 
interpretation of supposed kin-directed altruism by Tennant and von 
Schilcher: 
Perhaps the most extreme example that may fall 
within the scope of kin-directed altruism is the 
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self-sacrificing behaviour of kamikaze pilots. The 
modern Japanese population is descended from a few 
thousand Korean invaders; being therefore more 
closely related genetically than Europeans and 
Americans, say, their martial excesses are perhaps 
more readily understandable. (Tennant & von 
Schilcher, 1984, p. 145 ) 
I see no reason to believe that the supposed evolutionary forces directing 
organisms towards aiding their kin should constitute anything like a 
sufficient explanation of the behaviour in this case. The kin-directed 
altruism explanation relies on the implicit assumption that such 
evolutionary forces are so strong that they continue to override any form 
of cultural conditioning, or personal experience on the part of the 
individual concerned. If this is the case, then why are there not examples 
of similar behavioural excess occurring in, say, the highlands and islands 
of Scotland, or the Welsh valleys, where for generations small populations 
have reproduced in fairly strict isolation from outsiders? Surely here are 
the conditions for strong genetic relations, and the supposed resultant 
behavioural tendencies, in a more 'pure' form than the total population of 
Japan, despite its historical origins. Though there is indeed a sense of 
identity and community in such rural communities as I have suggested, I do 
not believe that one can seriously attribute its occurrence to biological 
factors of genetic relatedness, rather than citing sociocultural factors 
inherent in the lifestyle of those involved. Likewise, in the case of the 
Japanese pilots, I believe that a more correct and even plausible 
explanation for their behaviour could be found in the pervading ideology 
of the culture; with its history of strict hierarchical society, the divine 
status of the ruler, and the traditions of warriorship enshrined in the 
figure and example of the Samurai. 
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The only reason that human behaviour has to be forced into the 
explanatory moulds of kin altruism theory is because, as I suggested 
above, sociobiologists make an initial and largely implicit first premise. 
This 
_is 
that, because the cooperative behavioural evolution of other 
species could only apparently have evolved along the lines of kin-directed 
altruism, if altruism was to evolve at all, then the behaviour of our own 
species must be geared to the same mechanisms. Since other species are not 
free to 'choose' their behavioural strategies, neither are we. It is 
precisely this stronger interpretation of the evolutionary considerations 
which lies at the bottom of the sociobiological denial of the possibility 
of genuine altruism in humans. 
I accept the fact that the social interaction of other species is 
largely dependent upon individual responses to cases of one-to-one 
interaction. It is obviously of advantage to individuals (and to their 
genes) to be able to distinguish between potential enemies (such as 
competitors or predators), and those with whom it might be useful to 
cooperate. Presumably, this process must be carried out largely through the 
operation of instinctive reflex behaviours, evolved throughout the species' 
phylogenetic history. The simplest principles (in terms of cost/benefit to 
the organism) would therefore tend to evolve to govern the evolution of 
possible forms of social interaction, and kin altruism makes perfect sense 
as an explanation of the likely course of evolution, and as an explanation 
for many examples of observed behaviour. However, I would also argue that 
there are significant differences which alter the validity and application 
of such reasoning to the human case. Firstly, humans have an ability to 
communicate in various ways, and to form resultant informed opinions of 
the actual or likely behaviour of others which are far more complex than 
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any comparable ability observed in other species. On the strength of such 
abilities, we commonly make fine distinctions between those individuals 
with whom we interact, affecting our behavioural reactions in very subtle 
ways, which are open to constant revision throughout our life due to 
experiential learning. Our relations to others cannot therefore be reduced 
to simple mechanisms of recognition such as are captured by terms like 
'relative' and_! -mr =gel-&tive', Social factors covering a whole range Affect 
how we treat both kin and non-kin, to the extent that we might behave 
very negatively to some individuals despite their genetic relation to 
ourselves, whilst reacting very positively and altruistically towards 
someone who is not related genetically, but whom we nevertheless feel more 
motivated towards helping. Sociobiology might respond by labelling such 
behaviour towards non-kin as a 'misfiring' of the genetically-controlled 
behavioural mechanisms. Once again this is the hard 'Line adopted by 
Tennant and von Schilcher in their estimation of Mother Theresa: 
The biologist's final resort in the face of heart- 
rendingly pure altruism is to count it as too rare to 
have evolved by selective force. Saintliness prevails 
because saints cannot be prevalent. Its occurrence 
then would be put down to rare genotypic constitution 
or misfiring in unusual environments. (Tennant & von 
Schilcher, 1984, p. 149 > 
However, I would argue that such an account takes one large premise for 
granted: that human behaviour is in fact geared in all instances to the 
same evolutionary logic which controls the evolution of behaviour in other 
species. The above quote, as a final resort in the face of apparent 
disinterested altruism, labels it 'freakish' and therefore too rare to be of 
any consequence. Not only that, but it reveals the underlying premise that 
all behaviour is in fact under the strict control of genes, since the 
behaviour of Mother Theresa is due to 'rare genotypic constitution'. 
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In contrast to the above explanation, I would argue that one does not 
have to label such behaviour as 'freakish' or 'deviant' at all. Supposing 
that there were indeed a natural propensity in humans as a result of 
evolution to favour kin above non-kin. However, supposing further that this 
was not a case of strong deterministic genetic control: rather, that the 
human phenotype was capable of behaviour which went against the initial 
evolutionary forces coded for in the genes, due to effects of individual 
learning and the overall cultural environment. This would allow one to 
explain non-selfish individuals and those who behave favourably towards 
non-relatives with out recourse to explanations of genes 'misfiring' or 
particular individuals behaving freakishly. One could admit that their 
behaviour confers little or no advantage on themselves or their kin, and 
that they might in fact reduce their inclusive fitness potential through 
their behaviour, but that because there is not such a strong correlation 
between genotype and phenotype, 
the occurrence of such individuals in 
every generation poses no evolutionary puzzle. It is only if the underlying 
premise of one's argument is that all behaviour is closely and 
deterministically geared towards individual genetic advantage, that one is 
thereby compelled (as the above authors) to label any behaviour going 
against evolutionary logic as deviant. This is in fact the position of 
Tennant and von Schilcher concerning human behaviour, as is apparent from 
their discussion of 'problem' cases of apparently disinterested altruistic 
behaviour: 
The pure disinterested altruists among us - should 
any exist - form too insignificant a minority, 
despite the historical potency of their accumulated 
actions, to call for special confirmation in the 
evolutionary order. Like the necrophiliacs, the 
cannibals and the gifted idiots in our midst, they 
form a deviant residue. The genetic basis of their 
rare behaviour will itself be rare combinations of 
certain genes; and the circumstances that witnessed 
-125- 
their rare acts will be evolutionarily rare. 
(ibid, p. 154) 
Such an absurdly extreme characterisation of human behaviour can only 
arise because of an equally extreme commitment to the theory that all 
human behaviour is strictly controlled by genetic constitution. Individuals 
who help non-relatives at their own expense are only freakish against the 
assumption that helping kin and only kin is the strict behavioural norm. 
Why should we be inclined to accept that we are as a species governed in 
our behaviour by the precise evolutionary logic and behavioural tendencies 
which have been observed and posited for other species? Why not accept 
that we may indeed have tendencies towards such behaviour, but that the 
complexity of the human phenotype means that we are capable of being 
affected by social and other factors, resulting in behaviour which is both 
genuine in its motivation and yet not geared to the strict evolutionary 
logic of maximisation of genetic representation. So far there has been no 
evidence - apart from the insufficient a priori deductions from evolution 
- to support the idea that our behavioural repertoire is incapable of 
including actions based on principles which go against those of our 
phylogenetic ancestors. 
Given Hamilton's theory, we might well expect humans to show a 
relatively higher degree of affection or altruism towards their kin in 
normal circumstances. We might accept that such behaviour reflects a 
'norm' of human psychological development, and that this can ultimately be 
grounded in a general theory of behavioural evolution. But, given the 
complexity of human psychology, and the capacity for changes due to social 
factors and individual experiential learning, the occurrence of genuine 
altruism directed towards non-kin cannot be ruled out a priori. At least, 
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not without further proof and argument to the effect that human behaviour 
must always conform in some strict deterministic fashion to the narrow 
dictates of evolutionary logic. Such an interpretation of the evolutionary 
perspective on human behaviour renders the sociobiological point of view 
rather less dramatic than supposed by its chief exponents, and reveals 
little more (if anything) about human behavioural ranges than can be 
gleaned from the simplest of purely sociological accounts. 
The whole question of the relations of human individuals to kin and 
non-kin respectively appears to be more complex than is credited in the 
sociobiological account. There is a range of interaction which defies 
classification by the simple models used by sociobiology to explain the 
behaviour of other species. Humans do not respond mechanically to cues and 
signals by which others are then classified: they make decisions on the 
basis of many varied factors, and then respond within a whole range of 
possible behaviours. If this ability is ultimately a product of evolution, 
then so be it. Such a consideration does not make the decisions any less 
valid, or diminish our ability to assess and compare different individuals' 
responses, calling some altruistic and others selfish. At least within the 
sphere of human behaviour, such terms may still retain their normal 
significance, even if their application to other species must be heavily 
qualified in the light of evolutionary considerations. 
_, 
_ 
Parent L Offspring- an Sibling Rivalry 
The general theory of when one might expect individuals to display 
altruistic and selfish behaviour has been developed by Trivers and other 
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theorists, and subsequently applied to explain several specific areas of 
relationships within the family group. Trivers hoped to explain in terms 
of personal and inclusive fitness the altruism displayed by parents 
towards their offspring, as well as the tensions between parent and 
developing offspring, and the incidence of sibling rivalry at different 
stages of development (Trivers, 1972 & 1974). 
Once again, the theory begins with the formulae for genetic 
relationships wirst calculated by Hamilton, which states that in sexually 
reproducing species individual offspring derive on average 50% of their 
genotype from each of their parents (i. e. the degree of relatedness is 
expressed by the coefficient 1/2). Thus, if there is an evolutionary 
tendency to behave altruistically towards those who share some percentage 
of genes identical to one's own, it can be expected that parents will 
-invest a proportionate amount of energy and personal resources in 
altruistic behaviour towards their own offspring. However, since 
individuals are involved from the moment of birth in life's competitive 
struggle, Trivers deduces that "an offspring attempting from the very 
beginning to maximise its reproductive success (RS) would presumably want 
more investment than the parent is selected to give. " (Trivers, 1974, p. 249). 
The result of this is a conflict, in which every individual offspring can 
be expected to behave in ways which attempt to manipulate the parental 
altruistic responses to their own favour. Thus there will be a constant 
struggle between parent and offspring concerning the supply and demand of 
resources. Not only that, but since each offspring will try to dominate 
parental resources as much as possible, whereas there is no evolutionary 
reaEon for parents to discriminate between their offspring (who are all 
related to them by the same coefficient of 1/2), there will be conflict 
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between siblings for the largest share of available resources - 'sibling 
rivalry'. 
However, as with all behavioural strategies, one can predict certain 
upper limits to their continued development. If any one individual were to 
elicit too much attention and share of the available familial resources, it 
would detract from the fitness potential of its siblings, to whom it also----- 
bears a coefficient of relation of 1/2. Any gene for 'all-out attention' 
would therefore not be as advantageous as might at first sight appear, 
since individuals possessing such genes would tend to eliminate or be 
eliminated by their sibling rivals, thus effectively reducing the future 
representation of replicas of their genes. A gene for a more inclusive and 
less individual fitness oriented behaviour would have the competitive edge 
in a breeding population. Selection would therefore seem to favour a 
balance between outright selfishness and degrees of altruism; but the 
balance would be expected to remain on the side of selfishness. Such a 
theoretical deduction from the initial suggestions of Hamilton would seem 
to square well with typical scenes of familial rivalry, such as the greedy 
squawking of newly-hatched birds in the nest. Trivers goes on to assert 
that "it can be shown that, in theory, conflict over the amount of 
investment that should at each moment be given, is expected throughout the 
period of PI (Parental Investment)" (ibid, p. 252). This is because at all 
stages of development, the altruistic behaviour of the parent is elicited 
to an extent in response to signals of demand for attention given by the 
offspring, reinforced by signals of satisfaction when the demand is met. 
As Trivers points out: 
once such a system has evolved, the offspring can 
begin to employ it out of context. The offspring can 
cry not only when it is famished, but also when it 
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merely wants more food than the parent is selected to 
give. " (ibid, p. 257) 
It would therefore appear that conflict between parents and offspring, and 
the incidence of sibling rivalry are also explicable as an inevitable 
outcome of the tensions created by behavioural strategies in sexually 
reproducing species under a strong degree of genetic ccntrol. The 
individual (or rather the individual's genes) are torn between the 
cost/benefit conditions and resultant selective pressures which relate 
their behavioural outcome to factors of individual fitness, and those which 
relate their behaviour to factors of inclusive fitness. Selection and 
subsequent evolution will tend towards some compromise between the two 
extremes (i. e. there will be evolution towards an ESS). This may result in 
different periods within the individual's lifetime when their behaviour 
will tend . more towards altruism or selfishness, depending upon factors 
such as the individual's reproductive status and number and relation of 
surviving kin with whom they are in contact. Offspring, with a greater 
future survival and reproductive potential than their parents, will tend 
towards selfish manipulation of the parent, whilst parents will be 
prepared to invest to some extent altruistically in their offspring. 
Siblings will be torn between the altruism due to their 50% average 
genetic identity with each other, and the selfishness for which every 
individual is selected in response to the general level of competition in 
nature. Parents will invest equally in all their offspring (though giving 
more attention where needed to the young), whereas individual siblings 
will compete to manipulate parental behaviour for their own individual 
gain. The longer the period that developing offspring rely on parental 
investment for their survival, the greater the potential for various stages 
of conflict, resulting in the evolution of a more complex range of 
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behavioural interaction between the various protagonists. Once again, 
sociobiology suggests a theoretically-deduced underpinning from 
evolutionary principles for the behavioural phenomena of all sexually 
reproducing species. As this stands, I see no particular reason to 
criticise the theoretical coherence or observational correlation of such a 
theory within ethological studies. But I do take issue with the simple 
application of such a theory to the description and explanation of human 
familial behaviour, as Trivers believes his theory to be capable: 
the arguments presented here- are particularly 
relevant to understanding a species such as the human 
species in which parental investment is critical to 
the offspring throughout its entire reproductive life, 
(Trivers, 1974, p. 250 ) 
As I have argued above, concerning the simple and general application 
of kin altruism theory to human behaviour, there seems no reason to 
believe (and plenty of evidence to the contrary) that human social 
relations are geared to and under the influence of the same mechanistic 
processes and narrow evolutionary logic which no doubt governs most other 
species, and governed the phylogenetic ancestors of our own species. It 
may be true that in many mammalian species, as Trivers points out, there 
are natural constraints upon the optimum length of time that the mother 
spends in suckling and otherwise nurturing her young, leading to selective 
pressures upon genotypes to 'fix' this stage of behaviour by strong 
genetic control. This may lead to conflict between the mother and the 
young, who will be selected to demand a longer period of suckling than the 
mother gives. It may also be true that there is a likelihood of selective 
pressure to genetically 'fix' parental responses, such that more energy is 
expended upon the younger offspring, but otherwise all offspring are 
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treated equally, leading to a state of sibling rivalry for manipulation of 
available parental resources. 
In species where there is little capacity for communication and 
recognition of distinguishable individuals, the information relevant to the 
control and development of social interaction must be largely innate - i. e. 
behavioural strategies cannot be learned and developed in response to 
ongoing interaction during individual lifetimes, so they must be coded for 
in the individual's genes. There will therefore be a strong correlation 
(i. e. 'closed' relation) of genotype to phenotype. Not only that, but the 
pressures exerted by the need to compete within a natural environment of 
limited resources, and the purely material relationship of parent to 
offspring in terms of food, shelter and protection, would be expected to 
result in selection for and evolution of behaviour tied very closely to the 
strict logic of maximisation of energy investment and resource 
availability. There is no reason to. think that the pressures upon human 
relations, and the capacities for human social interaction are of the same 
kind, and that there is therefore selective pressure for the evolution of 
similar genetically controlled behavioural dispositions. 
In the human case, allegiances, favouritism, family feuding and a 
whole range of social interactions lying along a continuous scale define 
human social relations, and are ascribable to factors of experiential 
learning within a cultural context which are conceptually too complex to 
be instinctive. Before one is introduced to one's relatives, one has no 
instinctive response towards them whatsoever (at least, not one that 
conforms to some biologically-predictable pattern). Relations are built and 
continually alter, open to revision throughout individual lifetimes, due to 
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learning processes, and the complex customs, rituals and mannerisms which 
make up daily social intercourse. How could selection ever begin to operate 
upon the individual competing genomes, to differentially sort out those 
genotypes with the most advantageous phenotypic expressions, when the 
behavioural range is so complex and dependent upon such a range of 
factors, and the social environment in which such genotypes must express 
themselves is so unstable? What are the social characteristics which can 
afford to become genetically 'fixed' within individuals by selection, and 
which will guarantee higher degrees of inclusive fitness in future social 
environments? 
The period of maturation to adulthood in humans is normally longer 
than in any other species, both requiring and producing a level of social 
interaction far more complex than the purely material relationship of 
other species described above- in terms of provision of resources and 
protection. Except in the most tenuous subsistence environments, the 
comparative weakness and greater demands of certain individuals by virtue 
of age or illness will be more than compensated for by the capacity of 
relatives and even friends to produce more in the way of resources than 
they need for their own consumption alone. In short, humans exist for the 
most part in some sort of shared 'economy, the nature of which 
compensates for and largely reduces the effect of the kinds of 'resource 
thresholds' which dictate the daily behaviour of other species. This factor 
of human existence, coupled to the above points about the nature of human 
social relations, effectively frees the human individual from the kinds of 
environmental pressures and related behavioural decisions towards which 
Trivers' calculations suggest that they are motivated, and for which it is 
suggested that controlling genetic mechanisms have been selected. 
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Such complex factors of social development and relationship, brought 
about by the fact that humans inhabit not just a physical and biological, 
but also a cultural environment of conscious concerns and attitudes, would 
seem to reduce the importance and application of Trivers' speculations on 
familial relations. This is not to deny that evolutionarily-developed and 
genetically-heritable behavioural tendencies may play some role in human 
affairs, especially in guiding the emotional responses and behaviour in 
early stages of growth, thereby ensuring an advantageous bond between 
parent and offspring. But whereas for a fledgling one can define stages of 
development purely in terms of growth and attendant physical capabilities 
such as flight and feeding independence, in the case of human development 
the precise conditions and recognisable stages will differ from one 
society to another, and from family to family. Except for stages common to 
all such as weaning (a relationship which in humans is not even 
necessarily between the biological mother and the child), it would 
therefore seem impossible to predict from biological considerations alone 
at what stage or in what form conflict is likely to occur. The stages of 
individual development in human society are largely marked by cultural 
ceremonies known as 'rites of passage', which serve to define in symbolic 
form the changes in social status of individuals within the cultural group. 
Since obvious physical signs of development are lacking or ambiguous, such 
practices serve to prevent or ease the kinds of tension and conflict which 
might otherwise ensue. Perhaps in reply to this Trivers would assert that 
these are merely the social embellishment of underlying biological 
mechanisms and genetically heritable behavioural tendencies., and therefore 
coincide with the predictions of his theory concerning human social 
behaviour. In reply I would say that though they may serve some such 
function, their precise form, significance and timing is a matter of 
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culturally-conditioned factors, rather than any underlying genetically 
controlled behavioural disposition, and that to attempt to reduce their 
description and explanation to such a level would be to severely restrict 
our understanding of them. 
Given the above arguments, does the sociobiological perspective on 
family conflict from the predictions of kin altruism theory really offer 
much more in the way of explanation or prediction of human behaviour than 
can already be gained from a mixture of psychology and sociology? I 
believe that the answer must be negative, and that the failure to do so 
is due largely to an insistence on the misleading use of comparative 
behavioural models from other species, and the generalisation of 
behavioural predictions which fails to take into account the unique 
attributions of our own species for certain kinds of behavioural 
interaction. It may be the case that our species' ancestors were once 
limited to the forms of social interaction dictated by the genic 
selectionist logic in our distant evolutionary past, but it is invalid to 
argue, as Trivers implicitly does, that we are necessarily still tied to 
the same behavioural constraints, and that evolution has not given us 
capacities for behavioural interaction which are no longer bounded by the 
narrow logic of genetic advantage. 
2.., 
_ý 
Homosexuality 
Another of the areas of human behaviour to which the kin altruism 
theory has been applied is the explanation of the phenomenon of 
homosexuality. The reason for this area of behaviour coming in for such 
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scrutiny is that, as with genuine altruists, homosexuals apparently 
contradict evolutionary logic and thereby pose a puzzle. The opening 
premise of the sociobiological account of human homosexuality is that 
homosexuals produce no offspring, or certainly fewer than the average 
heterosexual in the population. As a result of this, the sociobiologist 
must find a way of accounting for the persistence of homosexuality across 
generations, since by conferring lower or nonexistent reproductive 
potential on those individuals exhibiting homosexual behaviour, it would 
appear that such individuals and their descendants ought to have been 
selected out of the species long ago in our evolutionary past. 
This points to the second underlying premise of the sociobiological 
account, which is that homosexuality is a behavioural disposition for 
which there is a particular genotype, and that the likelihood of any 
individual displaying homosexuality is therefore *raised or lowered 
according to the individual's genetic constitution. In other words, 
sociobiology assumes that there is a strong degree of genetic heritability 
for homosexuality. The 'solution' to the evolutionary puzzle posed by the 
persistence of homosexual behaviour within human society finds its fullest 
statement in the writing of E0 Wilson: 
Freed from the special obligations of parental duties, 
they would have been in a position to operate with 
special efficiency in assisting close relatives. They 
might further have taken the roles of seers, shamans, 
artists, and keepers of tribal knowledge. If the 
relatives.... were benefitted by higher survival and 
reproduction rates, the genes these individuals shared 
with the homosexual specialists would have increased 
at the expense of alternative genes. -This conception 
can be called the 'kin selection hypothesis' of the 
origin of homosexuality. (Wilson, 1978, p. 150) 
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Wilson's reasoning seems to answer the evolutionary puzzle of 
homosexuality in three stages. Firstly it suggests (as noted above) that 
homosexuals tend on the whole not to reproduce themselves, thereby freeing 
them to act as 'aunt' or 'uncle' to their kin, and assist in the raising of 
nephews and nieces (or perhaps even younger siblings), with whom they 
share some degree of genetic identity (a coefficient of genetic 
relationship equal to 1/2 in the case of siblings, or in the case of 
nephews and nieces, 1/4). Thus, though possessing a low or nonexistent 
individual fitness potential, by virtue of their homosexuality they are 
able to raise their inclusive fitness potential by aiding their kin to 
successfully reproduce. (There is even the suggestion that in some cases, a 
mother might recognise potential homosexuality in her offspring, and 
purposely 'manipulate' their behaviour in order to provide the family with 
a non-reproducing helper.. However, this line of argument is too implausible 
in the human case to be considered in detail. ) The second suggestion, 
which is particularly vague, is that homosexuals might in some way be 
more able or suited than others to take up roles of relative importance 
and influence within the community, such as religious leaders, counsellors, 
artists or some other position of relative authority. Again, this would not 
enhance their own reproductive potential, but would in some way raise the 
status within the community of their kin and their kin's offspring. The 
third stage of the explanation is again a little vague, but suggests that, 
though homosexuals do not themselves pass on the genes for homosexuality 
since their reproductive potential is at best low, nevertheless their 
relatives and their relatives' offspring may carry some of the same genes. 
Thus by helping them to survive and gain successful status within the 
community, they indirectly spread the genes for homosexuality through 
their kin. 
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It seems to me that the sociobiological account of homosexuality is 
flawed in every one of its major premises, and from the general 
assumptions it makes concerning the phenomena in question. Firstly, it 
assumes that homosexuality is under fairly strict genetic control, and 
therefore genetically heritable <otherwise its occurrence would pose no 
particular evolutionary puzzle), The evidence for this is from studies of 
human monozygotic and dizygotic twins (see Heston & Shields, 1968 - cited 
in Wilson, 1978, p. 151). Even Wilson admits that such an empirical basis for 
his theory is not beyond question. The problem with twin studies is that 
they are supposed to show the relative effects of genetic inheritance 
versus cultural conditioning on some trait in the individual. However, it 
is notoriously difficult to draw a clear demarcation between the two in 
practice, since identical twins tend to be treated by others in a more 
similar fashion than non-identical twins or ordinary siblings. Thus, one 
cannot point to a feature of their behaviour and say decisively that it is 
due to genetic rather than cultural factors of development, since the two 
are interdependent. Bearing a physical similarity and coincidence of age 
and therefore of developmental stages throughout growth affects the 
cultural environment as well. If there is a correlation between sexual 
behaviour and monozygosity in twins (and one research paper to that effect 
hardly constitutes a proven fact by anyone's standards), this could be due 
to genetic factors, or cultural factors, or a mixture of the two together. 
To take it, as Wilson does, that there is a sufficient empirical basis to 
support such a crucial premise of his argument is to draw conclusions 
which are biased far in excess of the available evidence. 
The next major assumption is that homosexuals necessarily have a 
lower reproductive potential than heterosexuals within the community. This 
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is taken for granted, revealing the underlying assumption that 
homosexuality is a single, simply definable behavioural type, manifesting 
itself in all individuals in the sane way, with the sarge effects on 
individual reproduction. This too is, in my view, a rather grand assumption 
to be making, since it is not at all clear how one defines homosexuality, 
or that it constitutes a single definable behaviour pattern with the same 
effect on reproductive potential in every individual. The recent 
investigations and flurry of interest in human sexual behaviour, and in 
particular homosexual behaviour, occasioned by the need to try and 
curtail the spread of the AIDS virus has revealed evidence that a 
significant number of individuals practice both heterosexual and 
homosexual relationships, often without the knowledge of their married 
partner, with whom they have a family. Even in the absence of such 
reports, it would still seem to be a rather simplistic view of things to 
talk of 'homosexuality' and 'heterosexuality' as if they were mutually 
exclusive practices, with totally separable outcomes in terms of likely 
reproduction. How would the supposed sociobiological account of 
homosexuality deal with the phenomenon of women who, after many years as 
wives and mothers, make a decision to leave their family and enter into a 
homosexual relationship as part of a general change in attitudes which are 
as much socially and politically motivated as to do with preferences in 
expression of sexual behaviour? Are we to understand such people as 
responding to underlying genetic dictates, or is sexuality inseparable from 
a whole range of social behaviours, through which individuals define and 
express their identity in a way which defies a process of simple atomistic 
analysis? Once again, i find the sociobiological assumptions concerning 
the necessary correlation of sexuality with reproductive potential, and the 
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simple and mutually exclusive definitions of sexuality 
damaging to their 
position, and a misleading presentation of the phenomena under discussion. 
The next stage in the sociobiological argument is Wilson's suggestion 
that homosexuals are more likely to become 'seers, shamans, artists, and 
keepers of tribal knowledge', thereby attaining some degree of prestige or 
status within the community and indirectly aiding their kin. This is 
perhaps the most curious of all the sociobiological positions, since it is 
unsupported by even a hint of further argument, except for a reference to 
scant anthropological evidence concerning the role of male homosexuals in 
some primitive tribal societies, and the suggestion that in Western 
societies male homosexuals perform better than heterosexuals on 
intelligence tests (see Wilson, 1978, p. 152 for further references). I can 
only surmise that Wilson is putting forward what might be called an 'Oscar 
Wilde Thesis', to the effect that homosexuals are in some way more 
artistically gifted or sensitive, or have unusual gifts of social 
importance which give them a potential for high regard in a society which 
values such things. Thus the lack of reproductive potential is compensated 
for by an attendant rise in 'sensibility', which again affects the standing 
of relatives within the community. However, what is utterly lacking is even 
a cursory discussion of the supposed genetic basis for such correlations 
of behavioural attributes. Are we to understand that there exists some 
kind of genotypical pdeiotropy - i. e. that there is a genetic linkage 
between genes for homosexuality and genes for artistic sensitivity, or is 
the development of artistic abilities and higher IQ ratings also a result 
of the individual's being 'freed from the special obligations of parental 
duties', thus giving then more time to perfect social roles which are 
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perhaps more demanding? On this particular point oý detail the 
sociobiological account is silent. 
The final point I wish to criticise is the sociobiological suggestion 
that, though individual homosexuals are unlikely to pass on genes for 
homosexuality directly, such genes (if they exist at all) may be passed on 
by close relatives, who are thus 'carriers' of the genes, but who do not 
express the sexual behaviour associated with such genes. Again, Wilson is 
not forthcoming about the precise nature of this genetic process, though I 
can only see two possible interpretations of how it might supposedly 
operate. The first is supported by Wilson's own comment that: 
Like many other human traits more confidently known 
to be under genetic influence, the hereditary 
predisposition toward homosexuality need not be 
absolute. Its expression depends on the family 
environment and early sexual experience of the child. 
What is inherited by an individual is the greater 
probability of acquiring hoinophilia under the 
conditions permitting its development. (Wilson, 1978, 
p. 151) 
Such a statement would seem to suggest that genes for homosexuality may 
be passed on by individuals who, although possessing them, do not express 
them it overt behaviour, since their sexual development has been affected 
by the social environmental conditions of their upbringing and early 
experience. Thus, genes for homosexuality could be present in two siblings, 
and expressed in one but not the other, being eventually passed on to 
future generations by the individual who in fact behaved heterosexually. 
Such an interpretation would seem to raise doubts about the importance of 
any genetic element of an account of sexuality, since it suggests that 
human sexual expression has as much if not more to do with the 
environmental effects on individuals of early social conditioning, as it 
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has to do with relative genetic constitution, The second possible 
interpretation of the precise mechanism by which genes for homosexuality 
are passed on relies on the idea that the behavioural expression of 
homosexuality is dependent upon whether the individual is homozygotic or 
heterozygotic for the genes in question. Such a line of reasoning is 
suggested by Tennant and von Schilcher's discussion of human 
homosexuality, where they state that: "it is no+ oT ýy-- possible that genes 
for homosexuality prevail because of superior heterozygote fitness. " 
(Tennant & von Schilcher, 1984, p. 141). The suggestion, again unbacked by any 
further discussion or elaboration, appears to be that individuals who are 
heterozygous for 'homosexual genes' may be in some unexplained way 'fitter' 
than individuals who either lack the gene altogether, or who are 
homozygous for the gene (and who presumably display homosexual 
behaviour). However, I am merely attempting to develop the line of 
argument on behalf of the sociobiologists, since it is not possible to gain 
a clear idea of their precise position merely from their own statements on 
the matter, which are at times little better than passing comments. 
In conlusion, I can only say that I find the whole treatment of human 
homosexuality by sociobiologists a web of confusion and invalid deductions 
from scant or nonexistent empirical evidence. The underlying premises of 
their argument are once again far from empirically or otherwise proven, 
and behavioural definitions are manipulated in ways which simplify the 
phenomena into a foam which conveniently fits the flow of the argument. No 
attention is paid to the complexity of the phenomena under appraisal, and 
detailed accounts of the supposed mechanisms in operation are lacking, or 
at best merely hinted at. In the case of human homosexuality, I can only 
conclude that sociobiology has not begun to fully recognise the subject of 
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its investigations, let alone offering any insight into the nature of that 
subject. 
2,6 Incest 
One of the traits of human familial behaviour most often cited in 
sociobiological literature as being under a strong degree of genetic 
control is the recognition and practice of incest taboos, The 
sociobiological explanation is in terms of a genetically heritable 
biopsychological mechanism, which affects conscious behavioural choices by 
individuals: 
The biological hypothesis states that individuals 
with a genetic predisposition for bond exclusion and 
incest avoidance contribute more genes to the next 
generation. Natural selection has probably ground 
away along these lines for thousands of generations, 
and for that reason human beings intuitively avoid 
incest through the simple, automatic rule of bond 
exclusion, (Wilson, 1978, p. 40) 
The question of how such a mechanism could function, since it implies an 
ability to recognise one's kin 'intuitively', is- answered by the 'spatial 
proximity' hypothesis. There is no need for there to be an intuitive 
ability to 'recognise kin' as such: all that is necessary is some mechanism 
which results in a tendency to avoid sexual relations with those who are 
very likely to be one's kin, and those are normally the people with whom 
one has been raised in childhood. Though not foolproof, such an evolved 
mechanism would in most cases serve the same function as a kin 
recognition faculty, and might explain how incest taboos and incest 
avoidance by individuals are such widespread if not universal phenomena in 
human society. 
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When two persons form one kind of strong bond 
between themselves, they find it emotionally difficult 
to join in certain other kinds. (ibid, p. 71) 
The empirical evidence for the sociobiological thesis comes from two 
examples of societies where non-genetically related individuals have been 
brought up in close proximity throughout childhood, resulting in an 
apparent reluctance to indulge in sexual relations in adulthood, despite 
the lack of actual genetic relation. This behaviour is interpreted by the 
sociobiologists as evidence in favour of the idea that there is an 
instinctive biopsychological disposition in operation which prevents 
individuals from becoming sexually attracted to one another, because on 
some unconscious level they regard each other as if they were true 
siblings. One of these examples is that of Taiwanese 'minor marriage' 
customs (see Lumsden & Wilson, 1983, pp. 133-139 for an account), but I will 
concentrate my argument on the more commonly cited example of exogamy in 
the Israeli kibbutzim. 
It had been noted by researchers that children raised together in the 
same 'family unit' or hut community on the kibbutzim tended almost 
exclusively to choose marriage partners from another hut or community in 
adulthood. There was, in effect, an almost universal adherence to an 
apparently self-imposed system of localised group exogamy. The phenomenon 
was explained by some researchers in terms of unconscious psychological 
mechanisms geared towards the instinctive avoidance of incest, operating 
proximately via cues such as spatial and behavioural proximity in early 
childhood (see Shepher, 1971 for this explanatory account), This example 
from human behaviour was linked to examples of instinctive incest 
avoidance in other species, plus the universality of human cultural taboos 
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against incest, to formulate a general sociobiological theory concerning 
the evolution and operation of genetically heritable incest-avoidance 
behaviour. The final story is that all sexually reproducing species have 
some degree of instinctive behavioural tendency to avoid incestuous 
couplings, which has evolved as a negative response to the consequences of 
incestuous behaviour, since the offspring of incestuous couplings are more 
likely to be homozygotic for deleterious or lethal recessive genes. Since 
incest is therefore likely to lower inclusive fitness potential, 
sociobiology states that there has probably been selection for genes which 
control individual behaviour in such a way that humans instinctively avoid 
sexual relations with those with whom they have been raised in childhood 
(who are likely to be kin). 
On the face of it, the sociobiological explanation of this form of ° 
behaviour seems to have some plausibility. However, there are some 
important critical points to be noted. Firstly, there is in this case, as 
as has been noted in other examples of sociobiological discussion of human 
behaviour, very little or no discussion of what actually constitutes the 
behaviour in question. Is 'incest' to be translated as referring to cases 
of full sexual intercourse between close relatives, or does it also include 
such things as kissing, petting and other related sexual activities, or 
even cases of mere sexual curiosity directed towards close relatives such 
as peeping through key-holes? The sociobiological account makes no attempt 
to separate the existence and enforcement of taboos against actual 
physical relationships, and individual thoughts and feelings concerning 
possible or fantasised relationships. It is presumed from the start that 
there is no significant distinction to be made between different kinds of 
physical behaviour, or between actual physical behaviour and individuals' 
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behavioural intentions, desires, fantasies, etc. I would argue that if 
sociobiology is going to offer a coherent account of such phenomena, then 
it must begin by attending to such definitional details, There would appear 
to be no necessary connection between individual psychological states, and 
public or covert behavioural actions, and yet the sociobiological theory 
begins by taking examples of publicly-observed action as evidence for 
supposedly corresponding underlying psychological states of the 
individuals concerned. In a society where certain forms of behaviour incur 
strong public condemnation, with attendant publicly-sanctioned punishments 
(e. g. a death penalty), one would expect to find a relatively low incidence 
of the behaviour in question. However, it would be simplistic and false to 
deduce from behavioural evidence alone that individuals in that society 
had an instinctive psychological aversion to the behaviour in question. Yet 
this is precisely the model of reasoning used by the sociobiologists in 
the case of incest avoidance. ° 
The sociobiologist could claim that my above argument presents a 
false analogy to their own, since the evidence from the kibbutzim shows 
public behaviour for which there is no corresponding sanction (since 
individuals are not avoiding incest - they are avoiding marrying non- 
related individuals, against which there are no public sanctions at all). 
Since the behaviour has nothing to do with public sanctions, they might 
argue, it must therefore be due to the function of some instinctive 
behavioural response. In reply I would argue that the behaviour in question 
can in fact be shown to be a possible reaction to public sanctions and 
codes of behavioural conduct, and that until this source of explanation has 
been shown to be invalid or irrelevant for some reason, it is premature to 
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insist that the true explanation must be couched in terms of some 
biopsychological mechanism. 
The evidence for an alternative explanation of the phenomena in 
question comes from a more recent report on sexual behaviour in the 
kibbutzim (Kaffman, 1977), In this paper Kaff man reports that there has 
been a change in sexual behaviour since the mid-seventies, such that the 
phenomena of sexual behaviour upon which Shepher and other earlier 
researchers based their assessment of kibbutz lifestyles in the 1960's is 
no longer accurate, and belongs to a special era of kibbutz development. 
According to Kaffman: 
Until the mid-sixties, the sexual and valuation 
education in the kibbutz preached abstention from 
sexual intercourse until after high school, and 
stressed the need for "sublimation" of sexual urges. 
(Kaffman, 1977, p. 208) 
This 'puritanical era' of the kibbutzim development can be characterised 
by the strong leadership and inculcation of educational and moral 
standards, with an emphasis on such things as sexual equality at all 
stages, and discouragement of sexual relations bewteen individuals below 
eighteen years of age. Such standards were internalised to a great degree 
by the children of the kibbutz, to the extent that "These youngsters 
regarded [ sexual ] abstinence as a positive value, and supported their 
attitudes with arguments similar to those of their educators" 
(ibid, pp208/209). Since the mid-seventies, however, values within the 
kibbutzim, the state of Israel and even the Western world regarding 
sexual freedom have undergone a considerable degree of change. Kaffman 
reports that these changes in moral valuations and attitudes towards 
sexual relations have had radical effects upon the sexual behaviour even 
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within the kibbutz, though there is no correlation 
between this change and 
the continuing living conditions which (according to the sociobiological 
theory) are responsible for the children's attitudes towards sex. 
Without any significant change in collective education 
methods, there has been a rapid shift toward removing 
the taboos on sexual intercourse among those at the 
secondary school level. Today, the norm is one of 
marked sexual freedom, though in a large part of the 
kibbutzim the coeducational child rearing approach 
has not changed; toddlers of both sexes continue 
sitting on their pots close to each other, children 
shower together, and boys and girls go on living in 
the same quarters from infancy through adolescence. 
<ibid, p210 ) 
It would appear from such evidence that there is no general connection to 
be induced from the facts of childhood proximity in kibbutz living 
arrangements, and general attitudes towards sexual relations. Further to 
this, Kaffman looks at the evidence for a. specific biospychological incest 
taboo mechanism, concluding that the evidence in this case too is 
insufficient, and that- simpler explanations of a purely sociological nature 
exist. The alternative explanations are: the smallness of communal groups, 
which forces individuals to look to other groups for variety and the 
chance to find a suitable sexual partner; the tendency to maintain peer 
group relationships into adulthood on the same footing; and finally the 
simple fact that romantic associations are unlikely to develop between 
individuals who know each other intimately from early childhood, when the 
glimpse of a stranger is enough to arouse curiosity and excitement. Added 
to this is the doubt that the purported exogamy was really such an 
absolute behavioural practice to begin with, as Shepher and the subsequent 
sociobiological reports have made it out to be: 
The suggestion of absolute sexual abstinence within 
the group is less than exact. Mutual sexual 
attraction, even sexual relations, between boys and 
-148- 
girls from the same group may not be typical, but it 
is not all that rare either. (ibid, p216) 
In the light of such evidence, it would appear that the sociobiological 
argument from the kibbutzim is, to say the least, less than compelling in 
its deductions. There are also further queries which can be raised against 
the sociobiological account of incest avoidance and the existence of 
taboos. For example, the supposed effectiveness of the instinctive 
avoidance of incest must correlate in some way to the degree of genetic 
relatedness of the individuals involved. That is, one would expect the 
strength of any instinctive behavioural response to differ with the 
genetic relationship involved - i. e. siblings should feel a stronger 
aversion towards incest than first cousins, who should feel a weaker 
aversion than uncles or aunts and their respective nephews or nieces 
(since the coefficients of relationship are 1/2 for siblings, but only 1/8 
for first cousins, and 1/4 for uncles and nephews, etc. ). There is no 
evidence to suggest that such correlations of relationship and subsequent 
behaviour actually occur: in fact, such a theory presents a further problem 
for sociobiology. In the case of the most common forms of incest - those 
of father/daughter, sibling and mother/son - the coefficient of genetic 
relation is equal, being in each case 1/2. However, the sociological 
evidence reveals that the incidence of father/daughter incest is higher 
than that of sibling incest, which in turn is higher than that of 
mother/son incest. If the psychological response is in each case due to 
the evolution of an instinctive mechanism linked to specific genes, then 
why doesn't it manifest itself with equal strength where the genetic 
relatedness is equal? One can perhaps formulate answers to such problems 
on behalf of the sociobiologists in terms of relative reproductive 
potential of the individuals concerned, coupled to their relative status 
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and degree of influence over others within the family group. However, even 
if such elaborations are logically possible, they are not forwarded by the 
sociobiological theorists themselves, who seen content to furnish the 
merest outlines of a theory, without regard for, the complexity of detail 
involved in actual cases. If the differential incidence of different forms 
of incest is due to further factors, are these too deducible from 
evolutionary considerations of human biology, or are they such that their 
explanation demands a framework of social theory and explanation? 
A final problem for the sociobiological explanation of human 
incestuous behaviour is in explaining the nature of the link between 
supposed instinctive behaviour on the part of the individual, and the 
manifestation of social sanctions and group morality governing public 
attitudes towards incest. Throughout the sociobiological discussion, it is 
taken for granted that these two aspects of human behaviour are 
functionally equivalent, and therefore to explain the one is ipso -facto 
to 
have explained the other. It is, however, far from obvious that an 
instinctive aversion to incest occurring at the level of individual 
psychology should result in or have any simple causal correlation with 
group manifestations, such as displays of public disapproval, backed in 
many cases by legal sanctions. The question which most readily springs to 
mind is why there should be publicly ordained taboos governing incestuous 
behaviour, if everyone indeed has some instinctive aversion towards it. 
Does evolution result in 'belt and braces' behaviour, which governs both 
individual and group behaviour, and if so, why is there so much cultural 
diversity as to the severity with which cases of incest are dealt with at 
the public level? <An extended discussion of this particular aspect of the 
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sociobiological account of incest taboos is given in the later section on 
coevolutionary theory - see belcw, pp. 235-237) 
In conclusion, I would argue that the sociobl. ological account of 
incest in humans raises more questions than providing answers. It fails to 
define the precise nature of its subject matter, and to account for details 
of behaviour which would normally be regarded as significant and in need 
of a further explanation. It takes a definitive line of explanation in the 
case of the kibbutzim example, where there are alternative explanations 
available which are not considered, and where even the evidence itself is 
not beyond dispute. Finally, it fails to answer problems raised by its own 
theoretical premises, thus displaying a lack of explanatory depth, and a 
relative inconsistency in comparison with viable alternatives such as the 
explanations of phenomena offered by Kaffman and others, who use a purely 
sociological framework for their discussions. 
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Chapter Three : Beyond the Farn i 1y 
Reci Local Altruism 
So far the explanations of behaviour have applied to the analysis of 
individuals and their nearest relatives. When one moves from this level to 
that of social groups, the models and theories become correspondingly more 
complex. However, the basic mode of analysis remains the same, geared to 
explanation of social structures and behaviour from a stance of 
methodological individualism. The justification for this is to be found in 
the sociobiological adherence to the arguments concerning the unit of 
selection, and the emphasis on what are taken to be a priori necessary 
features of organisms' behaviour deduced from evolutionary theory and 
concepts such as that of 'Evolutionary Stable Strategy'. All structures, 
from single cellular organisms to the social structures of human society, 
must be analysed eventually from a functionalist stance, in terms of the 
possible advantage they confer on competing genes within the gene pool. 
Contrary to theories which posit individual human social development 
as to some extent a process of gradual internalisation of already-existing 
customs, habits, fashions, etc. in, society (e. g. Piaget, 1932 & 1966), the 
sociobiological perspective insists that the features and structures of 
social groups must be attributable to the largely pre-existing behavioural 
propensities of the constituent individuals. Again, there is an insistence 
on the explanatory priority of genetically heritable behavioural 
propensities over learned behaviour due to environmental experience. Even 
small differences in individual instinctive behavioural constitutions can, 
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according to Wilson, result in a 'multiplier. effect', whereby they 
reverberate and become magnified throughout the social group resulting in 
large-scale effects on the precise social structure. 
Social organization is the class of phenotypes 
furthest removed from the genes. It is derived jointly 
from the behavior of individuals and the demographic 
properties of the population, both of which are 
themselves highly synthetic properties. A small 
evolutionary change in the behavior pattern of 
individuals can be amplified into a major social 
effect by the expanding upward distribution of the 
change into multiple facets of social life. This 
phenomenon can be referred to as the multiplier 
effect. (Wilson, 1975, p. 9) 
It would therefore appear that not only are the social interactions of 
individuals and their closest relatives explicable under a sociobiological 
analysis, but the social structures of the whole of human society as well, 
subject once again to the machinations of the genes - albeit in a 'removed' 
fashion. Such a fundamental theoretical stance runs counter to that of 
Marxism, for example, which posits the structure and changes of society as 
prior to the behavioural inclinations of the individuals comprising it. For 
the Marxist, it is the society which produces the specific individual 
behavioural types, and not vice versa. Changes in the behaviour of 
individuals are brought about by pressures to conform in various ways to 
the governing ideological structures, which are in turn ultimately a 
product of the necessity to regulate and uphold a given set of economic 
relations. The two theoretical stances are thus fundamentally opposed, 
beginning as it were from opposite ends of the structural scale: 
sociobiology at the level of the pre-social individual, and Marxism at the 
level of the pre-existing social structure. It is perhaps no coincidence 
that the strongest attacks on sociobiology have come from self-professed 
socialist thinkers, who see in sociobiology a scientifically-guised threat 
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to the theoretical premises of their own political ideologies. (For a 
fuller discussion of this aspect of theorising an human nature, see the 
later section pages 181-194 below. ) 
The first step in explaining the evolution of human society was to 
establish the possibility of some form of cooperative or 'altruistic' 
behaviour. This was achieved by the theories of Hamilton, and the 
extension of the concept of individual fitness to the new broader concept 
of 'inclusive fitness'. Having established the theoretical possibility of 
the evolution of a limited form of altruism directed towards kin, a further 
form of altruism was proposed called 'reciprocal altruism' (see 
Trivers, 1971), This form of behaviour is not limited to individuals and 
their genetic relatives, but to any conspecific with whom the individual 
shares a degree of social contact over a sufficient period of time. 
(Trivers also extends the term to cover examples of what would normally 
be called 'symbiotic relationships', existing between members of different 
species. However, as such individuals are not competing dir c_tly with each 
other for resources and differential representation in future generations, 
I do not think that such a use of the term is appropriate or constitutes 
what one would normally regard as 'social' relationships. I will therefore 
limit my own discussion to examples of altruistic behaviour directed at 
conspecifics. ) As the name suggests, it explains behaviour which enhances 
the fitness of some other individual at personal cost, but which in so 
doing raises the probability that the recipient of the altruism will at 
some future time return the favour. it is summed up in the saying 'You 
scratch my back, and I'll scratch yours! '. Because of the nature of the 
behavioural interaction involved, it can only be expected to evolve in 
certain species which possess prerequisite characteristics. Firstly, the 
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members of such species must be able to recognise and distinguish 
individuals, and to retain memories of individuals for long enough to 
carry out the acts of reciprocation. This leads to the probability that 
groups practising reciprocal altruistic behaviour will be fairly small, and 
their membership relatively stable, since there is obviously an upper limit 
to the number of individuals that can sustain relationships which rely on 
mutual recognition and_mem Qi_es of previous behavioural characteristics. 
Lastly, there must be some method of communication which goes beyond the 
simple mechanistic and largely instinctive repertoire of many species, 
since this would be insufficient to sustain the level of cooperation and 
updating of information needed for a reciprocal relationship to be 
achieved. Thus, one can predict that species living mainly in groups which 
have a fluctuating membership, a low degree of individual informational 
exchange, and where individuals are not recognised as such, is not likely 
to evolve reciprocal altruistic relationships. In fact, such behaviour has 
only so far been observed outside our own species in some of the ape 
species, and some social mammals such as wolves. The benefit of reciprocal 
altruism to the individual might be anything from grooming an otherwise 
inaccessible part of the body, to having one's life saved. Such behaviour 
is maintained against intrusion or abuse by selfish individuals by their 
exclusion fron future benefits. Anyone noticed taking advantage without 
paying back their share will be ostracised in future. Such 'cheats' stand 
to lose the benefits afforded to the other cooperative members of the 
group, some of which may be necessary for survival. 
In a society with a high degree of interpersonal communication and 
mutual benefit from social exchanges of all kinds, such as is the case in 
our own species, one would expect a correspondingly high proliferation and 
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diversity of reciprocal behaviour to evolve. However, as in the case of kin 
altruism, the term 'altruism' is somewhat of a misnomer. The altruist in 
fact stands to gain at some future time as a result of their behaviour, 
and the 'favour' they carry out is really no more than a 'loan'. Once again, 
in line with the deductions from evolutionary theory, there can be no 
behavioural exchange which is genuinely 'altruistic' in its everyday sense, 
Reciprocal altruism, like kin altruism, is essentially self-seeking, since 
by doing someone a favour now, the individual is only really increasing 
the chances of reciprocal help in the future when they may be in need of 
it. One comes back once again to the insistence of the sociobiological 
perspective that "a predominant quality to be expected in a successful 
gene is ruthless selfishness. This gene selfishness will usually give rise 
to selfishness in individual behaviour. " (Dawkins, 1978, p. 2). Where 
individuals are not apparently selfish, one should not therefore presume 
that they are in fact behaving altruistically in its normal sense. 
E0 Wilson's discussion of 'altruistic' behaviour follows the same 
lines as that above (see Wilson, 1978, pp. 155-175). Wilson distinguishes two 
farms of altruism he labels 'hard-core' and 'soft-core'. 'Hard-core' in 
Wilson's terminology corresponds to kin altruism, dealt with in the 
previous chapter. He states that one would "expect hard-core altruism to 
serve the altruist's closest relatives and to decline in frequency and 
intensity as relationship becomes more distant. " (ibid, p. 162). He contrasts 
this with soft-core altruism which "in contrast, is ultimately selfish. " 
(ibid, p. 162). Once again, the individual need not even be aware of the 
'ultimately selfish' nature of their behaviour, believing falsely that they 
are behaving in a genuinely altruistic way (. just how this is possible 
within an evolutionary framework will be examined in detail below). 
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Somewhat ironically, it is these forms of behaviour - ultimately and 
necessarily selfish so Wilson and others tell us - which form the cement 
of human society, involving as it does many forms of social intercourse, 
ritual and performance. 
But in human beings soft-core altruism has been 
carried to elaborate extremes. Reciprocation among 
distantly related or unrelated individuals is the key 
to human society. The perfection of the social 
contract has broken the ancient vertebrate 
constraints imposed by rigid kin selction. Through 
the convention of reciprocation, combined with a 
flexible, endlessly productive language and a genius 
for verbal classification, human beings fashion long- 
remembered agreements upon which cultures and 
civilization can be built. (ibid, p. 163) 
The same view of reciprocal altruism as forming the essential core of 
human society is echoed in much of the sociobiological literature, notably 
in the works of the man most responsible for developing the notion, RL 
Trivers: 
There can- hardly be any doubt that reciprocal 
altruism has been a potent force in human evolution. 
The emotions of friendship, moralistic aggression, 
gratitude, and sympathy, as well as our sense of 
fairness, probably arose as mechanisms to regulate 
reciprocal altruism. (Trivers, 1985, p. 393). 
Both Dawkins and Wilson also suggest that, whatever their specific forms 
of regularised exchange and complexity, human economic systems may also 
be seen as quantifications of the human behavioural propensity for 
reciprocal altruism: 
As a result only man has an economy. His high 
intelligence and symbolizing ability make true barter 
possible. Intelligence also permits the exchanges to 
be stretched out in time, converting them into acts 
of reciprocal altruism. (Wilson, 1978, p. 551) 
Money is a formal token of delayed reciprocal 
altruism. (Dawkins, 1978, p. 202) 
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According to the sociobiological account, hard-core altruism imposes 
limits on individual cooperative behaviour along the lines of genealogy. In 
order for individuals to go beyond such limits, a mechanism must have 
evolved which, although still ultimately self-serving, at least gives the 
opportunity for an exchange of cooperative acts between non-kin. Such a 
mechanism, we are told, operates via the genetic inheritance by every 
individual of emotional and general cognitive responses which guide 
behaviour towards the 'calculation' (be it conscious or otherwise) of 
reciprocal relationships with others. Thus, the ultimately selfish 
individual may, to an extent, be prepared to indulge in cooperative 
behaviour towards certain other individuals, provided that such acts 
eventually secure some degree of advantage (in the sense of being 'owed' 
some future favour). As for those not coming even within this limited 
range of recognition and reciprocation, they will be subject to behaviour 
governed by the unsympathetic and self-protective reactions of 
territoriality and xenophobia. It is no wonder that Wilson describes the 
collective state of an individual's social relations as "a melange of 
ambivalence, deceit, and guilt that continuously troubles the individual 
mind. " (Wilson, 1978, p. 166)! Seemingly trapped within a schema where all 
behaviour is tied to the evolutionary logic of self-serving individuals, 
Wilson bites the bullet and asks the most important question about human 
behaviour: 
Can the cultural evolution of higher ethical values 
gain a direction and a momentum of its own and 
completely replace genetic evolution? (ibid, p. 175) 
Perhaps not surprisingly, his answer is in the negative, reflecting once 
more the premise of sociobiological reasoning that genetically heritable 
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limitations on human behaviour overrule the possibility of change due to 
factors of social environment, the sel-LE-questioning nature of human 
reasoning, or man's apparently unique ability to create his own goals, 
ethical values and standards. 
The genes hold culture on a leash. The leash is very 
long, but inevitably values will be constrained in 
accordance with their effects on the human gene pool. 
(ibid, p. 175 ) 
Any utopian vision of a society in which individuals regularly perform 
acts of a genuinely altruistic nature is, in the sociobiologist's view, not 
a possible reality for human beings. There is just no room for the use of 
the term 'altruism' in its literal everyday sense. Once again, we are told 
that saintliness, or even simple charitableness, are either an illusion, or 
else exist in such scarcity as to be relegated in importance to the level 
of behavioural exhibits in some freak show (as Tennant & van Schilcher 
suggest, somewhere between the cannibals and the necrophiliacs). 
The sociobiological discussion of human relations in terms of 
reciprocal altruism obviously has strong similarities to the earlier 
discussion of kin altruism. Once again, it is argued a priori from 
evolutionary theory that there is no such thing as genuine altruism, 
therefore all appearances of altruism must be reinterpreted in the light of 
the theoretical premise. All behaviour is to be explained as ultimately 
selfish, even contrary to the claims of the agent involved, since they are 
not necessarily aware of the genuine motivations or the functions 
ultimately served by their actions. Once again, the same counter-claims 
against versions of psychological egoism can be made, and are made by 
Mary Midgley in an attack on the theory of reciprocal altruism in the 
human context (see Midgley, 1979, pp. 117-142). Midgley also claims that 
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individuals involved in behavioural decisions concerning potential 
altruistic behaviour (e. g. in the 'drowning man' scenario) do not have time 
to make the calculations of profit and loss necessary if actions are 
really to be undertaken in order to secure consequential advantage for the 
agent. Such a calculating species might have evolved, she says, but we are 
not it. However, I do not think that Midgley's argument goes far enough to 
combat the sociobiologist. She may be right to claim that actions such as ____ 
jumping in to save a drowning person are too instinctive to be the result 
of. cool calculation of the situation, but this is precisely where the 
sociobiologist would claim that the evolutionary aspect of behaviour comes 
into play. The individual need not consciously calculate anything at all 
for their resultant behaviour to coincide with the expectation of such 
calculations, were they to be made. Their reaction is supposedly the 
genetically heritable result of the selection of their forefathers' 
reactions, and by the logic of selection and the evolutionary process, only 
the more 'advantageous' reactions survive to be passed on to future 
generations. Those individuals who by nature tended to jump in to save 
anyone, regardless of possible return of favours, would also tend to be 
eliminated in competition with those whose behaviour coincided more with 
the calculable but not necessarily calculated expectation of return of 
favour. So what appears as a largely instinctive, uncalculated response by 
an individual is in fact the result of selective inheritance of accumulated 
ancestral 'wisdom'. No one individual need carry out any particular 
calculation, as Midgley seems to think is being suggested, for the end 
result of the natural historical process of evolution by natural selection 
to be identical or very nearly so to the product of conscious calculation. 
No honey bee ever sat down and calculated that the figure of the regular 
hexagon was the answer to the problems posed by hive construction. It was 
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an answer reached not by calculation but by evolution via random mutation 
and natural selection. Exactly the same argument applies to the evolution 
of human behaviour, and undermines Xidgiey's objection that individuals 
cannot be acting for their own consequential advantage because this would 
involve too much calculation, whereas classic examples of human 'altruism' 
show reactions to be largely instinctive. 
If the position of egoism which Midgley is attacking depends on 
behaviour being defined as consciously or intentionally selfish, then her 
objection to the sociobiologists would indeed stand, since it is not 
necessarily the sociobiologists' claim that all behaviour is selfish in an 
intentional way. This would appear to be the basis of Midgley's objection 
to Dawkins' use of the word 'selfish' in describing the non-conscious 
behaviour of entities such as genes. Under such a definition, behaviour 
could be both self-serving (being the product of evolutionary forces which 
necessarily make it so) and yet at the same time not be defined as 
selfish, since it is not intentionally so. However, such a dispute would 
seem ineffectual, since it merely turns on the definition and correct use 
of the term 'selfish' , without affecting the fundamental evolutionary view 
of human behavioural limitations, or the denial by others that human 
behaviour is no longer subject to the dictates of evolutionary logic. In 
contrast to Midgley's line of attack on the sociobiological stance on 
human altruism, I would therefore propose an alternative line of argument, 
which actually incorporates the sociobiological insistence on evolutionary 
considerations. 
I would begin by agreeing with the claim that where behavioural 
response and regulation is tied to the factors of resource acquisition and 
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competition with other organisms, altruism in its literal sense contradicts 
evolutionary logic. Where behaviour is a matter of instinct plus rule- 
governed learning capacities, there is no place for behaviour which is 
other than selfishly advantageous. Is there any reason to think that human 
behaviour is to be discriminated from such a general model? I think that 
there is, and my argument rests on the human faculty for self-conscious 
reflection, and the related capacities for reasoning, conceptualisation and 
linguistic ability. 
Humans do not appear to be in the same position as other species, in 
merely being presented with a world of perceptions through sense 
awareness, plus a set of more or less specific instinctive guides to 
behavioural reactions. Humans have the further capacity for self-awareness, 
for which I believe there is no evidence in other species. Given a certain 
situation, we may examine our own initial reactions, feelings and 
impressions before acting. We may look back on our own past behaviour 
almost as a third person observer, and examine our behavioural tendencies 
with a view to altering or at least acting with an awareness of them. In 
this way, present choices appear to be under a greater degree of control, 
and stand in a more autonomous relation to -past behaviours than in other 
species, where present behaviour is more simply and obviously traceable to 
a previous succession or pattern of events. On top of this, we can use 
imagination and other conceptual faculties such as abstraction to create 
goals towards which behaviour may be directed, rather than it being a 
simple product of a previous chain of behavioural reinforcement. All of 
these modes of thought are possible intermediary stages between initial 
perception of a situation and action, and may be further drawn out by 
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communication with others, and informational exchange with resultant 
effects on decision making. 
Presumably, since no other species shows signs of such capacities, 
they are a later product of evolution than the faculties employed in 
simpler stimulus-response type behaviours, which we share in common with 
other species. However, the sociobiological analysis of such faculties 
renders them useless or functionally impotent, since the insistence is that 
despite such capacities, our behaviour is still chained to the limitations 
and logic of the phylogenetically earlier non-self-reflective forms of 
behaviour. The additional attributes of self-consciousness, reasoning and 
conceptual communication with ourselves and others furnish us with no 
behavioural capacities beyond those already enjoyed by the rest of the 
natural world of organisms that lack such attributes. Any theory to the 
contrary, we are told, is the product of ignorance or self-delusion. 
It is at this point that I feel obliged to raise the question: given 
the usual functional economy of nature, why the unlikely evolution of a 
complex structure like the human brain and its attendant faculties if, so 
we are led to believe, much of it is in effect redundant? (This question 
will appear again in my discussion of theories of mind and especially 
epiphenomenalism. See below, pp. 2? 9-291. ) After all, we certainly have the 
subjective experience of being able, within limits, to reflect on our past 
and attune our future behaviour to goals of our own making which again 
have at least the appearance of being in some instances genuinely 
altruistic. This is backed up by the common observation that organisms 
appearing later in the phylogenetic history of life on this planet 
typically display behaviour which is more 'open' and geared to flexibility 
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of response, rather than being fixed to a rigid pattern of reflexive 
responses to given stimuli. If self-consciousness and the attendant 
faculties mentioned above cannot supercede or expand upon the behavioural 
goals and limits set by mere sentience alone, then what possible purpose 
can such complex capacities serve, and why do they provide us with the 
illusion of abilities which, we are told, we do not and cannot possess? 
One possible line of reply to this is to claim that the subjective 
experience or illusion of genuinely altruistic forms of behaviour which are 
contrary to the self-serving manipulations of the genes is in itself a 
sufficient explanation of its own existence. Such an illusion furthers 
group cooperation and instances of 'altruism' which - though in reality 
self-serving - have the effect of raising overall fitness levels in the 
group. Thus, the illusion of altruism is still more adaptively advantageous 
than comparable states of awareness which lack the illusion and resultant 
behaviour. Such a line of argument is pursued in an article by Joseph 
Lopreato (Lopreato, 1981). He begins by stating that he does not have an 
evolutionary answer to the question of why the capacity for self-deception 
should have arisen in the first place, declining to speculate on its 
function. 
I do not hypothesize about the evolutionary 
circumstances that led to self-deception, But it is 
reasonable to argue that, whatever the origin of self- 
fraud, once it was evolved, it developed a rich 
repertoire of mischievous tricks. (Lopreato, 1981, 
p. 121) 
However, despite this unpromising start, Lopreato does in fact go on to 
suggest a functional explanation for the evolution of self-deception and 
illusions about our own behaviour: 
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As consciousness reached higher levels of complexity, 
the curiosity instinct.... became thoroughly restless. 
Having pried into the nature of external things, it 
gradually turned on the mind itself to inquire about 
the nature of thoughts, desires, fears, self- 
centeredness.... Could introspection, under the 
influence of the need for approval, have threatened to 
reveal that the "evil" of others was in fact lodged in 
one's own being? (ibid, pp. 121 /122 ) 
Like the fall of Adam and Eve brought about by the knowledge of good and 
evil, the evolution of self-consciousness brought with it the potential for 
recognition of our own imperfections and the fundamentally selfish nature 
underlying all our behaviour: in order to survive such knowledge a further 
device - that of self-deception - evolved to cope with it, Lopreato goes 
on to suggest how the ability for self-deceit could in fact have become 
the starting point for genuine cases of altruistic behaviour, in which the 
selfish manipulations of the genes become perverted by aspects of human 
culture, and finally lose their original goal of maximising inclusive 
fitness levels, However, all of this is based on the original premise that 
the subjective experience of our own behaviour, and our readiness to 
attribute to others qualities of altruism is in fact an illusory trick, 
played on us by our evolved cognitive structures to protect us from the 
truth of our own and others' essentially 'evil' nature. Thus, sociobiology 
provides an explanation of the last stumbling block to acceptance of their 
theory: those who deny the 'selfish' nature of all behaviour on the grounds 
that we at least have the subjective experience and concept of altruism 
can now see why such an experience evolved, and how it falls short of 
constituting a counter-argument to the sociobiological thesis. 
Such an argument may have an appeal of sorts, in that it appears to 
be facing up bravely to a harsh reality - that of the essential and not 
very commendable nature of human behaviour. In so doing, it automatically 
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labels any counter-argument an instance of self-deception or fantasy, 
whilst satisfying itself with the fact that it has even provided an 
explanation for the occurrence of opposing arguments, and the reluctance 
to accept the 'truth' of its own conclusions. However, I believe that the 
above position on the possibility of genuine altruism in human behaviour 
and the explanation for the evolution of self-deceit raises more questions 
and confusion than it provides answers. 
Firstly, why should self-deception evolve in the way in which 
Lopreato suggests? Given that all species have evolved behaviour which is 
essentially and necessarily self-centred, why should individuals develop a 
psychological mechanism whereby they can pretend that - in their own case 
at least - behaviour is sometimes motivated from genuine altruism? Where 
and why did the concept of 'altruism' arise for it to be held as 'a 
standard, against which the ancestors of modern-day egos were supposedly 
forced to contemplate the essential 'evil' nature of others and their own 
being? Deception implies at least a duality of concepts, if not of actually 
possible behaviour - but we are offered no explanation as to why the 
concept of genuine altruism should have evolved within a 'selfish` species, 
thereby bringing about the desire to mask one's true nature even from 
oneself, by pretending that it conformed to one description rather than 
another. Why should a concept such as altruism ever come about in the 
total and necessary absence of any possible examples of such behaviour? 
Instead of the above questions which remain unanswered by the 
sociobiological story, one can imagine a different account of the evolution 
of human social behaviour. Rather than labelling the subjective experience 
of genuinely altruistic motivation a case of 'self-deceit', and constructing 
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ever more complex explanatory devices for incorporating 'supposed 
examples' of altruism within a schema which designates all behaviour 
selfish from an a priori standpoint, why not just allow that sometimes 
humans do in fact carry out actions which are genuinely altruistic? The 
sociobiologist admits that some actions appear to be altruistic, but then 
remembers his fundamental premise about the possible evolution of certain 
kinds of behaviour, and quickly constructs a further piece of theory to 
accommodate the new observational data within the original framework. 
However, as I have pointed out above, the sociobiological account raises 
more questions than it provides answers, whilst leaving totally unanswered 
the question concerning the evolution of a complex central nervous system, 
providing capacities for behavioural reactions which would appear to be 
'impotent' in the face of the all-controlling logic of the selfish genes. 
The reader is asked to believe that not only is all behaviour geared to 
the 'ruthlessly selfish' logic of genetic competition, but that The primary 
function of the evolution of the human brain and nervous system , with all 
its attendant faculties, is to provide us all with comforting but wholly 
false illusions about ourselves and others, so that we feel better in our 
daily existence and go about our selfish lives in a more reciprocally 
manipulative and therefore overall advantageous way. 
Once again, the sociobiological account of human behaviour rests on a 
dogged adherence to one or two basic premises, whilst refusing to allow 
that perhaps not all instances of behaviour are tied to or can be 
described within the framework of such premises. Instances of behaviour 
such as help offered by individuals under circumstances where there can be 
no possible expectation or opportunity of reciprocal benefit are dismissed 
as 'freakish' or given an unproven and unprovable Freudian-type analysis 
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in terms of unconscious motivations. Questions about why we entertain 
concepts which, we are told, have no possible reference in reality, are 
given partial and unsatisfactory answers in terms which have the effect 
(even if not by design) of raising ad hominem doubts about the willingness 
or capacity of the questioner to face up to the reality of true self- 
knowledge. Finally, the reader is asked to believe that self-awareness, 
surely-one of the latest and most complex products of evolutionary 
development, evolved to provide the individual with a view of themselves 
and others which is systematically distorted in its essential categories 
of behavioural assessment, and that it is only through an appreciation of 
this state of affairs that one can come to a true evaluation of the nature 
and significance of human behavioural relations. In the face of such 
theorising, I can only appeal to alternative explanations which begin by 
accepting that at least some instances of behavioural assessment, such as 
are commonly made, are in fact correct, and that one need not construct a 
complex and (in my view) at times wholly implausible explanatory 
framework in order to 'explain away' the host of examples which do not 
appear reconcilable with the fundamental premise of one's position. It is 
not perhaps a kind of 'cowardice' which prevents many people from 
accepting the view of human nature presented by sociobiology; it is 
perhaps an adherence to 'reasonableness' which, in the absence of concrete 
evidence or more coherent and convincing argument, dismisses the 
fundamental explanatory views of sociobiology as unnecessarily limited and 
distorting when applied to the field of human social behaviour. 
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Power Politics and the Evolution QffL the selfish State 
Many sociobiological texts claim that their theories can be used tc 
shed light on the processes involved in the sphere of human international 
relations, and the political institutions which govern this area of 
sociopolitical behaviour. The basis for their claim comes from the 
observed tendency of individuals to discriminate others and classify them 
according to some criterion of 'in-group/out-group' membership. This is 
supposedly a basic psychological trait of cognition common to all 
individuals, subsequently affecting many aspects of social relationships. 
Having thus divided one's perception of others, the two groups are treated 
according to very different behavioural standards, leading to behaviour 
which is described by the related terms of 'ethnocentricity' and 
'xenophobia'. Wilson, for example, forwards just such a view of human 
behaviour in his discussion of the supposed universality of organised 
warfare: 
The force behind most warlike policies is 
ethnocentrism, the irrationally exaggerated allegiance 
of individuals to their kin and fellow tribesmen. In 
general, primitive men divide the world into two 
tangible parts. (Vilson, 1978, p. 114) 
N 
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In a collection of papers dedicated to exploring the implications of this 
aspect of sociobiological theory, entitled I Sociobiology ol 
Ethnocentrism (Reynolds, Falger & Vine, 1987), the general point forwarded 
by Wilson above is developed at some length. Falger states the main issue 
raised by a sociobiological approach to the analysis of international 
political relations in his paper entitled "From Xenophobia to Xenobiosis? ": 
The purpose of this chapter is to deal with the 
question why deterrence exists at all - quite a 
standard question in international relations theory - 
and whether this typical group-behaviour pattern has 
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a longer history than the period since the first 
states were formed; this is a question which is most 
likely to be answered using theories and hypotheses 
developed in evolutionary biology. (Falger, 1987, p. 235) 
This kind of approach to the topic does not hope to elucidate any 
particular state of affairs; that can best be achieved by reference to 
proximate factors of the history and culture of the parties involved. 
Rather, the aim is to discover if there are any behavioural patterns and 
identifiable 'forces' of an ultimate and more general kind, which underlie 
and shape to some extent the nature and form of all political relations, 
no matter what the differences at the level of localised proximate factors. 
I believe that there are two senses in which Falger's arguments attempt to 
form a link between theories of international political relations and 
aspects of evolutionary theory. 
The first sense is that in which the system of international 
relations, and the processes which bring about the changes in such 
relations are seen as constituting an evolutionary system, essentially 
analogous to that which operates at the level of the biological evolution 
of organisms and species. Falger begins his analysis by expounding a 
realistic theory of international relations, in which the absence of any 
international governing body results in a state of semi-anarchy between 
nations. Every national group involved in such a situation attempts to 
secure and maintain its own status within a competitive and potentially 
hostile environment of equally self-motivated contenders: 
In any self-help system, units worry about survival, 
and considerations of security will subordinate 
economic gain to political interests. (Marxists see it 
just the other way around. ) (ibid, p. 237) 
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This picture of selfishly competing international groups aligns the 
balance of power theory of international relations with evolutionary 
theory. The analogy between the biological system of evolution by natural 
selection and power politics is made even more compelling when we are 
told that the development of international relations is, from one 
perspective at least, more due to non-conscious forces of competition and 
their outcome than to the conscious planning of individuals and political 
groups. Changes at the level of international political relations appear to 
be as much a result of 'blind' forces of natural selection within a 
competitive environment as the biological evolutionary changes occurring 
within and between competing species: 
This theoretical perspective distinguishes and 
dismisses itself from the common-sense conviction 
that international politics is the outcome of an 
ideological struggle and political will. In terms of 
the foreign policy of a national state, political 
leaders and their self-ascribed power are not 
unimportant at all. But seen from a longer historical 
perspective their influence appears to be more bound 
up with the internal and external structure of power 
relations, in which every (competitive) interaction 
among social groups takes place, than the other way 
around. (ibid, p. 240) 
Falger goes on to expound and support the theories of RD Alexander 
(Alexander, 1979), in which it was argued that the first nation-states 
evolved as a result of a natural process (i. e. with no need for conscious 
feoresight or planning from political leaders), changing from smaller to 
larger and more complex groups. This process of evolution towards 
increased size and complexity of internal and external relations 
supposedly came about as a result of a combination of two basic and 
opposing forces. The first was ethnocentrism, which became more acute 
because of the increased need for solidarity and group strength and 
identity in the face of external competition and threat. The second force 
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was that of xenophobia, the growth of which is an obvious counterpart to 
the increase of ethnocentricity, and accounted for changes in the relations 
between competing groups. Thus, at the level of intergroup relations, the 
view supported by Alexander and Falger is that of an autocatalytic process 
of change, subject to forces of increasing competition, intergroup 
diversification, and differential survival by natural selection. The 
increasing pressure of defence needs and stability within a competitive 
environment, building upon the supposed genetically heritable tendencies 
towards ethnocentricity/xenophobia, lead naturally to the formation of 
warlike groups and an emphasis on organised defensive strategies of 
behaviour, thus maintaining an uneasy balance of power. 
Such self-reinforcing processes, in combination with 
suitable ecological environments in several regions 
in the Middle East, and evolving technological 
capabilities, gave birth to the first nation-states. 
(ibid, p. 244 ) 
Such a view of the evolution of international relations between the 
earliest human civilisations, and its subsequent effect on the continuing 
course of human history, is also forwarded in very similar terms by 
Wilson, who explicitly acknowledges the extension of evolutionary theory 
to explaining the origins and continuing phenomena of political relations: 
Primitive men cleaved their universe into friends and 
enemies and responded with quick, deep emotion to 
even the mildest threats emanating from outside the 
arbitrary boundary. With the rise of chiefdoms and 
states, this tendency became institutionalised, war 
was adopted as an instrument of policy of some of 
the new societies, and those that employed it best 
became - tragically - the most successful. The 
evolution of warfare was an autocatalytic reaction 
that could not be halted by any people, because to 
attempt to reverse the process unilaterally was to 
fall victim. A new mode of natural selection was 
operating at the level of entire societies. 
(Wilson, 1978, p. 119 ) 
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The first sense in which the rise and relationships of nation states is a 
supposedly suitable topic for investigation by evolutionary theorists is 
therefore by analogy to the processes of biological evolution by natural 
selection. The historical process of state formation, and the subsequent 
relations between states can be captured and explained using models and 
theories already developed to describe biological evolution. However, this 
is not the only sense in which evolutionary theory may be thought to have 
some relevance to theories of international relations. 
There is a further, and in my view more contentious sense in which 
political theory and the biological sciences may be linked. This is in the 
above-mentioned reference to human individuals having a genetically 
heritable tendency towards classification of others, and resultant 
ethnocentric and xenophobic behavioural reactions, which supposedly lie at 
the root of all group formation and the identification of others as 
'outsiders' and therefore potential enemies. This is the behavioural 
premise upon which the theory of the natural evolution of warring states 
is based: 
international politics is one prominent area where 
in-group/out--group manifestations are overwhelmingly 
present, and, [1 it will be argued that it is here 
that the connection between biology and the study of 
international politics is most promising. (Falger, 
1987, p. 240) 
When this view of human behaviour is added to the existing sociobiological 
descriptions of the supposed limits to human cooperation - the 
biologically-dictated restrictions and true significance of 'altruism' - the 
resultant picture of human potential in the international arena is not 
exactly promising. The references to the continuing existence of arms 
races, mistrust, and the often limited and explicitly reciprocal nature of 
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any international agreements are all used as evidence in support of the 
view that we are as a species limited to just such forms of behavioural 
relations, not because of any lack of good will on our part, but because of 
our genetically endowed behavioural range. This is coupled to the emphasis 
on the 'autocatalytic' nature of power struggles, which reinforces a common 
theme in sociobiological writing - that of the insignificance of 
consciously-motivated action in a world where most changes are really 
brought about by forces which are non-conscious, and beyond any kind of 
conscious manipulation by ourselves. The development of human history is 
largely seen from the perspective of a nexus of impersonal forces 
operating on and within human society, resulting in changes which 
individuals can do little to alter or even comprehend. 
Falger does not, however, accept the supposed inherently xenophobic 
nature of man's behaviour without some discussion of the grounds for such 
a view. This involves posing the question of whether xenophobia is a 
product or a precursor of post-agricultural society. Did the nation states 
emerge because of tendencies towards xenophobia, or vice versa? Some 
theorists (e. g. Montagu, 1976 and Reynolds, 1980) have argued that there is 
no archaeological evidence for high levels of violence in. pre-cultural man. 
This argument is backed up by further anthropological evidence of the 
peacefulness of many contemporary hunter-gatherer societies. However, 
Alexander and Falger both take the opposite view in this debate. They 
argue that unless there is positive evidence of a lack of warlike violence 
in pre-cultural man (though one wonders what such evidence would look 
like), it remains in their view likely that modern behavioural norms can 
be extrapolated backwards into our pre-cultural history. They conclude 
that it is 'unlikely' that xenophobia is a product of cultural existence, 
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and that it pre-dates and explains the emergence and continuing relations 
of states and national groups. 
So, although it will never be possible to prove it 
definitely, the model of in-group/out-group behaviour 
is so extremely widespread and tied up with 
competition, conflict and cooperation that one can 
safely use it as an axiom in theories about 
international politics of past and present. 
(Falger, 1987, p. 245) 
The theory does not stop at using the supposed genetically heritable 
characteristics of ethnocentricity and xenophobia to explain the sphere of 
international relations: Falger believes- that such characteristics also 
explain many of the features common to the internal social structures of 
human groups, thus providing a possible link between the natural and the 
social sciences: 
Alexander's hypothesis on the rise of the nation- 
state - depending on intergroup competition and on 
the maintenance of balances of power between human 
groups with the increase of those groups - seems to 
be the most powerful explanation bridging the factual 
and theoretical gap between present time and man's 
long prehistory, and between the realm of the social 
and evolutionary-biological sciences. (ibid, p. 246) 
Thus, after a brief comparison of the contending theories, Falger answers 
the question he posed at the start of his paper: in his view international 
deterrence strategies do in fact pre-date the historical emergence of the 
first nation-states, and they conform to the basic behavioural 
characteristics of ethnocentricity and xenophobia which are supposedly 
genetically heritable behavioural patterns in humans. This view is also the 
underlying premise of Alexander's theory of human history. Even if the 
word 'cooperation' is brought into Falger's discussion of political 
relations, the arguments already presented by Wilson and others would 
immediately translate it into 'reciprocal' or 'kin' altruism, leaving one 
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with the view that international relations are at best a process of mutual 
exploitation, and at worst an inevitable arena of threat, suspicion, 
counter-threat and irrational aggression, necessarily beyond any 
individual's comprehension or control. 
In the light of the above, it is somewhat surprising to find Falger 
stating his hope that, through an appreciation of the true nature of our 
behaviour, we may come to change it via rational means of control. He 
looks forward to the possibility of groups mingling and sharing one 
another's resources -a utopian state of human relations which he compares 
with the cooperative relations found between some species called 
'xenobiosis'. Such a surprisingly optimistic coda is to be found in other 
texts which reach similar conclusions to Falger, and raises important 
questions about just what is being stated in the final analysis. 
Even if ethnocentrism and group conflict have their 
origins in our evolutionary past, and even if our 
genes predispose us to make in-group/out-group 
distinctions and behave accordingly, we can hope at 
least that through greater knowledge and 
understanding we can substantially overcome these 
tendencies. (Falger, 198?, p . 2? 1) 
The obvious conclusion is that love and friendship 
should embrace all humanity.... nevertheless, made as 
we. are, we are unable to obey it [this commandment]. 
We can feel the full, warm emotion of friendship and 
love only for individuals, and the utmost exertion of 
willpower cannot alter this fact. But the great 
constructors can, and I believe they will. I believe 
in the power of human reason, as I believe in the 
power of natural selection. I believe that reason can 
and will exert a selection pressure in the right 
direction. (Lorenz, 1963, p. 258 - entitled 'Avowal of 
Optimism') 
We are forced to choose among the elements of human 
nature by reference to value systems which these same 
elements created in an evolutionary age now long 
vanished... Fortunately, this circularity of the human 
predicament is not so tight that it cannot be broken 
through an exercise of will. (Wilson, 1978, p. 203 - 
entitled `'Hope') 
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All of the above three statements seem to raise serious doubts as to the 
conclusion of the sociobiological analysis of human social relations. I 
would argue that, given their accounts of man's tendency towards 
xenophobia and aggression, to which "our genes predispose us" (Falger), 
added to the historical dimension of culturally entrenched identities and 
perceptions of national groups and boundaries, it is difficult to see how 
one can still have hopes of enlightened behaviour and social change 
brought about through rational control. Surely, from their own premises 
concerning human behavioural tendencies, it must be doubtful (to say the 
least) that anyone would feel a sufficient natural urge to invest their 
energies in a project of group reconciliation. We have also been forcefully 
reminded of the likely consequences of a unilateral lowering of one's 
defensive strategy, which in a balance of power situation is tantamount to 
national suicide. 
To hope that enlightened action can transcend the evolutionary roots 
of human behaviour as they have been described is, in my view, to attempt 
a U-turn on their own previous pronouncements. At other places in the 
writings of Wilson we are told that our rationality is slave to our 
instincts, and that our instincts are tuned over millions of years of 
evolution to the balance scales of selfish advantage. Lorenz also sides 
with Hume against Kant in the debate over the strengths and relative 
functions of the passions and reason. Dawkins has told us "We are born 
selfish". Where then in all this system is the genuine motivation or 
capacity for escape from selfish competitive rivalry supposed to originate 
and gain a secure foothold, at any level of behaviour from individuals to 
national political consciousness? Falger begins to visibly falter in his 
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conclusions as to the practical relevance of his theoretical arguments 
about the origins and nature of national consciousness and aggression in 
human society: 
However, to be completely honest: in explaining 
today's existence of 'mutual deterrence' or the 
'balance of terror', we do not need evolutionary 
biology. The structural theory of power politics 
itself contains enough to do that job. (Falger, 1987, 
p. 247) 
This is juxtaposed with a passage on the same page which would appear to 
present a different kind of conclusion: 
In general, a more biologically oriented political 
science could contribute substantially to a more 
fundamental analysis of political life. The emergence 
of biopolitics is promising in this respect. (ibid, 
1987, p. 247) 
I believe that Falger, Wilson, Lorenz and others have created a paradoxical 
situation by their theories, from which they wish but find it very 
difficult to extricate themselves. If sociobiological theory is false, or 
does not imply the kind of strength of heritable behavioural dispositions 
which have so far been implied, then it can have little or no relevance to 
possible future changes in society. As a false or partial theory whose 
predictions can be overturned by effects described in sore other area such 
as social history, its pragmatic value is minimal or n' 11. If, however, it 
is a true theory whose predictions can be made largely or wholly without 
regard to factors such as those cited in the traditional social sciences, 
then it would appear to offer a vision of a species which, short of a 
Baron von Munchhausen feat of self-preservation, is incapable of escaping 
the behavioural dictates of its evolutionary heritage. Thus, the truth of 
sociobiology would also seem to render its pragmatic value nill. Such a 
conclusion is at odds with the professions of Wilson, Lorenz and Falger, 
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who all try to assert that despite their own rather bleak characterisation 
of the necessary nature of human behaviour, they can still offer a degree 
of optimism for the future. 
In my view there is -a way out of the apparent dilemma above, based 
on my discussions of the human capacity for altruism. The sociobiclogical 
theory of human relations within and between societies is based partly on 
the theory of supposed instinctive tendencies towards ethnocentricity and 
xenophobia, and partly on the supposed limitations to genuine cooperation 
described by the theories of kin and reciprocal altruism. The theory that 
xenophobia is an instinctive predisposition, rather than a product of the 
social climate produced by the rise and establishment of nation states is, 
according to Alexander and Falger, established by a lack of evidence to 
the contrary. This, in my opinion, will surely not do as an acceptable 
argument on which to base their theory; Firstly, what would positive 
evidence of a 'lack' of warlike behaviour in our pre-cultural ancestors 
look like? The existence of war and battle tends to leave more of a 
visible trail than its peaceful counterpart. A lack of evidence sufficient 
to decide the matter must mean just that: it cannot be used as an 
empirical premise to establishing the sociobiological theory. If the 
alternative theory states that present behaviour is the product and not 
the precursor of cultural society, then that same behaviour cannot be cited 
as evidence for its existence prior to the emergence of culture, by using 
'extrapolation' when it is the very validity of such extrapolation which is 
in question. To argue in such a way, as Alexander and Falger do, is to 
commit a very basic and in my view obviously circular error in reasoning, 
and one which must cast doubt on the presumed impartiality of their 
research. 
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Even if one were to accept some sort of genetically heritable 
behavioural predisposition towards xenophobia, this might be amenable to 
change via the avenue of altruism and cooperative behaviour, leading to a 
breakdown of the instinctive interpersonal barriers. But, of course, this 
avenue is a cul-de-sac for sociobiologists: all altruism is ultimately 
selfish, at best an exchange of favours surrounded by deceit and mutual 
manipulation. If, as I argued in the sections on altruism, this were not in 
fact the case and genuine altruism were a possible behaviour for our 
species, then the inescapability and urgency of sociobiology's 
characterisation of the necessary nature of human inter- and antra- group 
relations would be to a large extent diminished, One might accept that in 
the early history of mankind, international relations developed according 
to an unplanned system of anarchic balances of power, subject to evolution 
by natural selection of aggressive dominance. One might even accept that 
there is an instinctive tendency towards favouring the group with whom 
one identifies, and that all foreigners are at first an object of suspicion. 
However, none of this implies that history must continue to develop in 
such a way, given the improvements in international means of 
communication, migration, transport and factors such as economic 
interdependence. Neither does it imply that any tendencies towards 
xenophobia are ineradicable, since the converse behaviour is ethnocentrism, 
and all that divides the 'friend' from the 'foe' is their identification. 
Improvements in this area can be brought about through education, and once 
again international means of communication and travel may play a major 
role in bringing peoples to recognise each other on a friendly basis. As 
already noted, the sociobiological account seems to suggest that 
identification of others and the resultant behaviour is largely an 
instinctive process, rather than taking into account the possibilities of 
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change through learning: it posits once again behavioural characteristics 
which are so deeply embedded in our nature that they are not amenable to 
the kinds of change i have suggested. And this is despite the authors' 
unanimous efforts to inject a little-optimism into the concluding part of 
their writings. 
If one accepts the above arguments I have presented against the 
necessity of the past and present climate of human relations, it would 
follow that a true and complete understanding of them must be formulated 
not in terms of necessary ultimate forces and their results, but rather in 
terms of contingently historical proximate forces. Such a view may still 
not assert the complete freedom in a libertarian sense of individuals and 
groups, since it may well identify limiting forces which are the product 
of social history itself. (Such is the view of traditional Marxism to be 
discussed in the next section, ) However, even if individuals and groups 
were seen to be under a degree of limitation from pervading 
sociohistorical forces, the emphasis of explanatory principles would still 
be shifted from that of ultimate biological mechanisms incapable of rapid 
change, to that of proximate sociohistorical forces, whose heritability is 
due to different mechanisms and which are subject to more rapid changes. 
This is not to deny that there are features of human psychology which we 
owe to the evolutionary history of our species. It is, however, to deny 
that such factors can play anything more than a peripheral and perhaps 
pragmatically empty role in questions of present sociopolitical relations, 
and the possibility of future change in such states of affairs. This 
conclusion is at odds with that initially presented by the sociobiologists, 
though it does seem to come closer to their concluding remarks, suggesting 
that perhaps they too see a greater role for genuine altruism and 
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cooperation guided by reason, despite their earlier denials of such a 
possibility. 
3, ý The Debate between Sociobiology and Marxism 
Sociobiology has received a great deal of critical interest and 
comment from representatives of many different disciplines and 
backgrounds. Perhaps the most widely publicised of these have come from 
self-professed left-wing political activists, whose form of attack has 
ranged from articles in journals, books and the popular media, to personal 
verbal and even physical abuse of the leading proponents of 
sociobiological theory. An example of an extended critique of sociobiology 
and related topics, written from a sociopolitical perspective is the book 
Not in. (ham Genes (Rose, et al, 1984). The authors of this work, who proclaim 
their political sympathies in the introduction, carry out a Kuhnian-type 
analysis of the sociopolitical climate surrounding the conception, 
development and reaction to sociobiological theory. Their aim is to 
discredit its scientific credentials by proving its status as a socially 
divisive misuse of science, which is upheld more by its furtherance of a 
given sociopolitical ideology than by any actual scientific evidence or 
theory. In their view sociobiology is an integral part of a broader 
philosophical and political viewpoint -a viewpoint they label 'The New 
Right' - and to which as committed socialists they are in total 
opposition. 
From a historical point of view, it is of course no surprise that 
sociobiology should be regarded by many as an inherently suspicious line 
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of thought. Evolutionary ideas applied to human society and social 
ideologies were, after all, used in a crude form to give pseudo-scientific 
justification for right-wing ideologies of Social Darwinism in America and 
Europe from the last quarter of the nineteenth century onwards. Some 
commentators on this topic have even suggested that the major part of the 
theory of National Socialism in Hitler's Germany was already provided, 
prior to the rise to power of The Third Reich, by members of the Berman 
scientific community, such as Ernst Haeckel. The horrors of the Nazi 
racist policies were the enactment at the political level of a largely pre- 
existing theory, supposedly rooted in evolutionary premises which gave an 
ethical justification from natural scientific grounds for what followed. 
it would of course be a gross exaggeration to claim 
that the German scientific community, especially the 
members of the biological science faculties, were 
directly responsible for national socialism.... 
Nevertheless .... It is simply true historically that 
German academics and scientists did, in fact, 
contribute to the development and eventual success of 
national socialism, both directly through their 
efforts as scientists and indirectly through the 
popularisation or vulgarisation of their scientific 
work. (Stein, 1987 , pp . 266 /26? ) 
Whether or not one concurs with the view that sociobiological 
explanations of human behaviour are best seen as a "political 
manifestation of biological determinism.. .. directly opposed to the political 
and social demands of those without power. " (Rose, et al, 1984, p. 21), I 
believe that one can see how sociobiology poses a direct threat to the 
theoretical basis and practical aims of Marxist Socialism. In this section 
I intend to show that, even if there had been no such historical link 
between evolutionary theories of human nature and right-wing political 
ideologies, sociobiology would for reasons of fundamental theoretical 
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opposition alone continue to draw heavy fire from the artillery of left- 
wing commentators. 
To appreciate the basis of the opposition between sociobiology and 
Marxism, it is necessary to examine and attempt to clarify Marx's own view 
of human nature and society. To begin with, it is perhaps interesting to 
note Marx's own reaction to Darwin's publication of the Origin: 
Darwin's book is very important and serves me as a 
natural-scientific basis for the class struggle in 
history. One has to put up with the crude English 
method of development, of course. Despite all 
deficiencies, not only is the death-blow dealt here 
for the first time to 'teleology' in the natural 
sciences but its rational meaning is empirically 
explained. (McClellan, 1977, p. 525) 
Marx clearly greeted Darwin's theory as providing a non-teleological 
materialist explanation of the origin of human life, thus coinciding with 
and complementing the overall philosophical perspective of his own 
theories of human social evolution. However, his interest in Darwin's work 
appears to have stopped just there: there is no suggestion that Marx 
considered biological evolution and its laws to have any further relevance 
to the explanation of man's social history, other than providing a base 
upon which such further explanation might stand. Darwinian theory provides 
a materialist account of the origin and possibility of human social 
history: Marx saw himself as charting the route that possibility then 
takes, under the control of new forces, properties and laws. As one recent 
commentator on the relation of Darwin to Marx has said: 
Thus, while Marxism recognises the essence of man 
deriving from his membership in the human species, it 
draws the attention of researchers to the most 
important element, namely a concrete-historical 
analysis of man, and to the identification of specific 
traits of social relations such as the nature of 
labour activities. (Frolov, 1986, p, 9l) 
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Clearly, such a view differs from that of sociobiology. Where Marxism 
looks for the social traits of human nature in the historical record of 
human society, the sociobiological analysis of social relations is derived 
from theories which emphasise properties of man as a particular biological 
species, and which theoretically precede any actual social history. 
On the topic of human nature, as with much of Marx's theorising, it 
is a difficult and controversial task to attempt a definitive account of 
what Marx's views actually amounted to. This is partly to do with the fact 
that the body of Marx's writings covers a wide historical span, and 
particular topics are often given piecemeal treatment in many manuscripts, 
requiring a textual collage technique an the part of the reader to gain as 
complete as possible a picture of the overall view. It is also perhaps 
difficult in the particular case of assessing Marx's views on the 'essence' 
of human nature, because his theories amounted to a denial of any such 
'essence', if by that term one is to understand some fixed, universal, 
identifiable quality by which human behaviour can be explained and 
defined. One of the main sources for the Marxist view of human nature is 
to be found in the sixth and seventh sections of Marx's Theses on 
Feuerbach resolves the religious essence into the 
human essence. But the human essence is no 
abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its 
reality it is the ensemble of the social relations. 
Feuerbach, consequently, does not see that the 
`religious sentiment' is itself a social product, and 
that the abstract individual whom he analyses belongs 
to a particular form of society. (Elster, 1986, p . 22 ) 
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Marx's criticism of Feuerbach reveals two main elements of his own theory 
of human nature, and the means by which in his view it can be properly 
investigated. Firstly, there is no 'essence' of human nature as such to be 
discovered within any given individual, taken as an isolated member of the 
species Homo Sapiens. Rather, the essence of human nature only appears and 
can only be discovered as a relational phenomenon: the essence of human 
nature as that thing whfch--disttnguishes humans from other species is to 
be found in the specific forms of social relations which groups of humans 
naturally develop. The second paint is logically connected to the first: 
namely that analyses of human nature cannot be undertaken via a process 
based on methodological individualism. Such a methodology severs or 
ignores the social relations actually in existence between individuals, 
thereby theoretically destroying the very processes and locations at which 
- according to Marx - man's essential nature reveals itself. Human nature 
cannot therefore be deduced as a set of properties inherent in each and 
every individual seen from a biological point of view: it can only be 
discovered by the method of historical induction from observation of 
actual social groups and their particular activities and relational 
structures. This amounts to a firm denial of any theory of human nature 
which attempts, as sociobiology does, to derive in a reductive fashion an 
account of essential social characteristics of humans from a knowledge of 
individual psychology. 
it should be emphasised that Marxist-Leninist theory 
has not simply shown the significance of social 
factors operating together with biological ones.... 
Instead, Marxist-Leninist methodology determines the 
significance of social methods for studying man, thus 
opposing biological tendencies in the course of which 
a scientifically unjustified reduction takes place, in 
which essential properties of man that appear in his 
integrated biosocial existence are reduced to 
individual aspects of man as a living tangible and 
sensing being. (Frolov, 1986, p. 100) 
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Because of the wealth of interpretation and revision of Marx's 
original ideas which has been carried out by successive political 
reformists and theorists, there is a great deal of debate within the social 
and political sciences as to whether Marx really intended to deny 
altogether the existence and use of 'human nature' as a meaningful concept 
per se, or whether he merely intended to outlaw the use of the term to 
mean some set of non-relational, non-historical, abstracted and fixed 
tendencies of humans regarded in isolation. (For a defence of the latter, 
perhaps less crude interpretation of 1(arx on human nature, see Geras, 1983). 
What is clear is that Marx's analytical approach to the phenomenon of 
human social development did not include a regard for biological features 
of the species as relevant to the explanation of human history in the way 
in which the sociobiological approach to the same topic does. The 
superstructure of any given society (which includes political, legal, 
religious and moral systems, as well as aesthetic and other commonly-held 
values) is, according to Marx, the result of and in a dialectical relation 
with the economic base of that society. This in turn consists of the 
available raw materials, the means of production by which these are 
converted into usable goods, and the labour relations demanded by such 
production, including the means of distribution, markets and consumption 
rates, etc. The vulgar interpretation of Marxism labels such an analysis of 
society 'Economic Fundamentalism', accusing it of presenting an over- 
simplified and biased account of social structures by exaggeration of the 
importance and driving force of the economic base as merely one 
determinant among many in society. More generous interpretations emphasise 
the dialectical interactive nature of the relation between base and 
superstructure, giving the Marxist model a more reasonable appearance. 
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The main weight of our argument so far has gone into 
demonstrating that the superstructure depends on its 
economic foundations. But it is necessary to 
emphasise the fact that the superstructure operates 
retroactively on its base, and that both spheres 
therefore determine each other. (Jakubowski, 1976, p. 57) 
(For a further defence of Marxism against the charge of economic 
fundamentalism and over-simplicity in relating economic to social and 
ideological factors of human society, see Tucker, 1980, especially pp. 46-49. ) 
Whether one sees the Marxist analysis of human society as inherently 
biased and crude or not, it is clear from his work that individuals cannot 
be described except within a given sociohistorical context, from which 
they derive their particular natures. The most important feature of this 
context is the structure which controls and maintains the material 
production of the society, and the relations between individuals which 
such production necessitates. 
As individuals express their life, so they are. What 
they are, therefore, coincides with their production, 
both with what they produce and with bow they 
produce. Hence what individuals are depends on the 
material conditions of their production. 
This production only makes its appearance with 
the increase of population. In its turn this 
presupposes the intercourse of individuals with one 
another. The form of this intercourse is again 
determined by production. (from The. German Ideology, 
Elster, 1986, p. 26) 
Beyond the fact that man is seen as essentially a 'social' animal, that 
naturally forms social bonds and groups, and also naturally and creatively 
produces goods made from the raw materials of his habitat, Marx does not 
regard man as having an 'essential nature' in the sociobiological sense of 
behavioural capacities and limitations shaped by biological evolution and 
genetically heritable on an individual basis. Rather, the behaviour of 
-188- 
individuals is seen as - to a debatable degree - the product of the 
society in which they grow up and live, since it is the structure of the 
social group which determines the possible behavioural tendencies of the 
constituent individuals. The overall structures of the group are, in turn, 
ultimately dependent upon the processes and relations involved in the 
extraction of raw materials and the means of production. As far as Marxist 
theory is concerned, therefore, the social behaviour of individuals cannot 
be explained or predicted in abstraction from the given society in which 
those individuals live, since it is only in the context of social relations 
that individuals express their nature at all. This point is indisputably 
asserted by Marxist theorists: 
Man's consciousness and thought emerge as a social 
product, and accordingly are secondary in relation to 
his social existence. (Frolov, 1986, p. 92) 
Frolov's statement strongly echoes an aphoristic line of Marx's own 
writing, once again from Ilia German Ideology: "It is not consciousness 
that determines life, but life that determines consciousness. " 
(Elster, 1986, p. 28). 
To sum up, Marxist doctrine is at odds with that of sociobiology in 
its major theoretical and methodological premises concerning what one can 
know about human social behaviour. Sociobiology is committed to 
methodological individualism in its approach, deducing supposedly a priori 
facts about human nature from evolutionary considerations, from which the 
macrostructures of society are then both deduced and interpreted. For 
Marx, however, the social individual does not and cannot exist even in 
theory except when seen in a given sociohistorical context, the nature of 
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which can only be known through a historical analysis by a process of 
inductive observation. 
In spite of such fundamental differences between sociobiology and 
Marxism, they also share certain similarities as theories of human nature. 
To begin with, as noted in the quote from Marx above, they share an anti- 
transcendental and non-teleological theoretical stance. They both account 
for the course of human history with great emphasis on the effects of 
unconscious material forces, which precede and encompass the development 
and actions of any particular individual. In Marx these forces are 
identified as being ultimately economic, whilst in sociobiology they are 
ultimately the result of biological evolution. Roth theories thus picture 
the individual or social group as developing and acting according to a 
pre-existing framework of restrictive forces which check and shape 
subsequent - capacities and tendencies. Both theories insist that social 
planners and political reformers must look to another area - economic 
history or evolutionary biology - to discover the necessary knowledge 
prior to analysing or attempting to consciously alter any aspect of human 
society. To act without regard for such areas would be, in their view, to 
ignore the factors which are of most significance for the course of human 
history. Both theories thus place a theoretical limit on the amount of true 
'freedom' left for genuinely innovative thought or behaviour by individuals, 
given their premises concerning the operation upon individual development 
of impersonal forces which precede and shape individual existence. In this 
respect, both theories entail somewhat of a paradox as far as the 
possibility of social change through conscious human endeavour is 
concerned. This point, already raised in my analysis of sociobiologicai 
theory (see pages 177-180 above), is also a prominent feature of 
. 01 
-190- 
discussions of Marxist theory, where it is argued by some that the Marxist 
emphasis on economic forces in shaping the history of social change risks 
reducing the consciousness and actions of individual leaders and groups to 
mere products of a given deterministic environment. For Marxism as for 
sociobiology, the accusation of 'determinism' is never far away. 
Where the two theories disagree violently is in their respective view 
of the capacity for human society to undergo radical social change. For 
Marxists, aspects of contemporary Western society such as inter- and 
intra-national aggression; nationalism; hierarchical divisions of society 
according to sex, race and class; paternalism and sexual role divisions; 
acquisitiveness and material possessiveness, and other forms of social 
inequality and causes of unrest are all aspects of a particular stage in 
possible economic and social development - namely Capitalism. Since the 
superstructure is formed and regulated in accordance with the economic 
basis of the society, such aspects of social inequality and alienation are 
seen as phenomena produced and dictated by the prevalent relations of a 
capitalist labour structure. In the event of Capitalism giving way to an 
alternative economic structure such as Socialism (a change which 
traditional Marxists think not merely possible but inevitable) the social 
relations between individuals would also change. A given social climate 
does not exist because of the aggregation of individual behavioural 
psychologies: rather, individual psychology is produced by nurturing within 
a given social climate. For sociobiologists, on the other hand, the very 
qualities of human nature which Marxists take to be the transient products 
of a given socioeconomic epoch, are instead instinctively present in every 
individual's nature, as a result of our species' evolutionary history and 
our individual biological heritage. With regard to any particular social 
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epoch, they constitute a behavioural foundation for social relations, 
rather than a product of such relations. Whereas for sociobiology the 
major features of social behaviour are genetically heritable, for Marxism 
they are socially heritable. 
This theoretical division leads to further conflict between the two 
views of human nature. Marxists are committed by their ideology to 
creating a society in which the social inequalities and injustices inherent 
in the capitalist phase of economic development are overcome, and finally 
transformed into relations of equality and mutual respect. This aim is 
regarded by them as not merely desirable in a utopian sense, but also 
practically possible. However, this project of envisioned social reform is 
denounced by sociobiology, the central dogmas of which are the 
impossibility of genuine altruism and the inevitability of egotistic 
competition. Sociobiology constitutes a refutation of the possibility of 
ever attaining a socialist state of genuine equality and cooperative 
existence. Sociobiology thus poses a double threat to the ideology of 
Marxist socialism. Firstly, it undermines the theoretical basis of the 
Marxist analysis of social relations, by tracing the origin and necessary 
features of individual behaviour to our species' evolutionary past, and 
asserting that behavioural tendencies of a fairly inflexible nature were 
laid down then, prior to the existence or possible influence of any 
economic forces. Any further social development is therefore constrained 
within the behavioural boundaries of this pre-economic epoch in the 
history of our species. Secondly, it denies the possibility of any 
socialist-minded programme of socioeconomic reform, since the avowed aims 
of socialists contradict the biologically inherited norms of human social 
behaviour. In the light of this, it is hardly surprising that left-wing 
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commentators have denounced sociobiological theory as offering pseudo- 
scientific support to aspects of the status quo of many present-day 
capitalist societies. Whether or not such a direct claim can be made as it 
is by writers such as Stephen Rose, it is certainly true that the 
conclusions of sociobiology, if not overtly supportive of the status quo, 
are in fundamental opposition to the theory and practical aims of 
socialist reform. 
With regard to the political and ethical stance of sociobiology, 
Wilson and other proponents of the theory have made claims on several 
occasions to the effect that they are engaged in work of a purely 
objective scientific nature which is, in their view, undertaken in an 
atmosphere free of any political or normative intentions. However, in the 
light of the above analysis, it is difficult to see how sociobiology can 
help but ester the field of normative social theory, since its own 
conclusions make it a theoretical and practical opponent of one of the 
most influential sociopolitical theories at work in contemporary society. 
If 'ought' implies 'can', and sociobiological theory places limits on the 
range of what humans can and cannot do, then it has already entered the 
arena of normative sociopolitical theory - . willingly or not. 
In the 
conclusion of his article on the origins of National Socialist ideology, 
Stein gives a stern reminder to those scientists who insist that their 
work can be carried out in some kind of ethical and sociopolitical vacuum: 
must we not admit that the scientific findings of the 
natural science of sociobialogy or the social science 
of biopolitics are as likely to be appropriated by 
interested parties, even scientists, to serve political 
ends as were the scientific findings of the Berman 
social Darwinists, racial anthropologists and 
eugenicists? The history of scientific racism, 
ethnocentrism, and nationalist xenophobia suggests 
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that this is no mere academic question. (Stein, 1987, 
p. 267) 
To claim, as Wilson and others have done, that their work is 'purely' 
scientific is to beg a little too much indulgence from their audience. In a 
post world war technology, even the simplest account of scientific history 
allows for social and political factors as being of importance to the 
state and progress of any particular line of research. No work is carried 
out without funding, or at least governmental knowledge of its contents, so 
the. claim that one is 'just- doing science' cannot be taken seriously. 
Sociobiology contains within its theory - implicitly or explicitly - 
statements about human nature; the meaning of social behaviours; the 
limits of human behaviour and feeling; and guidelines for would-be social 
planners. Moreover, these ideas have been presented both in 'scientific' 
form for the academic community, and in 'popular' versions (Wilson, 1978; 
Lumsden and Wilson, 1983; Dawkins, 1978), specifically aimed at a general 
market of readers, with a view to disseminating the ideas of sociobiology 
across a wide audience. Given that individuals are going to evaluate to 
some extent their ideas about human nature and society in the light of 
such books, how can the authors then claim that they are not involved in 
the business of sociopolitical debate or influence, and dodge issues such 
as moral responsibility for the possible effects of their work? 
Whatever their wishes to the contrary, the proponents of sociobiology 
will not escape attention, from politically- minded theorists, who will 
inevitably decypher the normative -implications of their work. As I have 
shown in this section, there is good reason to expect that most of this 
attention will naturally come from members of the political left-wing, 
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whose ideology and social aims are most threatened by sociobiological 
pronouncements. 
2.4 
. 
Ref igi on and the New Reel i cators 
The topic of religious belief and the practices of organised religious 
groups, perhaps more than any other aspect of human society, reveals deep 
divisions in contemporary western social attitudes and theory. Historically 
this was not always the case. Although difficult to determine with any 
strong degree of consensus, one could say that until the latter half of the 
nineteenth century most discussion of religion was of a 'theological' 
nature. By that I mean that the interested parties disputed the meaning 
and relative status of various contending beliefs, alternative faiths, or 
alternative interpretations of received religious texts or articles of 
faith. The status of religious belief and practice per se was not openly 
put into question, except by a small number of professed agnostics or 
atheists who stood to pay dearly for their scepticism. Various factors 
combined towards the middle of the last century to alter this state of 
affairs, resulting in the present climate of debate which offers a wider 
range of problems and questions concerning the phenomena of religious 
belief and practice. 
It was the founders of modern sociology who first formulated a new 
way of looking at religious belief and practice as a social phenomenon, 
rather than entering into the field of traditional theological dispute 
between contending religious factions (for example: Weber, 1922 & 
Durkheim, 1915). The novelty of Weber and Durkheim's approach to the 
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subject was in effect a philosophical change of stance: rather than 
accepting the literal significance of religious experience, statements and 
practices, they applied a functionalist analysis in order to relate them as 
social phenomena into a broader conception of the overall functions of 
social structures. Their method thus involved a move from the mere 
description and comparison of the subjective accounts of religious 
practitioners, to the adoption of a more 'objective' stance, where such 
phenomena were reinterpreted as serving a social function not necessarily 
perceived by the involved participants. The subjective accounts of belief 
and practice were translated into the language of functional social 
structures, and as such could be accommodated within a rationalistic 
appraisal of society. By such a change of methodological stance, religion 
was to be brought within the cognitive framework of the rationalist 
positivist sciences, and any references to transcendental phenomena or 
meaning reduced via the functionalist approach to objectively verifiable 
structures of human society. (The later dominance of Logical Positivism in 
British philosophy around the 1930's took an even tougher stance as 
regards religious belief, declaring that religious along with all other 
classes of statements which could not be assigned either analytic or 
empirical content were literally meaningless, and therefore not worth the 
expenditure of further intellectual effort. Ironically, as will be shown 
below, Wilson and others have argued that the 'meaninglessness' of 
religious doctrine is -perhaps the clue to its origin and importance in 
human society. ) 
It is perhaps no coincidence that Weber and Durkheim's revolutionary 
analysis of religion came just when it did, as there were a number of 
contributory or related factors of change in other areas of intellectual 
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thought which occurred around the same era. For example, the rising 
success of the empirical sciences in explaining phenomena under an 
exclusively materialist conception of the universe, replacing previous 
religious or metaphysical accounts; Darwin's naturalistic account of man's 
own origins; the development of the psychoanalytic approach to the 
meanings and origins of various forms of behaviour and states of 
consciousness; sociopolitical changes towards the secularisation of social 
controls, in favour of increasing state legislation and a clear demarcation 
of the power and function of church and state respectively; the 
dedeification of the teleological theory of human historical development 
central to many religious or idealistic philosophies (specifically the 
Idealism of Hegel), carried out by such philosophers as Feuerbach, and its 
replacement by a materialist concept of historical change; the rise of 
historical analysis and questioning of the Bible and other sources of . 
religious doctrine; and finally the explicit philosophical questioning of 
the status of religious experience and organised religion exemplified by 
writers such as Nietzsche. It would be unwise to attribute- the change of 
stance characterised by the functionalist approach to religion to any 
particular factor or factors, but perhaps when the above-mentioned are 
taken into account it becomes more easily seen as part of a general 
change, which might be described as embodying a philosophical move 
towards a more positivist analysis of all phenomena, and their subsequent 
incorporation into the expanding explanatory range of a materialist 
cognitive framework exemplified in the theory and method of the natural 
sciences. 
Weber and Durkheim thus laid the foundation for contemporary 
sociological analyses of religion, which still adopt the functionalist 
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perspective. In a chapter entitled 'The Functions of Äeligion in 
Contemporary Society' (Wilson, 1982), Bryan Wilson lists among the commonly 
attributed functions of religion: individual psychological reassurance; 
provision of social solidarity; substantiation of ethical and legal 
statutes; explanations of ultimate origins of life and promises of future 
continuation of life in some form; justification for waging war on other 
groups; the regulation of and a ritual platform for emotional release; the 
provision of symbols and rituals for encouraging group identity, and the 
converse identification of outsider groups. Such a list typifies the 
sociological approach to religion, and provides the starting point for the 
sociobiological account. 
Where the sociobiological account of religion differs from that given 
above is to suggest and develop a further level of explanation which 
claims priority Dyer that of the social sciences, by relating social 
structures and functions to ultimately biological structures and processes, 
described in terms of evolutionary theory and population genetics. In other 
words, where the social sciences offer a reductive account of religion in 
which beliefs and practices are cashed out at the level of social structure 
and function, sociobiology takes the social phenomena and relates them to 
their further function in terms of biological mechanisms describable 
within the framework of the synthetic theory of evolution. 
Although the manifestations of the religious 
experiences are resplendent and multidimensional and 
so complicated that the finest of psychoanalysts and 
philosophers get lost in their labyrinth, I believe 
that religious practices can be mapped onto the two 
dimensions of genetic advantage and evolutionary 
change. (Wilson, 1978, p. 179) 
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The sociobiological as opposed to the sociological account of religion thus 
involves two stages of reduction: firstly, from the literal meaning of 
religious experience and practice to social structures and functions which 
promote in some way the 'organic health and unity' of the social group. 
Secondly, how such social functions ultimately relate to effects on 
inclusive fitness levels possessed by members of the social group, also 
relat ve-fie - members of other social groups with whom there may be 
competition for resources. As I will go on to point out, this second level 
of reduction is not approached identically by all sociobiological 
theorists, as there is disagreement over just how closely social structures 
are tied to factors of genetic competition. However, I doubt if any two 
social scientists agree entirely on the functional purpose of many social 
structures, so the disagreement within sociobiology is not in itself a 
serious detraction from the plausibility of their theoretical approach. 
Since E0 Wilson believes that group selection is a possible and 
relevant factor in evolutionary change, he explains the ultimate biological 
function of religion as contributing to the maintenance or raising the 
fitness level of the group concerned, relative to other groups or sub- 
groups with whom the initial group is involved in some form of 
competitive interaction. Thus, for example, though an individual may die in 
battle or perform some act of lesser sacrifice in the name of religious 
conviction, the net effect of such behaviour is likely to result in an 
overall raising of the inclusive fitness quota for the group as a whole, 
though obviously not for certain individuals within the group. Clearly 
there would be natural limits to the optimality of any particular form of 
behaviour in terms of its benefit to the group: unreserved mutual self- 
sacrifice by every member of the group is one extreme of the behavioural 
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range which would be maladaptive, as would unreserved egotism. As with 
other features of biological systems, it can be predicted that the relative 
ratios of particular behavioural forms would be subject to a certain 
amount of random fluctuation, but nevertheless - given a relatively stable 
environment - they would display a definite degree of homeostasis around a 
point of optimal advantage for the given environment, 
religions are like other human institutions in that 
they evolve in directions that enhance the welfare of 
the practitioners. Because this demographic benefit 
must accrue to the group as a whole, it can be gained 
partly by altruism and partly by exploitation, with 
certain sectors profiting at the expense of others. 
Alternatively the benefit can arise as the sum of the 
generally increased fitness of all the members. 
(Wilson, 1978, p. 182) 
The first sense in which religion is seen as an ultimately 'biological' 
phenomenon is thus in its effects on group and individual fitness levels. 
However, there is a further sense in which Wilson believes that religion is 
an appropriate subject matter for the biological sciences. This is 
forwarded in Wilson's argument that there could be selection for readiness 
on the part of individuals to be religiously indoctrinated - i. e. that 
there could be selection for genetically heritable tendencies towards 
religious experience and expression, Wilson's argument is quoted below at 
some length: 
The hypothesis before us is that some gene 
frequencies are changed in consistent ways by 
ecclesiastic selection.... Incest taboos, taboos in 
general, xenophobia, the dichotomisation of objects 
into the sacred and profane, noism, hierarchical 
dominance systems, intense attention towards leaders, 
charisma, trophyism, and trance-induction are among 
the elements of religious behaviour most likely to be 
shaped by developmental programs and learning rules. 
All of these processes act to circumscribe a social 
group and bind its members together in unquestioning 
allegiance. Our hypothesis requires that such 
constraints exist, that they have a psychological 
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basis, and that the psychological basis in turn has a 
genetic origin. (Wilson, 1978, pp184/185) 
I will ignore the possible lines of criticism which one could raise at 
this point, such as the ambiguity of psychological features having 'a 
genetic origin' as Wilson puts it, and the question of whether there is any 
empirical evidence for the theory he is forwarding. I will instead accept 
that Wilson thinks that there could genuinely have been some kind of 
evolutionary process of selection for individuals whose genetically 
heritable behaviour tends them towards the formation of and participation 
in organised religious activities. Such a suggestion is of course welcomed 
by some as providing an ultimate biological explanation for the frequent 
sociological observation that religion of some form is common to every 
known human society, and appears to be in some way an instinctive 
behavioural feature of our species. 
Wilson's theory of the genetic heritability and resultant selection 
for religious behaviour is, as Wilson acknowledges, suggested in the 
context of a linguistic theory by RA Rappaport (Rappaport, 1971). (It is 
also perhaps hinted at in a remark made by Henri Bergson. ) The suggestion 
made by Rappaport, endorsed by Wilson, is that the existence and use of 
symbolic language brings with it the occurrence of semantic ambiguity, and 
the possibility of intentional deception by any party or parties. This 
novel, socially complex and potentially divisive state of affairs must be 
countered and held in check by some non-meaningful (and therefore 
unquestionable) but nevertheless respected and powerful concept, resulting 
in a social institution and a set of governing behavioural codes. 
Rappaport suggests that in order to combat "the dissolving power of the 
intellect" as Bergson put it, there evolved the idea of 'the sacred', which 
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forms the essential core of every form of religious observance. The 
judicious use of such a concept could fulfill the desired social function 
by sanctifying those aspects of social order and cultural tradition which 
were deemed to be essential to the continued survival of-the group. 
Propositions such as these sacred sentences are 
peculiar. Since their terms have no material 
referents, they are not amenable to verification, but 
neither are they vulnerable to falsification. They 
are, in a strict logical positivist sense, nonsense.... 
The sanctification of such sentences, however, assures 
the recipient that they are sufficiently reliable to 
act upon. (Rappaport, 1971, pp. 29 /30 ) 
The first question which such a theory raises is the degree to which such 
an 'evolutionary process' is meant to be the product of human intention, 
and how much a process of non-intentional blind selection. It is not clear 
from Rappaport's or Wilson's account whether it is the first or the second 
of these two, though in my view the difference is not insignificant. Are we 
to understand that certain individuals in positions of power took the 
opportunity to establish further power by manipulating an 'instinctive' 
readiness to be indoctrinated present in the population, or is the story 
supposed to be that as a result of the readiness to be indoctrinated, 
certain individuals 'rose' to fill positions of power, just as nature tends 
to 'fill' available ecological niches? Whereas I would accept the second 
case as an example of a process of evolution by natural selection, 
occurring at the level of social phenomena but analogous to processes 
which occur within biological evolution, the former scenario does not 
appear to me to be analogous in the same way. The element of human 
intention changes the forces involved in the process, since the structures 
formed in society as a result of human intention have a different origin, 
history and significance. Though a structure which has evolved 
by natural 
selection may resemble perfectly another structure which is the product of 
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human design, the two are surely not describable in precisely the same 
terms, just because as end products they fufill the same function. The 
difference in origin and history of development between the 'natural 
evolution' of religious structures and the 'intentional creation' of such 
structures is blurred or ignored in the sociobiological account, which is 
merely content to relate the end products to a functionalist account, and 
to draw comparisons of a very general nature between them. Distinctions 
which would make all the difference as far as deciding if a process is to 
be analysed in a certain way or not - such as pointed out above - are 
not drawn by the sociobiologists, and in my view such an omission on 
their part undermines the credibility of their analytical method. 
The plausibility of the line of argument put forward by Rappaport and 
Wilson is also open to another criticism. They argue generally that there 
is or has been selection for religious attitudes or behavioural 
inclinations. These must therefore have appeared initially as genetic 
mutations affecting behaviour, and come under selective pressure in 
competition with allelic rivals. Their supposed advantage over competing 
behavioural forms ensured their positive selection, until they became 
general species-specific traits. What began as a randomly produced trait 
affecting social behaviour and ultimately inclusive fitness quotas spread 
to fixity in the population (in this case, the whole species), and became a 
genetically heritable social trait. However, the specific behavioural 
characteristics mentioned by Wilson in the above quote (incest taboos, 
xenophobia, etc. ) as constitutive or at least representative of religious 
behaviour could and have been explained individually in terms of serving 
some socially and perhaps ultimately biologically advantageous 
function. 
Although it is by no means clear, Wilson appears to be saying that all 
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these characteristics have become genetically heritable as a result ol 
selective pressures for the overall religiously inclined mentality of 
individuals, of which these characteristics are severally and partially 
constitutive. 
On the other hand, it seems to me equally if not more plausible that 
each of these characteristics on its own could have been-sei±ected for, and 
that religious mentality is a general manifestation of a whole range of 
aspects of human society, whether genetically or socially heritable. The 
function of religion could be identified foremost or exclusively at the 
social level, where it functions to organise and unify various contending 
elements of human experience and relations under a single but complex 
conceptualisation. One wonders just how Wilson envisions the process of 
selection for 'religiosity' if it encompasses such a wide and complex range 
of behavioural phenomena. Is there supposed to be a convergent selective 
force acting on many genetic loci with a single overall result in 
behavioural responses, or is 'religiosity' controlled in its expression by 
just a few loci, upon which a single selective pressure could act? Once 
again, the details are not provided by the sociobiological theory. It seems 
more plausible to me to posit such complex social phenomena as religious 
belief and practice as being social 'macro-properties', which combine and 
involve many constituent elements of behaviour. If this were so, then one 
could not posit the existence of natural selection for 'religious belief 
and practice' per se, since this complex behavioural phenomenon does not 
appear as a unified trait capable of coming under selective pressure 
either at a genetic or a social level. It must therefore be seen as a 
complex product of certain underlying component factors of behaviour, 
which may or may not be subject to selective pressures of some sort. Being 
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a product, however, it is not correct to say that it is or could be itsel* 
'selected' in some way. 
The above points do, in my view, somewhat diminish the plausibility 
of Wilson and Rappaport's claim that religion is a genetically heritable 
trait. However, Wilson goes on to consider other aspects of religious 
behaviour, and in particular one area in which I believe there is an 
interesting link between human psychology and a traditional problem in 
philosophy. Wilson echoes previous social theorists (such as Julian 
Huxley) who question whether religion is endangered by the growth of 
secular social strutures, and the rise of a scientific materialist 
conception of the universe and man's place in it. Wilson argues that, since 
religious fervour appeals more to emotional rather than rational responses 
. (its doctrines and practices relying on the use of mystical symbolism and 
the communication of shared intuitive response, rather than an appeal to 
empirically ascertainable or logically deducible facts), he doubts whether 
a form of scientific secular humanism can ever functionally replace the 
older form of established religions: 
But religion itself will endure for a long time. as a 
vital force in society. Like the mythical giant 
Antaeus who drew energy from his mother the earth, 
religion cannot be defeated by those who merely cast 
it down. The spiritual weakness of scientific 
materialism is due to the fact that it has no such 
primal source of power.... Humanists will never enjoy 
the hot pleasures of spiritual conversion and self- 
surrender; scientists cannot in all honesty serve as 
priests. (Wilson, 1978, p. 201) 
This worry of Wilson's is, I think, part of a larger problem posed by any 
rationalistic approach to questions of human behaviour and prescriptive 
theories of social organisation. Traditionally, ethical dictates have found 
their ultimate foundation in some transcendent, non-naturalistic area of 
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justification - such as the will or decree of a deity, or else an intuited 
absolute moral truth. A rationalist approach to ethics attempts to 
construct a system of moral justification based on generally accepted 
rules of logical inference, which link relevant facts to deduceable 
behavioural prescriptions. However, although such a system may provide one 
with prescriptions as to how to attain certain goals, it would appear that 
ultimate goals themselves cannot be anything but non-rationally justified, 
To borrow a phrase from Wittgenstein, eventually one just hits the 
'bedrock' in terms of further possible rational justification, and one can 
go no further using rational inference alone. Even the most widely debated 
attempt to construct a plausible rationalist ethics - Utilitarianism - 
relies ultimately on acceptance of the foundational premise that the end of 
all morally correct action is promotion of happiness or pleasure and the 
converse avoidance of pain. Rationality may indicate the means, but it 
seems incapable of giving sole moral justification for any professed end. 
What Wilson refers to as a conflict on the psychological level, 
between the cold rationality of science, and the 'primal source of power' 
tapped by religion may be a reflection in psychological terms of the 
logical structure of goal-directed actions. Rationality provides us with 
the means to calculate the best route to attaining certain ends; it may 
even help us to choose between competing ends. But in itself it cannot 
fully justify those ends. The ultimate source of conviction for belief in 
any moral system cannot reside within that same moral system, or else the 
justification is circular and invalid. It cannot therefore be a 'rational' 
impulse; ultimate justification must be sought in a sphere of understanding 
which transcends the rational - an intuited feeling either from one's own 
being, or else attributed to an active external source such as a 
deity or 
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impersonal forces in society which trancend or impinge upon the thoughts 
and feelings of the individual. Social structures may indeed arise in the 
manner suggested by Rappaport, which serve to protect or bolster the 
cherished non- or pre-rational foundation from the 'dissolving power' of 
intellectual questioning and debate. In this way, religion might be seen as 
serving a socially functional purpose along the lines suggested above, as 
do other features of human society, by providing a psychologically 
supportive structure within which individuals are freed from the strain of 
fundamental doubts, and are therefore able to carry out aims and 
intentions without further worry for the ultimate justification of their 
ethical system. It is not, however, necessary that the psychological traits 
connected with religious belief and observance must be posited as 
genetically heritable; on the contrary, my own analysis reveals that 
religion is possibly a socially constructed product aimed at a solution of 
problems inherent in decision making per se, and its universality is 
explicable as a consequence of the universal predicament created by the 
structure of rational systems of thought and action. One does not have to 
suppose that there is some positive force compelling individuals towards 
religion, as Wilson suggests in his genetic account of the 'religious 
impulse'. It could equally be a universal but nevertheless social reaction 
to a negative aspect of human psychology. After all, the supposed angst of 
the true existentialist is not felt in reaction to some positive truth or 
value: it is rather a realisation of something negative or non-existent. It 
is the nausea which rises in response to the realisation that there are no 
ultimate moral truths, and therefore no ultimate and self-transcendent 
guides to action. It is the vertigo caused by standing on the brink of 
action and peering into the abyss of absolute freedom. 
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In the light of the above comments, I therefore reject the 
sociobiological account of religion offered by Wilson, and his attempt to 
capture the phenomena of religious observance within some description that 
is amenable to biological analysis. In contrast, Richard Dawkins attempts 
to give an account of religion which differs significantly both from that 
of Wilson and from that traditionally offered by the social sciences. Since 
Dawkins is at pains in his work to play down the existence of selection 
occurring at levels more complex than that of the individual genes, he is 
unwilling and unable to account for religion in the same way as Wilson, by 
reference to factors of group selection and inclusive fitness levels. Most 
surprisingly, considering all that he has so far expounded, Dawkins denies 
that religion can be explained by reference to its serving some function 
ultimately advantageous to the genes at all. Instead, at this point he 
introduces his own novel concept of a 'meine', which is supposedly the 
cultural equivalent of a gene. 
I think that a new kind of replicator has recently 
emerged on this very planet .... We need a name for the 
new replicator, a noun which conveys the idea of a 
unit of cultural transmission, or a unit of imitation. 
'Mimeme' comes from a suitable Greek root, but I want 
a monsyllable that sounds a bit like 'gene'. I hope my 
classicist friends will forgive me if I abbreviate 
mimeme to meine. (Dawkins, 1978, p. 206) 
The new entities are supposedly analogous in certain respects to the 
genetic replicators, but a clear idea of just how far' one can truly draw 
such an analogy is difficult to attain. They appear to be 'ideas', 
'concepts' or even behaviour patterns, with examples such as "tunes, ideas, 
catch-phrases, clothes, fashions, ways of making pots or of building 
arches. " (ibid, p. 206). Even the concept of 'God' appears to count as a meme. 
Although Dawkins does not enter into any discussion of the precise 
philosophical dimensions of these new entities, it would appear that their 
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primary existence is as ideas, and that their continued existence is 
dependent upon their relative success in being accepted by and affecting 
the subsequent behaviour patterns of individuals and collective groups, 
Dawkins' introduction of this new concept does, in my view, raise 
several problems for his own work in general, and specifically for his 
account of religion as a human social phenomenon. Firstly, there is the 
supposed analogous relation of memes to genes. Memes obviously differ in 
their origin: whereas genes are the result of mutations or recombinations 
of existing genetic material whose properties are random in respect of the 
environmental demands made upon the organism, the production of a meine 
would not normally appear to be a random process at all. Presumably the 
designer of stiletto heels was at least concerned with solving some 
problem posed by the existing state of the shoe fashion market, rather 
than working at some problem in aeronautical engineering. Likewise, the 
melody of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony was the product of a trained and 
gifted musician intent on the business of composing a major work of art. 
It did not occur in the thoughts of a member of the Prussian Guard on 
night duty, thinking of his wife and family at home in bed. It would seem 
that, far from having a random relation to the environment with respect to 
their conception, meines are very much intentional products in response to 
an existing environment of demands and concerns, which may shape them in 
fairly specific ways. This is not to deny the fact that individuals may on 
occasion have blinding insights and find solutions to problems at the most 
unusual moments, such as when driving a car or playing golf or some other 
unconnected activity. What it does point out is that this is not the norm 
for 'memetic' production, whereas randomness with respect to present and 
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future environmental conditions is one of the defining characteristics cf 
neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory. 
As regards reproduction or transmission of meines, it is Lamarckian 
as opposed to Darwinian. An idea or fashion or whatever can obviously be 
adopted or copied by any individual during their lifetime, and passed on 
further to others during their respective lifetimes. There is not only 
transmission across but within generations, between individuals who bear 
no genetic relation to one another. This form of reproduction is something 
which cannot possibly occur in the process of germ-line biological 
transmission and replication of genetic information. The contribution of 
Gregor Mendel to the Darwinian theory of evolution was to show how the 
mechanism of inheritance actually functioned. One of the key issues solved 
by Mendel's experiments was whether genetic inheritance of characteristics 
was particulate, or whether genetic information was blended during 
reproduction. Mendel showed that for the biological process of 
reproduction, the genetic inheritance of traits is particulate, and no 
blending occurs. However, once again the so-called process of memetic 
evolution differs, in that meines can be inherited intact, or else they can 
be blended with other existing rnemes, or altered slightly by an individual 
for their own purpose. As far as memes are concerned, the process of 
inheritance is not necessarily particulate, though it may actually be on 
occasion. Finally, whereas genes are necessarily physical objects, whose 
properties can in theory be captured within a natural science description, 
it is not clear what status memes are supposed to have. They apear to be 
ideal - at least initially - and then they become in some sense 
'physically instantiated' in the world. Whether memes are the proper study 
of the social or the natural sciences, or some new hybrid of the two which 
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combines both disciplines is left unclear in Dawkins account, as is the 
precise ontological status of the new replicators. 
Such fundamentally significant distinctions between genes and memes 
raise the question of whether Dawkins can introduce his new concept and 
establish its status by reference to 'analogy' at all. How far can one go 
in claiming that something is 'analogous', despite the fact that many of 
its essential features differ radically from those of the supposed 
analogue? Dawkins is not claiming that human social development can be 
described as in some sense an 'evolutionary process'. He is claiming that 
it is an evolutionary process which is strongly analogous to and therefore 
can be described using the same terms and theories as those used for the 
description and explanation of biological evolutionary processes. However, 
as I have pointed out above, the process of 'memetic evolution' differs 
from that of genetic evolution in every one of its major characteristics, 
so it can hardly be claimed that the two processes are describable under 
the same neo-Darwinian synthetic theory of evolution by natural selection. 
Having proposed the new concept of a meme, Dawkins then goes on to 
make a surprising statement about them: he says that they are not 
necessarily subject to the evolutionary demands and strategies of the 
selfish genes. 
Whenever conditions arise in which a new kind of 
replicator can make copies of itself, the new 
replicator will tend to take over, and start a new 
kind of evolution of their own. Once this new 
evolution begins, it will in no necessary sense be 
subservien t to the old. (Dawkins, 1978, p. 208) 
I regard this statement as surprising because, given everything which 
Dawkins has so far claimed on behalf of the genes and the behaviour which 
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they produce - directing capacities from sheer physical growth to patterns 
and limitations to learning - it would seem at the very least problematic 
to claim such autonomy on behalf of memes as the cultural products of a 
given biological species. Since meines come into existence as the thoughts 
and actions of human individuals and social groups, it would seem obvious 
that a necessary condition for their individual success and survival would 
be the effect they have on the fitness quotas of the groups in which they 
are held as beliefs or adhered to as practices. Any merne which put the 
group at risk (e. g. a meme for gratuitous acts of violence against fellow 
group members, perhaps coupled to some concept of personal prowess) would 
tend to eliminate individuals in contact with it, and in time the whole 
population. Contrary to Dawkins' statement that memes and genes are not 
functionally connected, I would argue that the general features of any 
social system must conform to - or at least not come into serious conflict 
with - the functional requirements and dictates of the group as a 
biological and social system, which includes effects on the gene pool. 
Until this point, Dawkins' whole thesis has been dedicated to the task of 
convincing the reader of the necessary features of the evolved 'hardware' 
underlying our mental and general behavioural capacities and tendencies. He 
has been at pains to point out his view that genes are necessarily 
selfish, and that this will tend to create a world of selfish organisms. 
even selfish groups. This, we have been told, is due to the evolved 
structures of the brain and CNS, which result in our own case in the range 
of reflexive, emotional and even rational capacities. In view of such a 
thesis, I now find it odd that Dawkins claims that, given the evolution of 
such hardware, nevertheless at the level of culture we are capable of 
producing enduring concepts and behaviours which functionally 
have little 
or nothing to do with our genetic evolutionary past or 
future. 
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The whole idea of memes and memetic evolution seems to raise 
problems for Dawkins' version of scciobiology. The value of the 
sociobiological approach was supposedly in its ability to assess to some 
degree the genetic heritability and biological functional origin of at 
least some forms of social behaviour. Dawkins now tells us that there are 
at least two forms of replicator: genes and memes. There are presumably 
therefore two forms of advantage or kinds of fitness to be calculated: 
genetic and memetic. However, the two replicators share the same vehicle - 
i. e. active individuals. It now looks as if, given any particular behaviour, 
one will have to decide by some method whether it has evolved as the 
result of its conferring advantage on the genes or on the memes or, 
despite their supposed independence from one another, on both. How such 
problems of behavioural interpretation are to be dealt with is not clear 
or even apparently foreseen in Dawkins' account. What does seem clear is 
that, far from furthering his case, Dawkins' introduction of memes into the 
argument seems to cast doubt on the whole of his thesis so far. Dawkins, 
like other sociobiological thinkers, has insisted on a reductive account of 
social phenomena from an evolutionary biological stance. The existence of 
behavioural functions which are not related to biological features of the 
organism, and thus ultimately to genetic advantage, casts doubt on the 
feasibility and purpose of the whole reductive enterprise. With the 
introduction of memes we are once again in the position of having two 
separate spheres of functional explanation: one biological (genetic) and 
the other social (memetic). Social behaviour is no longer necessarily 
linked to biological processes via the factors of inclusive fitness and 
advantage. The only sense in which the two kinds of evolution are linked 
is that of 'analogy', and this sense has been shown above to be in serious 
question. It would appear that with the introduction of memes, Dawkins has 
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only succeeded in separating the 'socio' from the 'biology' once again, 
after expending so much effort in attempting to show that the two areas 
must be seen from a single unified perspective. I can only therefore 
conclude that, far from furthering his argument, Dawkins' introduction of 
the concept of 'men es' in order to explain religious and other forms of 
activity is more damaging to the validity of his own thesis than many of 
his critics' own objections. 
Perhaps, in spite of the above points, it is possible and revealing to 
try and see the reasons why Dawkins introduces the concept of memes at 
the closing stages of his argument. To begin with, extremes of religiously- 
motivated behaviour and emotional experience are not easily accommodated 
into the sociobiological account of ultimately selfish behavioural 
motivation and consequence, and the supposed impossibility of widespread 
or recurrent genuine altruism. Wilson accounts for such behaviour in terms 
of a group-selectionist theory of behavioural evolution, but Dawkins' own 
insistence on the primacy of the gene as the unit of selection in 
biological evolution does not permit him to entertain any such notion. 
Perhaps he also sees that he has left little room in his account for 
traditional notions of 'free will' or 'human agency' as capable of escaping 
the mechanistic dictates of the selfish genes. His coining of the term 
'meine' certainly seems to introduce a sudden and unexpected degree of 
behavioural freedom and novelty into what was predominantly a 
deterministic-type account of human behavioural capacities. I do not intend 
to impute Dawkins with having portrayed humans as totally determined in 
its strictest philosophical sense, though many critics of his work have 
labelled it a form of 'genetic determinism'. I merely wish to point out 
that, until the introduction of the concept of 'meines', the origin, 
-214- 
evolution and 'purpose' of behaviour in a functionalist sense were all 
directly linked to the existence and necessary characteristics of the 
genes. The introduction of memes and Dawkins' explanation of them as a new 
form of replicator not necessarily tied functionally to the old seems to 
open the way for a range of behaviours denied as impossible or freakish 
under the previous biological dictates. The effect of this is nowhere more 
evident than in the following passage: 
We have the power to defy the selfish genes of our 
birth and, if necessary, the selfish meines of our 
indoctrination. We can even discuss ways of 
deliberately cultivating and nurturing pure, 
disinterested altruism - something that has no place 
in nature, something that has never existed before in 
the whole history of the world. (Dawkins, 1978, p. 215) 
This statement totally overthrows the insistences made throughout Dawkins' 
work that, reasoning from principles of evolutionary theory, genuine 
altruism is just not possible. The only possible forms of 'altruism' are 
the limited forms of kin and reciprocal altruism. Where, one is forced to 
ask, is this 'power' to come from, which will enable us to escape the 
dictates both of our biological heritage, and our social environment and 
its influences? Can there exist an element of our nature which does not 
derive its form and origin from either or both of these factors? Is 
Dawkins referring to anything more than some vague sense of transcendent 
freedom of the will, which as a serious philosophical doctrine would take 
a lot more explaining than he has so far offered? If we can indeed 'defy 
the selfish genes of our birth' to cultivate genuine altruism, then why not 
as regards other aspects of our behaviour as well? If this is in fact 
possible, then the 'biological' side of our natures would seem to have very 
little relevance, since we have the power to defy its dictates. Once again, 
it appears that the introduction of 'memes' into the dicussion only ends up 
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by taking the 'biology' out of 'sociobiology', to leave one with the social 
sciences much as they were before the controversy began. The concept of 
'memes' seems to provide Dawkins with some sort of escape route from the 
closed behavioural framework so far outlined in his work, and enables him 
to introduce a note of optimism for the future of the species into his 
concluding remarks. If my criticisms are valid, however, Dawkins' 
conclusion is no more than a rather carelessly thrown crumb of comfort, 
cast in order to placate his harshest critics, and perhaps encouraged by 
personal intuitions which run counter to the direction suggested by his 
own scientific arguments. 
It was noted above that the concluding sections of both Wilson's and 
Lorenz's works also displayed a note of optimism which was, however, 
paradoxically at odds with the main thrust of their previous arguments 
(see above, pp. 175-176). I would suggest that the change in tone displayed 
by the authors has very little to do with any given scientific theory or 
observation made during their research. Rather, it constitutes an 
affirmation - contrary to much of their own argument - of a particular 
metaphysical view as regards human nature and the way in which we 
commonly think about and explain human behaviour, The basic and seemingly 
ineradicable metaphysical premise which I believe underlies the above 
authors' conclusions is that - within certain limits - human behaviour and 
choice is in some sense of the term 'free', and that in some cases at least 
it is not amenable to explanatory reduction to the terms and theories 
which apply to the rest of the animal and plant world. lt would appear 
that, despite their commitment to the expanding use of a mechanistic 
acientif ic model of explanation, they are unable in the last. stage to draw 
the conclusions which the stance of the natural sciences would seem to 
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imply as regards human thought and action. This is not to suggest that a 
commitment to materialism necessarily implies an equal commitment to a 
thesis of strict determinism and explanatory reduction. However, in the 
light of all that has been said concerning the millions of years of 
evolution during which our basic behavioural tendencies were laid down, 
and the necessarily selfish aspect of all organisms' behaviour, it is 
somewhat surprising and confusing to be told that humans can break out of 
this behavioural mould and choose to become otherwise. In the light of all 
the evolutionary arguments so far presented, which tell us that even our 
rationality is the end-product of gene-centred natural selection processes, 
it becomes difficult to see how there could be much room left for a view 
of human behaviour as rationally autonomous from the genetic mechanisms 
for whose unconscious ends it came into being in the first place. Yet this 
is what we are being asked to believe. 
Perhaps after all there is something ineliminable about our concept 
of free will as regards our own behaviour, to the extent that intuitions 
take precedence over the arguments of even the most hard-headed scientific 
perspective. As one writer has suggested in a slightly different context: 
Until now, the image of man which has prevailed in 
all images of 'god' is that man is neither totally 
free nor wholly determined. Man is conceived of as 
possessing always at least a modicum of free will, 
but in all images there is also an element of 
determinism, sometimes larger, sometimes smaller... . But 
within the framework.... some room is left for man to 
decide for himself. (Glock, 1973, p. 301) 
One might say, to borrow the title of a philosophical work on this very 
question, that in most images of human behaviour, however mechanistically 
determined the picture they offer of ourselves, there is always a little 
'elbow room' left as that area over which we are deemed to have a degree 
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of genuine control, and the freedom to exercise rational choice. It seems 
that such a view is held in the end even by the proponents of the 
sociobiological theories of human social behaviour, though the source of 
such a view cannot be the sociobiological theory itself. It was perhaps 
the dissatisfaction with the tenor of his concluding remarks, so different 
from what had gone before, that spurred Wilson to attempt a reworking of 
sociobiological theory in its specific application to human behaviour, 
which will be examined in the next section. 
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Chapter Fc ir- : Cc 1utzo1-1 ary Theory : 
The New Start? 
In chapter two of promethean Fire , Lumsden and Wilson describe- the 
controversy which surrounded the initial publication of sociobiological 
theorising about human behaviour. The vehement attacks made by 
politically- motivated groups such as Science for the People (New York 
Review of Books, 1975) were later followed by criticisms which pointed to 
doubts and weaknesses within the structure of sociobiological theory 
itself, rather than to the theory's potential sociopolitical dimensions. 
These criticisms forced the confession from Wilson that: 
The questions of importance in the social sciences - 
of mind, self, culture, and history - are beyond the 
reach of sociobiology as that subject was originally 
formulated. 
° These criticisms of human sociobiology, also 
forcefully argued by Science for the People, were 
largely correct. (Lumsden & Wilson, 1983, p. 45) 
With the added impetus of a new researcher - Charles Lumsden - Wilson 
proceeded to reformulate his project of merging the social sciences with 
biological theory, describing the new approach to human behavioural 
analysis in the introduction to Genes' Mind. Culture: 
Behavior is not explicit in the genes, and mind 
cannot be treated as a mere replica of behavioral 
traits. In this book we propose a very different view 
in which the genes prescribe a set of biological 
processes, which we call epigenetic rules, that direct 
the assembly of the mind ..... culture is the translation 
of the epigenetic rules into mass patterns of mental 
activity and behavior. (Lurnsden & Wilson, 1981, p. 2) 
The added dimension of culture in some form of interplay with 
inherited genetic structures and the resultant behavioural traits required 
Wilson to expand on his original characterisation of human and animal 
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behaviour. He proceeded to develop a new scheme of behavioural 
classification which would allow him to incorporate this new element in 
his theorising. The new classification divided species according to their 
possession of and ability to acquire cultural traits by means of four 
basic processes, labelled: Simple Learning; Imitation; Teaching and 
Reification. The last of the terms is defined as "the construction of 
symbols and other abstract representations of the environment. " 
(L&W, 1981, p. 3). Species are called 'acultural' if they display none of the 
above four methods of acquiring cultural behaviour, and 'eucultural' if they 
display all four. The only species falling within the category of 
'eucultural' is Homo Sapiens: the next group (labelled 'Protocultural II' and 
capable of learning, imitation and teaching) contains wolves, dogs, lions, 
elephants and apes. 
Such a scheme of categorisation provides Wilson with a justification 
for his general claim that humans differ from other species only in the 
degree of complexity of displayed behaviour, behavioural acquisition and 
development techniques, and not in kind: 
Although recognising the preeminence of symbols in 
human culture, we do not agree with Geertz, Schneider 
and some other social scientists in considering them 
to be exclusively diagnostic of culture.... In short, 
human beings differ quantitatively from animals in 
the magnitude of the enculturation process. (L & W, 
1981, pp. 3 & 5). 
However, the increase in behavioural complexity made possible by the 
attainment of the fourth level of the evolution of cultural traits is 
clearly an important factor when analysing human behaviour. The stated 
recognition of this fact by Lumsden and Wilson at the start of their work 
demands a new and more complex range of terminology and behavioural 
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modelling if sociobiology is to do justice to its own revisionary 
programme. The aim of this chapter is to assess this 'new start' in the 
light of the criticisms and objections already raised, and to see if the 
sociobiological approach to human behavioural analysis and explanation has 
finally come of age, as promised by its most eloquent proponents. 
One of the most common lines of criticism pursued against Wilson's 
and others' earlier accounts of human behaviour was that it offered a very 
rigid, one-way deterministic model. The picture was very much one of genes 
prescribing definite phenotypic traits in an inflexible way with respect 
to environmental factors, resulting in individuals who, as collective 
social groups, also displayed social behaviours which were directly 
explicable in terms of the genes or genotypes present in the population, 
irrespective of prevalent environmental factors (see above, p. 68). The 
overall model could be represented by the use of single arrows thus: Genes 
- Individual Behaviour -4 Culture. In contrast to this characterisation, 
Wilson promised to redress the balance by giving a more effective role to 
cultural factors in his new account, offering a more dynamically 
interactive model of the relationship of genes and culture: 
The conception that began to emerge is that genes and 
culture are held together by an elastic but 
unbreakable leash. As culture surges forward by means 
of innovation and the introduction of new ideas and 
artifacts from the outside, it is constrained and 
directed to some extent by the genes. At the same 
time, the pressure of cultural innovation affects the 
survival of the genes and ultimately alters the 
strength and torque of the genetic leash. (L & W, 
1983, p6O). 
The new model would appear to contain interactive forces of relation which 
are capable of operating in two directions, characterised 
by double-headed 
arrows: Genes H Individual Behaviour H Culture. In order 
to analyse and 
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fully articulate the precise nature of these relations between the 
'biological' and the 'cultural' aspects of human social behaviour, Wilson 
invents a new terminology, of which the two key terms are 'culturgen' and 
'epigenetic rules'. The first term denotes a given cultural unit or 
artifact, the most precise definition of which is giver. as: 
a relatively homogeneous set of artifacts, behaviors 
or mentifacts (mental constructs having little or no 
direct correspondence with reality) that either share 
without exception one or more attribute states 
selected for their functional importance or at least 
share a consistently recurrent range of such 
attribute states within a given polythetic set. (L & 
W, 1981, p. 27). 
Though it is difficult to extract from the text typical examples of what 
might count as 'culturgens' further to the above definition, Wilson does go 
on to say that they might be such things as "an assortment of food items, 
an array of carpenter's tools, a variety of alternative marriage customs to 
be adopted or discarded, or any comparable array of choices. " (L & W, 1981, 
p.? ). The concept of a 'culturgen' is likened by Wilson to similar ideas 
proposed by other social theorists, but most notably (in the present 
context) that of 'memes' -a concept coined by Richard Dawkins and 
discussed at some length in a previous chapter of this thesis (see above, 
pp. 207-213). An important difference between Dawkins' meines and Wilson's 
culturgens apparently (and surprisingly) not noticed or thought relevant 
by Wilson is that whereas Dawkins explicitly states that such cultural 
units, once in operation, are no longer necessarily restricted 
by factors 
such as their conferring or detracting from individuals' 
biological (i. e. 
reproductive) fitness potential, Wilson's culturgens are always portrayed 
as functioning within a process of dynamic interaction of genes and 
culture. In other words, the prevalence of any particular cultural elements 
is ultimately and always dependent upon their adaptive significance, and 
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the existence of corresponding genotypical traits which tend to prescribe 
such behavioural cho-ices. Whereas fcr Wilson culturgens are ultimately 
linked to genes (the 'leash principle'), for Dawkins memes may and perhaps 
inevitably do take on a life of their own (as 'the New Replicators') . 
Having suggested a new term for characterising the element of 
cultural diversity in human social behaviour, Wilson goes on to provide 
the all-important link in his schema (the 'leash') between the genes at one 
end and the culturgens at the other. This is what he calls the 'epigenetic 
rules' defined as: 
the genetically determined procedures that direct the 
assembly of the mind, including the screening of 
stimuli by peripheral sensory filters, the 
internuncial cellular organizing processes, and the 
deeper processes of directed cognition. The rules 
comprise the restraints that the genes place on 
development (hence the expression "epigenetic") and 
they affect the probability of using one culturgen as 
opposed to another. (L & W, 1981, p. 7). 
These rules governing the course of individual development in interaction 
with environmental factors can be further divided into two groups: the 
primary and the secondary epigenetic rules: 
Primary epigenetic rules are the more automatic 
processes that lead from sensory filtering to 
perception. Their consequences are the least subject 
to variation due to learning and other higher 
cortical processes ........ 
The secondary epigenetic rules act on color and all 
other information displayed in the perceptual fields. 
They include the evaluation of perception through the 
processes of memory, emotional response, and decision 
making through which individuals are predisposed to 
use certain culturgens in preference to others. (L & 
W, 1981, p. 36). 
Wilson cites empirical evidence in support of his model of the processes 
of individual development with such examples as the universality of 
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linguistic schemes of colour classification, which divide the spectrum 
according to the four prime colours. This is an example of a primary and 
therefore relatively inflexible epigenetic rule, where the individual 
cognition and behaviour is severely restricted by -the structures and 
operation of the cognitive apparatus itself. Examples -of secondary 
epigenetic rules are such things as the reaction of babies to attention 
from other humans (facial recognition); visual complexity recognition in 
infants; nonverbal communication, and such things as fears and phobias. 
These characteristic patterns and types of human behaviour are, according 
to Wilson's new theory, to some extent under heritable genetic control. 
That is, differences and similarities between individuals displaying such 
behaviour are ascribable to differences and similarities between those 
individuals' genotypes, rather than to the effects of their individual 
experience of the environment and behavioural novelty produced by genuine 
learning. According to which particular aspect of behaviour one is 
addressing, the prescriptive effect of the genotype may be more or less 
amenable to change due to environmental forces acting on the individual at 
different stages of development. Secondary epigenetic rules are more 
amenable to such forces than the primary ones, but still prescribe a 
limited range of behaviour beyond which the individual cannot respond: 
these parameters are heritable and remain fixed for the individual 
throughout their lifetime. 
This idea of human reasoning and behaviour being explicable in terms 
of the supposed influence of genetically heritable rules has been taken up 
enthusiastically, and developed into an overall approach to philosophical 
questions by Michael Ruse (see Ruse, 1986a & 1986b). The two main areas 
-224- 
which he believes fit within the explanatory range of Darwinian 
evolutionary theory are epistemology and ethics: 
There are rules for approval of modus ponens and 
consiliences, no less than there is a rule setting up 
incest barriers. This is the hypothesis. (Ruse, 1986a, 
p. 161) 
He also uses the concept of 'epigenetic rules' as genetically heritable 
traits affecting individual psychology in every major aspect of human life. 
In short, I argue that the priciples which guide and 
mould science are rooted in our biology, as mediated 
by our epigenetic rules. (ibid, p. 155) 
It is in the case of the supposed operations of secondary epigenetic 
rules that sociobiological theory becomes both interesting and 
controversial. Although the secondary rules are supposed to be more 
'flexible' i. e, amenable to developmental change in response to interaction 
of the individual with prevalent environmental forces, there is, as i said 
above, a limit to their flexibility. Such a thesis might go unnoticed if it 
limited its conjectures to such things as patterns of facial recognition in 
infants, but the epigenetic rules envisaged by Wilson affect everything 
from infantile visual perception to adult sexuality, role adoption, 
aggression, and all the behaviours familiar to readers of the earlier 
sociobiological claims about human behaviour. If the new sociobiology were 
to limit its claims to the explanation of behavioural functions supposedly 
governed by the primary epigenetic rules, it would cease to be interesting 
or novel, since it would merely tell us that Homo Sapiens as a species has 
a cognitive and behavioural range unique to it as a species. Such a 
pronouncement would be merely to repeat the findings of the early 
comparative ethologists such as Lorenz and Tinbergen. Lumsden and Wilson 
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wish to go further than their predecessors, however, in order to make 
specific pronouncements on particular aspects of human behaviour and 
society, and to discuss the origins of the differences and similarities 
between individuals within the same species. It is at this point that 
sociobiology exceeds the theoretical scope of the foundational works upon 
which it was built, and at this point that its claims become novel, 
controversial and worthy of close critical scrutiny. Since the theory is 
largely built upon the two newly-coined concepts of 'culturgens' and 
'epigenetic rules', forming what the authors refer to as the 'gene-culture 
cycle', it is these ideas which I propose to evaluate in the following 
pages, in order to see if the account which they offer of human social 
behaviour is any more tenable than that previously offered by the early 
sociobiological theorising. 
In the previous sections of this thesis one of the principle 
criticisms raised against the sociobiological account of behavioural 
evolution was that the account it offered of the relation of genotypical to 
phenotypical traits of an organism was far too crude. Writers spoke of 
'genes for' this or that trait, suggesting that isolated sections of DNA 
could be treated in theory as if they were responsible for isolated 
phenotypic traits, with no regard for other present genetic factors or the 
organism's interaction with the environment (see above, pp. 21-24). This kind 
of 'genetic atomism' was labelled 'bean-bag theorising' by its critics, and 
dismissed as gross simplification of a more complex and holistic process. 
I believe that much the same criticism can be made of the concept of 
'culturgens' and the way in which it figures in Wilson's account of human 
society and its relation to the developing individual. Culturgens are 
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presented as isolated units of the total cultural web of society, and are 
therefore supportive of an atomistic analysis of culture. Culture itself is 
defined as the sum total of existing culturgens. This atomistic approach 
to social analysis is made explicit in the closing paragraph of Genes. 
Mind, aL_d, Culture where one of the stated aims of a unified science is 
"The decomposition of social behaviour into objective functional units" (L 
& W, 1981, p. 362). In reply to criticisms of the stance adopted in this work 
regarding the theoretical analysis of culture, the authors state: 
Moreover, it is of great theoretical and practical 
importance that some culturgens are discrete and 
readily conceptualized in the procedure followed in 
our elementary test models. (L &W , 1982 ,p . 31) . 
It is important to note in the above quote that culturgens are said to be 
not merely isolatable for the purposes of constructing theoretical 
descriptive models of 4uman social behaviour. Individuals are supposed to 
be making actual choices between perceived alternative culturgens, guided 
by their possession of and response to the inherited epigenetic rules of 
decision. In order for the mechanisms prescribed by the epigenetic rules 
to be operant in individual behaviour, it is therefore necessary that 
culturgens exist as perceptible atomistic units within the totality of 
culture as it is perceived by any individual at one time. If there are to 
be rules guiding my choices, then there must be definable units over which 
such rules may operate. It is, however, far from obvious that the totality 
of 'culture' as it presents itself to individual perception can in theory or 
in practice be divided into the kind of discrete units suggested by the 
concept of culturgen. Further to this, the notion of 'choice' in human 
behaviour is typically presented as being a simple matter of binary choice 
between two competing alternatives. In order for there to evolve a set of 
'rules' guiding such choices, it is necessary that the outcomes of previous 
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similar choices can be systematically represented in some way, in order 
for comparisons and evaluations to be made. In the case of human social 
behaviour, however, it is clear that any particular choice or aspect of 
individual behaviour is carried out within a complex social context, the 
precise elements of which will alter from one occasion to another. This 
has the effect of adding a further degree of complexity to the process and 
possibility of 'rule' formation. 
According to the account of culture being offered, cuiturgens are 
supposed to increase or decrease in popularity according to the genetic 
fitness potential which their adoption or rejection confers on actively 
choosing individuals. But just as the fitness potential of a gene or 
genotype can only be stated as relative to the values of competing genetic 
units in the available gene pool, so the fitness potential conferred by the 
adoption or otherwise of a culturgen can only be calculated as a value 
relative to that conferred by competing alternatives. From this 
observation I believe that one can deduce two important conclusions 
regarding the concepts of culturgens and epigenetic rules. Firstly, any 
model which portrays and describes particular culturgens as advantageous 
in a discrete, atomistic sense - as opposed to viewing them as competing 
constituents of a continuous holistic type system - is a misleading 
simplification of reality. It is very rarely that a choice can be 
represented in a simple binary fashion, but this is clearly the model on 
which Wilson continues to base his theory of human behaviour. 
Gene-culture coevolutionary analysis runs counter to 
the organicist conception of many social scientists, 
which views culture as a virtually independent entity 
that grows, proliferates, and bends the members of 
the society to its own imperatives. (L & W, 1981, 
p. 176) 
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There are in fact three steps: from genes to 
epigenesis, from epigenesis to individual behaviour, 
and from individual behaviour to culture, (L & W, 
1981, p. 343). 
Secondly, supposing that evolution did favour the development of the kinds 
of structures that Wilson says are prescribed by the genes and govern 
behavioural choice, it would seem that any form of 'rigid' or 'inflexible' 
rules would not be of much use to the organism in question. The reason for 
this is that the outcome of choices in terms of maximisation of individual 
advantage is always dependent on the ever-changing factors present in the 
total social-environmental climate in which any particular choice is made. 
The presence of inflexible rules governing choice would therefore defeat 
the object of their own existence, since they would not be capable of 
taking into account the necessary changes of surrounding environment 
which provide the evaluative context in which any particular behaviour is 
measured. In short, if rules evolve at all, it would appear that they would 
tend towards increasing non-specificity in their heritable element, thus 
allowing for a greater degree of individual behavioural flexibility in 
response to novel and contemporary environmental factors. 
This leads one on to the second of the two new concepts introduced 
by Wilson on which his new theory is based - that of epigenetic rules. 
These are supposedly psychological characteristics of individuals (though 
not necessarily in a conscious form) which have some specific 
neurophysiological basis ultimately due to the individual's possession of a 
particular genotype. An example of primary epigenetic rules are those 
apparently governing human colour perception. Certain genetic structures 
carry the information which results in the fairly uniform construction and 
operation in each individual of the occipital and attendant neuronal 
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apparatus of sight. Deviations from the norm of visual perceptual ability, 
such as forms of colour blindness, are traceable to heritable alternative 
alleles affecting precise development of the sight-related structures, The 
general uniformity of heritable visual perceptive structures is further 
reflected by a uniformity of linguistic usage, resulting in the observed 
universal features of the vocabulary of colour classification in natural 
languages. To present such a thesis is neither novel nor, i think, far- 
reaching in its consequences for behavioural analysis and explanation. It 
is merely to reiterate with new phraseology an already-established 
observation-based theory. As far as everyday views of human knowledge and 
behaviour are concerned, the theory that our general range and acuity of 
sense-perception is species-specific and governed by some fairly universal 
and inflexible components of the human genotype should no longer come as 
a revelation, and does not in my view present any grounds for significant 
controversy. Where the theory becomes genuinely interesting and 
controversial is in its claim that there are secondary epigenetic rules. 
These are supposedly of a more general nature, but still with definite and 
far-reaching consequences for individual behaviour and the resultant 
structures of human societies: 
our interpretation of the evidence from cognitive and 
developmental psychology indicates the presence of 
epigenetic rules that have sufficiently great 
specificity to channel the acquisition of rules of 
inference and decision to a substantial degree. This 
process of mental canalization in turn shapes the 
trajectories of cultural evolution. (L & W, 1981, p. 56) 
Whereas such things as colour, smell and taste perception in humans are 
both well-documented by empirical experiment and fairly uncontroversial in 
their implications for social theorising, Lumsden and Wilson go on to say 
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that genetically-accountable differences and similarities between 
individuals exist for such things as the following: 
spelling, sentence construction, perceptual skill, 
psychomotor skill, extroversion/introversion, 
homosexuality, proneness to alcoholism, age of first 
sexual activity, timing of Piagetian stages of 
development, some phobias, certain forms of neurosis 
and psychosis, including manic-depressive behavior 
and schyzophrenia, and others. (L & V, 1981, p. 16) 
One can add to this list the earlier sociobiological favourites such as 
male/female role differentiation, aggression, incest taboos, altruism and 
other features of human behaviour regarded as under a significant 
influence from heritable predispositions. Unlike the examples of various 
forms of sense-perception, these latter forms of cognition and behaviour 
are far from uncontroversial, With such things as 'incest' and 
'homosexuality' it is not clear that a single, simple definition of what 
constitutes such behaviour is possible (see above, pp. 134-150). If this is 
so, then it becomes increasingly difficult to see how there could be 
specific rules innate to every individual controlling the expression -of 
attitudes towards such behaviour, since the object of the rule would appear 
to be complex rather than simple. Nowhere is Lumsden and Wilson's 
disregard of this factor of complexity more in evidence than in their 
discussion of the supposed innate aversion towards incestuous 
relationships in human beings: 
Culturgen categories range all the way from those in 
which the variation consists in two obvious states, 
such as the acceptance or rejection of incest, to much 
more subtle and complex phenomena that must be 
subdivided in an arbitrary manner. (L & W, 1981, p. 30) 
Apart from the problem with the first part of this quote - viz the 
supposed 'obvious' nature of the behavioural choices involved in such 
-231- 
things as incestuous behaviour - the second part of the quote also seems 
problematic in view of my above point about the probable and possible 
evolution of rules which govern vague categories of choice. If the 
phenomenal categories furnished by cognition are themselves 'arbitrary', in 
what sense can it be claimed that there has been evolution for universal 
or near-universal 'rules' governing the perception of and behavioural 
reaction to such phenomena? 
A further criticism of the picture of human development being offered 
here is that, contrary to Wilson's opening remarks about the previous 
sociobiological model being replaced by one which incorporates a far 
greater degree of complexity and scope for individual behavioural 
development and change, I would argue that the model is still one of 
fairly static individual capabilities. We are told that any particular 
individual is born with a set -of heritable prescriptive rules, coded for in 
some way in their genotype. These govern a range of possible behavioural 
development, within which there is scope for assimilation of environmental 
influence and resultant change. However, the scope for change is still 
fixed at the moment of conception and formation of the zygote: i. e. the 
behavioural parameters are not presented as capable of further development 
or change during the course of the individual's lifetime. The true 
'flexibility' built into the new coevolutionary picture is one which occurs 
across but not within generations. It is presumed that for any behaviour 
for which there exists an epigenetic rule, there will be variation between 
individuals for that rule and for resultant behaviour. As a result of this, 
there will occur a process of natural selection within populations, by 
which those individuals who manifest the most 'advantageous' behaviour due 
to their possession of particular genotypes will survive and flourish, to 
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pass elements of their heritable characteristics on to the next generation. 
This means that epigenetic rules can only undergo 'change' in the sense of 
their evolving across generations by natural selection, presuming that 
there exists sufficient variation between individuals, and a corresponding 
selective pressure. The flexibility is therefore confined to evolution 
across generations, and does not have as much to do with the flexibility 
of development--of--paßt cular individuals as it might at first sight appear 
from Lumsden and Wilson's opening remarks. 
As a starting point in assessing the general status of the new 
theory, Lumsden and Wilson themselves provide four prerequisite conditions 
which must be met in order to provide minimal justification for their 
theory. The first of these is that epigenetic rules must be shown to be 
commonplace in human societies in forms amenable to analysis of the 
theory. Secondly, there must be demonstrable genetic variance for such 
rules between individuals within populations. Thirdly, there must be a 
verifiable link between cultural practices and genetic fitness - i. e. 
cultural practice must be reflected by changes in the proportional 
representation of particular genotypes within the population's gene pool, 
and vice versa. Lastly, there must be a verifiable link between genes and 
cellular structures or ontogenetic processes resulting in significant forms 
of cognitive structure and process. It will be my contention that, apart 
from the above doubts concerning the terminology of the new model, 
coevolutionary theory as it is presented in the works of Lumsden and 
Wilson fails to meet the four requirements which they proclaim themselves 
to be minimal for its acceptance. I will deal with them in turn in the 
order in which they are mentioned above. 
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I think that it is fairly uncontroversial to state that some aspects 
of human cognition are uniform within and across various apparently 
isolated human cultural groups. As I suggested earlier, information such as 
that all children show a preference for food with a relatively high sugar 
concentration (i. e. high calorific value) would not come as a surprise to 
most people, and carries no great controversial implications. The 
universality of other forms of human behaviour is far from 
uncontroversial. Incest is a good example of behaviour which Wilson takes 
to be under some form of universal species-specific heritable control, 
supported by the evidence that its occurrence is relatively low in all 
known human societies, and there exists some form of corresponding taboo 
against its practice. The first of the prerequisites for proving the gene- 
culture coevolutionary thesis was the production of evidence independent 
of actual social practice that underlying epigenetic rules governing 
certain behaviours do in fact exist. It is obvious from the writing of 
Lumsden and Wilson that they do not appreciate the difficulty of 
substantiating their claims in this way. The evidence which they actually 
present is to refer to various cross-cultural similarities as proof of 
underlying fairly rigid heritable behavioural rules, operating on all 
individuals regardless of specific details of their cultural upbringing and 
personal development. However, a moment's thought suffices to come up with 
the objection that such cross-cultural 'universals' could also be due to 
cultural convergence or 'cultural parallelism', due to similar environmental 
effects on species-specific but nevertheless flexible cognitive structures. 
The fact of certain kinds of cultural uniformity does not prove that 
alternative forms of behaviour lie outside the possible behavioural scope 
of the species, or that the uniformity itself is not due to similar 
environmental effects on basic capabilities. For there to be a serious 
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empirical basis for this aspect of the coevolutionary theory, Wilson would 
have to offer independent evidence of the hypothetical genetic structures, 
and from psychology or neurophysiology of the effect of such structures on 
individual cognitive development. In fact, the only evidence of this kind 
offered by Lumsden and Wilson is of the fairly uncontroversial kind 
already mentioned, concerning such things as colour vision or infantile 
dietary dispositions. 
Further to this, Lumsden and Wilson appear to offer a circular 
argument in support of the existence of underlying epigenetic rules 
governing individual behaviour. Their mistake appears to be due to the 
'double aspect' of epigenetic rules, and the role which this concept plays 
in their coevolutionary model. I say 'double aspect' since epigenetic rules 
are supposedly both the results of heritable genetic structures and the 
causes of corresponding social structures. By their influence on the 
individual, they produce mass patterns of choice between competing 
available culturgens. The supposed 'proof' of the existence of epigenetic 
rules is to work backwards from the observed to the unobserved; from the 
empirical to the hypothetical side of the model. The inference is from the 
existence of certain visible social structures, to the existence of certain 
invisible genetic structures. Since these invisible structures have been 
posited in the first place in order to explain the observed evidence of 
social practice, it is circular and invalid to argue, as Wilson does, that 
the evidence from social practice is 'proof' of the existence of the 
underlying hypothetical genetic structures. The existence of uniform social 
practice is evidence of nothing but itself: it only becomes evidence of the 
existence of underlying genetic structures if such structures are known to 
exist and have such effects, and there is no alternative explanation which 
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accounts for the uniformity of the social structures - and this is the 
very point at issue. Such an error is, in my view, grave in its 
implications not only for this particular aspect of the discussion of the 
coevolutionary theory, but also since it implies a disturbing lack of 
rigour in the reasoning used to justify the authors' theories in general. 
A further problem for acceptance of the theory is in the way it deals 
with particular phenomena such as incest taboos. As pointed out by many 
critics of the theory, the terminology of the 'culturgen' allows Lumsden 
and Wilson to lump together for theoretical explanatory purposes a range 
of significantly differing behaviours which, to the discerning eye of the 
social scientist, are far from uniform. The point is most graphically 
illustrated by Kitcher's discussion of incest taboos and their 
coevolutionary explanation (Kitcher, 1985, pp. 344 - 346). Kitcher proposes 
three hypothetical societies called respectively the 'Shunsib', the 
'Moralmaj' and the 'Tabuit'. As the name suggests, the Shunsib people 
exhibit a high degree of incest aversion, but there is no social 
institution reflecting this individual behaviour. In the Moralmaj society, 
there is also a high degree of incest avoidance, but they also educate 
their children in such a way as to condemn incestuous practices, though 
without ever making such condemnation a public affair. In the Tabuit 
society, there is not only a high degree of aversion to incest, but its 
occurrence is expressly forbidden by their civil and/or religious codes. 
Its occurrence carries severe publicly-ordained penalties for those 
convicted. Since Lumsden and Wilson only ever talk of incest taboos and 
the practice of incest as a single, indivisible culturgen, it would appear 
that their analysis of these three societies would render them all 
equivalent, since in each of them there is an avoidance of incest. However, 
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it seems obvious that to the social scientist the three societies represent 
very different social phenomena. Wilson could try to differentiate between 
them by saying that the Shunsib and the Maralmaj are separated by their 
different use of a culturgen for 'criticizing the behaviour of others'. In 
the Shunsib tribe this culturgen is low in frequency or nonexistent, 
whereas in the Moralmaj society it has a high frequency of use. However, 
it now seems as if there is a distinction between the simple fact of 
individual incest avoidance, and the existence of a propensity for 
instructing one's children that such practices are wrong -a distinction 
which does not appear in Lumsden and Wilson's account, where the avoidance 
of incest and the existence of some rule governing one's propensity to 
instruct others in one's opinion are never treated as separate phenomena. 
If they are separate phenomena, what is the nature of the psychological 
link between them, and how is this controlled, since there now appear to 
°be two culturgens: one corresponding to individual behaviour, and the other 
corresponding to one's moral approbation of others? The problem is further 
complicated when one considers the Tabuit society, since they have not 
only the phenomenon of private practice, but also the existence of a public 
system of sanctions and punishments. The problem here is how to account 
for the public ceremony of punishment, since if this is also held to be a 
culturgen, then it must be a joint manifestation of individual behavioural 
propensities. One might be able to envisage how individuals could have 
behavioural propensities guiding their personal reaction to potential 
occurrences of incest, but what would a genetically heritable propensity 
for condoning and taking part in public ceremonies related to incest look 
like? As Kitcher intended, the more otie begins to try and offer expanded 
versions of the Lumsden and Wilson arguments in order to deal with the 
examples, the more unlikely and incomprehensible the explanations become. 
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Kitcher concludes the section by stating that Lumsden and Wilson have 
failed to respond to the critics of the earlier sociobiological theories, 
and that in order to do so: 
Luinsden and Wilson will need a theory that accounts 
for the presence of social institutions, public ways 
of regulating the behaviour of individuals. The 
challenge will be to specify the group property of 
having a social institution in terms of the frequency 
of the use of culturgens, conceived as things that 
individuals can adopt. Unless that challenge is met, 
there will be no reason to think that Lumsden and 
Wilson have solved the problem they set for 
themselves. (Kitcher, 1985, p. 346). 
It would appear from the above analysis that Lumsden and Wilson have 
indeed failed to fulfill the first of their required proofs for the 
coevolutionary theory, and that far from clarifying the original proposals 
of sociobiological theory, it has led to further confusions. 
The second criterion for establishing the truth of the ccecolutionary 
theory was to show that "genetic variance in epigenetic rules must exist 
within human populations. " (L & W, 1981, p. 16) . The evidence in support of 
this element of their theory comes from studies of identical and non- 
identical twins. However, such data is notoriously problematic if used as 
evidence in the way here required, and limited case studies of fraternal 
and identical twins will not yield sufficiently independent evidence to 
decide the issue (see above, ppl37/139 for criticism of the use of twin 
studies in relation to the analysis and explanation of homosexuality). The 
argument forwarded by the authors is that case studies of twins shows 
evidence of greater behavioural similarities between identical as opposed 
to non-identical twins. The argument then proposes that this greater 
degree of similarity is due to the identical twins' possession of identical 
genotypes, rather than to any environmental factors, on the grounds that 
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the non-identical (dizygotic) twins share a similar environment, yet do 
not display the same degree of behavioural similarity. However, what such 
evidence does not take into account is the precise details of the 
environmental effects in the two types of case. It can obviously be argued 
that identical twins share a much more 'identical' environment than non- 
identical twins. They are treated more equally by their peers and others, 
they are even confused for each other or able to swap places deliberately. 
Parents will tend to expect and react to displays of different stages of 
growth and development identically. Perhaps the sheer fact of their 
similar physical appearance is enough to ensure that their treatment by 
others is bound to be more identical than in the case of fraternal twins. 
Subsequently, one would expect their emotional and general cognitive 
development to be more similar than in the case of non-identical twins. In 
this case, 'it is not at all easy to separate the fact of genetic identity 
from the prevalent facts concerning relative identity of environmental 
forces, which is what is required if such cases are to stand as evidence 
of the relation of genetic to environmental factors in individual 
development. Since it is impossible to be sure that any particular traits 
displayed by identical twins are due to genetically heritable factors 
rather than to environmental ones, to cite such cases as Lumsden and 
Wilson do in support of their theory is an insufficient proof of their 
contentions. Once again the authors argue from scant evidence of the 
similarity or dissimilarity of behaviours in particular cases to the 
existence of underlying genetic causes for such behavioural similarity. 
However, the genetic factor used in the explanation is the very thing in 
need of independent evidential support, since the supposed evidence can be 
equally interpreted as supportive of a viable alternative thesis. Once 
again, I would argue that the authors have failed to provide convincing 
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evidence in support of their theory, and have merely shown how their 
theory would fit in with and not contradict existing observations which, 
however, permit of other equally viable explanations. (A lengthy discussicn 
of the problems raised by the citing of case studies of twins in relation 
to questions of genetic heritability is to be found in chapter five of It 
j, g our Genes by Rose, Kamin and Lewontin. ) 
The third area of evidential support for the coevolutionary theory is 
in the question of a positive link between cultural practices and genetic 
(i. e. reproductive) fitness within (and presumably between) different 
cultural groups. The examples of cultural elements which have these effects 
are such things as the following: 
For example, certain practices in tattooing and other 
modes of body marking, as well as circumcision, 
treatment of menstrual and afterbirth blood, and diet, 
are known to transmit viruses and other infectious 
agents that profoundly affect mortality, birth rate 
and even sex ratio. (L &W , 1981, p . 17 ) 
The effects of such practices on the health of individuals and on 
demographic features of the cultural group in general are claimed as 
proof of a direct link between culture and genetic fitness potentials. One 
must, however, analyse such a claim to extract its precise implications. It 
is true that tattooing, circumcision, obstetrical practices and other 
customs involving exposure of or damage to body tissues all involve an 
increased risk of viral infection and mortality rate changes due to 
insufficient medical care or knowledge. This is too obvious and trivial a 
point to be the one intended by the authors. The clue to the real purpose 
of such examples is given in the next few pages of their 
text, where 
Lumsden and Wilson go on to discuss two examples of dietary customs. 
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The first case has to do with the special method of alkali cooking 
which considerably raises the nutritional value of maize, compared with 
alternative methods of preparation. Wilson states that in the Americas: 
there exists a strong positive relation between the 
intensity of maize cultivation, the use of alkali 
cooking, population density, and the complexity of 
social organization. (L & W, 1981, p. 17) 
If the population is one for which maize consumption is a major factor in 
the diet, and if the variation in cooking methods causes large changes in 
the nutritional value of the end product, then it comes of no surprise to 
find that demographic features such as comparative population density show 
some degree of correlation to cullinary techniques. However, it becomes x 
clear from the sentences which follow that the authors' example is meant 
to indicate something far stronger than this simple correlation of 
demographic and dietary factors: 
It seems unlikely that the many New World societies 
adopting alkali cooking could have directly perceived 
this procedure as the solution to their biochemical 
shortfall and hence as a requisite for further 
population growth and social evolution. (L & W, 
1981, p. 17) 
What is being darkly but definitely hinted at here is the suggestion that 
the present-day prevalence of societies using the alkali cooking method 
cannot be due to factors of conscious decision making by any individuals 
or groups thereof. The necessary knowledge for such a decision was until 
comparatively recently lacking, and could therefore have played no part in 
the history of the cooking methods. The obvious but unstated implication 
is that the present state of affairs is the result of some process of 
evolution by natural selection: those groups adopting alkali cooking 
methods thrived, and those which didn't are not extant in sufficient 
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numbers to tell the tale. But if this is all that is being implied, it is 
perhaps not too controversial a thesis, but nor does it constitute evidence 
in support of the coevolutionary thesis as defined by the authors. Before 
spelling out why this is so, I will go on to their second example which 
shares similar characteristics. 
The second example is also of dietary customs, and has to do with 
the consumption of a particular foodstuff called fava beans. These can 
have serious deleterious effects, even fatal, if consumed by individuals 
who possess a certain sex-linked recessive gene labelled G6PD-. It also 
happens that in many Mediterranean societies there exist taboos and 
special rituals regarding the preparation and consumption of the fava 
bean. Lumsden and Wilson's concluding comment on these phenomena is once 
again suggestive of what they regard their examples as proving: 
Yet there is little evidence that the peoples affected 
made any direct, rational connection between their 
beliefs and what is now perceived to be the true 
nature and cause of favism. (L & W, 1981, p. 18) 
This example, along with the first one above, is meant to be evidence of a 
definite 'coevolutionary link' between certain aspects of culture and genes. 
But just what is meant here by 'coevolution'? To return to the first 
example, one might accept the suggested explanation that, as a result of 
alternative cooking methods, cultural groups thrived or dwindled 
accordingly. Perhaps, as the authors seem to be suggesting, those groups 
that 'got it wrong' died out or migrated towards those that 'got it right' 
and were visibly flourishing as a result. Demographic patterns 
became 
attuned to cultural practice, without knowledge of the relative merits of 
variant practices. But what does this story show? Merely that cultural 
practices can have serious effects on the numbers and composition of 
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populations, with or without the direct causes being known by any 
individuals within the population. 
Was this the kind of 'coevolution' that Lumsden and Wilson claimed 
was going to be vindicated in their work? I think not. In the introduction 
to Genes. Mind, =d,, Culture the authors offer the following definition: 
Gene-culture coevolution is correspondingly defined 
as any change in the epigenetic rules due to shifts 
in gene frequency, or in culturgen frequencies due to 
the epigenetic rules, or in both Jointly. (L & W, 1981, 
P-11). 
The thesis put forward here is that culture and gene pools can interact 
with each other in a way which is non-random with respect to the 
characteristics of particular genotypes within the gene pool. Coevolution 
is not merely a quantitative change within the gene pool: it is a 
qualitative change, due to differential selection for particular genotypes. 
The result is cycles of interrelated cultural and genetic evolution, In the 
above two examples of dietary customs, there has arguably been an 
occurrence of cultural evolution by natural selection. That is, particular 
practices have survived differentially over time due to the effects they 
have on individual and overall group fitness levels. The fitness potential 
of any particular individual was related to their inclusion into a 
particular cultural group: i. e. X survives or dies because they belong to an 
alkali/non-alkali cooking group. The important point to note is that X's 
fitness potential here is calculated irrespective of their particular 
genotype. The difference between X's fitness potential, where X belongs to 
a group of alkali cookers, and Y's fitness potential, where Y belongs to a 
group of non-alkali cookers is due purely to cultural factors of the group 
and its practices, and has nothing to do with differences between X and 
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Y's respective genotypes. The only way that the examples could fit in 
with the coevolutionary thesis as stated above would be if there also 
existed genes prescribing the various methods of food preparation and the 
existence of dietary taboos. In that case, individuals would survive 
differentially not merely due to their chance inclusion in a particular 
cultural group, but because the spread or demise of particular cultural 
practices would be affected by evolutionary changes in the gene pool 
composition by natural selection for particular genetically heritable 
characteristics. 
It is the latter kind of account which appears to be the true 
underlying aim of the coevolutionary theory, and if proven would indeed be 
a significant factor in assessing such examples of human social behaviour. 
However, even Lumsden and Wilson stop short of suggesting that evolution 
in the first of the above examples has occurred as a result of selection 
for 'genes prescribing epigenetic rules favouring alkali cooking methods'. 
It would appear that some such account is in fact necessary if it is to 
count as an example of what the authors themselves define as genuine 
coevolution. In the second example we are again told that the occurrence 
of the taboos cannot. have anything to do with the conscious apprehension 
of the facts of the matter. But once again, it is difficult to see how the 
origin of the taboos is to be explained in the way that the coevolutionary 
theory suggests. It is true that the people presumably lacked knowledge as 
to a connection between the consumption of the bean and its effects on 
certain individuals possessing the recessive gene. But this does not mean 
that they were unable to observe and reflect on instances of illness 
following consumption of the bean, without knowing the precise details of 
the causal relation. I would suggest that this is precisely the kind of 
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situation in which one would expect myths and superstitious taboos to co-me 
into existence: when certain phenomena have been observed in regular 
conjunction with one another, but the true nature of the causal connection 
is beyond the 'scientific' explanatory powers of the cultural group. To 
capture and render useful the knowledge from observation, an explanation 
is formulated within already-existing explanatory schema, provided most 
commonly by religion, myth, legend or some set of superstitions. If this is 
not the origin of such taboos, then again one must ask where the authors 
think the origin truly lies. Are they perhaps suggesting that along with 
the deleterious reaction to fava beans due to possession of the recessive 
gene, there has evolved some form of innate psychological aversion also 
linked to the particular genotype? If so, how would it relate to the 
existence of the taboo, which is presumably practiced by all members of 
the group, regardless of individual genetic constitution? (These questions 
are comparable to those raised by the account of incest avoidance and 
taboos - see above, pp. 235-237). Such problems are never examined by the 
authors, and one is instead left with a case of observed cultural practice, 
the origins of which do not appear to require anything like the complexity 
of the coevolutionary theory being offered. Nor do the examples further 
the case for the coevolutionary theory in the way that the authors 
intended. 
The fourth and final part of the proof for the coevolutionary theory 
is the evidence for a link between possession of specific genes or alleles 
and specific paths of cognitive development. This is the kind of link 
which in the above examples of dietary practice were shown to be 
necessary in order to make them genuine examples of ý: oevolution as defined 
by the authors. The examples offered in support of this aspect of the 
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theory range from peripheral sensory screening in sight, sound and smell, 
etc. to operant learning processes. Even the authors admit that research 
into the cellular basis of cognition processes in humans is "fragmentary", 
yet they feel confident enough to pronounce that "there is no shortage of 
models to explain the neuronal basis of consciousness and the mind. " tL & 
W, 1981, p. 19). This may be so, but such a plethora of models merely reflects 
the enthusiasm of the researchers and theorists involved: it does not 
constitute the kind of hard scientific evidence which the authors 
themselves recognise as necessary to the establishment of their theory, 
and which they have so far failed to deliver to their readers. (I also 
doubt that many philosophers would share the apparent opinion of the 
authors that the relation of conscicusness to cur physical nature is all 
but solved! ) In short, as with the other aspects of the coevolutionary 
theory, the authors have little evidence that the precise behaviour- 
directing structures actually exist in the forms in which they suggest. 
The bulk of the evidence merely supports the already-stated and 
uncontroversial thesis that the main forms of sensory perception are 
limited to certain genetically heritable and species-specific ranges and 
sensitivity, which is far from the claim that complex forms of social 
behavioural interaction are under similar kinds of control. I would 
therefore conclude that Luisden and Wilson's coevolutionary theory of 
human social behaviour has not been proven, even by the standards laid 
down by the authors themselves. Though not for any one particular reason, 
in general one could say that the failure is due to an oversimplification 
of important aspects of behaviour and its characterisation; a failure to 
recognise or entertain equally viable alternative explanations; a lack of 
sufficient and relevant empirical evidence; and finally a tendency to draw 
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invalid deductions from certain premises, or to mistake such deductions as 
the only possible interpretation of the available evidence. 
The only areas in which the coevolutionary theory is acceptable is 
where it is fairly uncontroversial: the authors mistakenly think that the 
uncontroversial evidence can be extrapolated and used to back up a 
stronger thesis for which evidence is actually lacking. The weaker thesis 
which I believe can be supported by existing evidence and by a priori 
theorising from knowledge of evolutionary principles is that the organs 
and the ranges of sensory perception and peripheral filtering of 
information they furnish are species-specific and largely unconscious in 
their operation, being due to morphological structures whose features are 
genetically heritable. This is in line with comments made in the 
comparative ethological studies of Lorenz and Tinbergen. Lumsden and 
Wilson appear to be forwarding a stronger thesis about very specific 
aspects of behaviour at a much more complex level, but as I have argued, 
they lack the empirical evidence and the argumentation necessary to 
establishing this thesis. 
If one accepts the above analysis, it would appear that Lumsden and 
Wilson have failed to prove the worth of their new 'science' of human 
social behaviour, either on theoretical or empirical grounds. Apart from 
the doubts I have raised as to the scientific credentials for the 
coevolutionary theory, one also begins to wonder just what Wilson's 
conception of human nature and society is, in the light of statements like 
the following: 
The ultimate, evolutionary goals of the mind, toward 
which minute-by-minute problem solving is directed, 
reside in the epigenetic rules, and in that sense the 
core of both humanness and individuality are invested 
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there rather than in the more purely cognitive and 
ratiocinating portions of the mind. (L & W, 1981, p. 348) 
And this is following the introductory promises of a proper place in the 
theory for the nature and effects of human society and thought in all its 
varieties! Quotes such as the above sound more like statements of genetic 
determinism, in which consciousness and rationality are relegated to 
epiphenomenal status, incapable of significant or any behavioural effect. 
Such an interpretation of the Wilsonian view is made even more plausible 
when Lumsden and Wilson briefly dispose of the greatest products of human 
achievement in a similar manner to that suggested above, only a few pages 
further on in their text: 
We should keep in mind that most of the wondrous 
inventions of science and technology serve in 
practice as enabling mechanisms to achieve 
territorial defense, communication of tribal ritual, 
sexual bonding, and other ancient sociobiological 
functions. Curiosity, even the artistic impulse 
itself, might also fill such a role. (L & W, 1981, p. 360) 
This almost grotesque compression of human culture and its meaning into a 
few biased examples is coupled with unfounded statements of the supposed 
closed inevitability of present and future development: 
Only with difficulty can individual development be 
deflected from the narrow channels along which the 
great majority of human beings travel. (L & W, 1981, 
p. 358) 
A society that chooses to ignore the implications of 
the innate genetic rules will still navigate by them 
and at each moment of decision yield to their 
dictates by default. (L & W, 1981, p. 358) 
Such statements only go to show that, despite pretensions to a new 
form 
of behavioural analysis which gives appropriate weight to cultural factors 
and the flexibility of human behavioural responses, the authors are still 
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committed to a model of individuals under the control of genetically 
acquired behavioural imperatives. Lumsden and Wilson even end their work 
with a section entitled "The Explanation of History" in which they appear 
committed to the view that human history is largely determined, and can be 
explained and even predicted if only one has enough knowledge of the 
causal laws governing its movement. The problem with such a view is that 
somewhere along the way, everything recognisably 'human' about history and 
the cultures which comprise it just disappears, and one is left with a 
description of a species which it is hard to recognise as one's own. If 
sociobiology is claiming to be a viable contender for replacing existing 
human psychology and the social sciences, then it must offer a portrait of 
human society which captures its richness and depth. In fact, what often 
emerges in sociobiological texts is little more than a caricature of human 
individuals and society, - in which theories are offered to account for 
isolated and distorted aspects of behaviour, the features of which are 
sometimes difficult to recognise as 'human' at all. One might sympathise 
with the sociobiological contention that there is a greater degree of 
continuity between human and other species' behaviour than has been 
previously credited by the existing social sciences, and that this error 
stands in need of correction. But such sympathy is easily lost when the 
'new synthesis' of theories is achieved at the severe cost of accurate 
representation of the human protagonists. 
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Chapter Five : Evolutionary TJi4=ory 
and Phi1c c phy of' Mind 
Is it possible, at certain moments we cannot imagine, 
a horse can add its sufferings together - the non- 
stop jerks and jabs that are its daily life - and turn them into grief? What use is grief to a horse? 
( Equus; Act 1, Scene 1. ) 
In the previous chapters I have critically examined at some length 
the attempt by certain theorists to apply the principles of evolutionary 
theorising to the explanation and. -description of human social behaviour. I 
believe that my arguments have shown that, contrary to their claims, they 
have failed to establish their thesis by way of sufficient reasoning or 
empirical evidence. Consequently, very little remains of their specific 
arguments to commend itself to those already involved in the established 
disciplines of research and description of human behaviour which fall 
under the umbrella term of 'social sciences'. Whatever the future may hold 
by way of inter-disciplinary 'synthesis', it will not - in my opinion - 
take the reductive form of 'cannibalism' boasted by Wilson and other such 
thinkers in their often polemic style of scientific prophesy (Cf. 
Wilson, 1975, p. 6) . 
In this final chapter I would like to turn from concentration on The 
theories of sociobiology, and present some rather more positive thoughts 
concerning the ways in which I do believe that evolutionary theorising can 
and ought to have a bearing on human concerns. In particular I wish to 
provide some justification for the view that the Darwinian explanation of 
the origin of species has a relevance to several related areas of 
philosophical thought. Contrary to the claims of some philosophers, 
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reasoning which takes account of aspects of empirical theory such as 
biology can and should have far-reaching consequences for traditional 
philosophical debate. In short, I believe that it would be not only unwise 
but invalid for philosophers to continue theorising upon certain topics 
within the analytic tradition as if the synthetic theory of evolution by 
natural selection had never been propounded. 
Leaving aside the specific arguments of sociobiology as forwarded by 
any particular writer, one could characterise it very roughly by reference 
to its central tenet, viz: that the behaviour of all species can and should 
be sufficiently explained within the neo-Darwinian framework of synthetic 
evolutionary theory. Thus, both the historical origins and method of 
explanation of at least some aspects of human behaviour are supposedly 
continuous with those of other species. Homo Sapiens may be unique in its 
natural history and certain species-specific abilities, but the same may be 
said of every natural species. Within such a theoretical schema, 
differences are of degree rather than of kind. Such a 'dogma' is the 
foundation stone of the whole sociobiological edifice of research and 
theory. 
In sharp contrast to such a claim, many philosophers (if not the 
majority) have argued for various reasons that the origin and explanation 
of at the very least a large part of human behaviour differs in kind or 
principle from that of any other species. Its explanation therefore 
demands and may only be rendered comprehensible within the conceptual 
domain of a unique explanatory framework. The modern versions of such a 
view can be traced from enlightenment figures such as Descartes, up to 
contemporary philosophers such as Donald Davidson, Peter Winch, Antony 
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Kenny and AI Melden. Though these philosophers have their individual 
reasons for wishing to draw a sharp division between the description of 
Homo Sapiens and that of the rest of the natural world, the outcome of 
their theoretical stance is comparable. One could characterise them by 
saying that they reject the notion of behavioural and corresponding 
explanatory continuity between Homo Sapiens and even the most plausible 
instances of other species - for example primates such as Chimpanzees or 
Gorillas. Such examples are regarded as in some way lacking the necessary 
credentials for admission to the ranks of 'rational agents' or 'conscious 
beings' or some other office of distinction attainable only by members of 
our own species. Ultimately, all these philosophers base their distinction 
on some characterisation of human thought as possessing unique qualities 
(e. g. intentionality, rationality, meaning, or simply consciousness or self- 
consciousness), from which it is then argued that the resultant behaviour 
must also therefore admit of a different order of explanation, however 
great the temptation to make cross-species comparisons. The mother 
Chimpanzee nursing its young in the zoo compound is touching because its 
movements so perfectly resemble those of a human mother: to imply that 
such behaviour is in fact an expression of similar maternal thoughts and 
feelings is dismissed as unphilosophical and confused anthropomorphism. 
The line of argument I wish to pursue in this concluding chapter will 
attempt to go some way towards resolving some of the issues raised by 
such different perspectives as I have roughly outlined above. It involves a 
dangerous passage between the Scylla of sociobiological reduction of all 
behavioural explanation to the level of cross-species 'types' or 
'strategies', and their apparently inadequate and idealised models of one- 
to-one behavioural interactions, and the Charybdis of human behaviour as 
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occupying a logically unique and isolated niche in ethological studies and 
philosophical theorising. 
In chapter two of his work Thought aui Knowledge (Malcolm, 1977), 
Norman Malcolm analyses the somewhat 'notorious' position of Descartes 
regarding the comparative mental life of humans and other species. 
Malcolm's conclusion is that, as regards human thought, Descartes: 
explicitly and consciously adopted the position that 
there is a propositional kernel in every feeling, 
desire, voluntary act, emotion, and sensation. This is 
why he could hold that his essential nature consists 
solely in being a thinking thing. (Malcolm, 1977, p. 48). 
Malcolm goes on to say that, in contrast to the Res Cogitans of essential 
human being, Descartes regarded all other species as being: 
devoid of mind, of all consciousness and awareness, 
of real feeling and sensation, because they do not 
"apprehend" "entertain" "contemplate" plain or, in 
language, think of propositions. (ibid, p. 49). 
This view of Descartes regarding the mental life of other species is one 
with which Malcolm strongly disagrees. In essence, Malcolm`s objection to 
Descartes' position comes down to the fact that Descartes holds "an 
absurdly over inte1lectualized view of the life of man. " (ibid, p. 49). The 
undue emphasis which Descartes places on linguistic formulation as 
necessary to any and every form of thought both distorts the correct 
presentation of humans, and in so doing condemns all other species to a 
supposed existence as insentient, unconscious automata. Such views would 
be disturbing enough if they were merely limited to an era within the 
history of philosophy, but equivalent views to that of Descartes find 
forceful expression in the work of contemporary thinkers such as Donald 
Davidson (Davidson, 1975), Wilfrid Sellars (Sellars, 1956), Richard Rorty 
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(Rorty, 1965) and Paul Churchland (Churchland, 1979). Although based on a 
different overall philosophical framework, the resultant view of Davidson 
and others turns out to draw the same conceptual boundaries regarding 
behavioural explanation and the attribution of mental life as were drawn 
by Descartes in the seventeenth century. Moreover, Davidson's argument Con 
which I will focus initially) is in places specifically aimed at the 
position of thinkers such as Malcolm. I will therefore turn now to an 
exposition of Davidson's 'neo-Cartesianisin' to see if there really are 
sound philosophical grounds for maintaining such rigid divisions between 
man and the rest of the natural world. 
Davidson's views on this matter find their fullest expression in the 
article entitled Thought and, Talk (Davidson, 1975). Davidson begins with 
the question "What is the connection between thought and language? " and 
promises to "show how thought depends on speech" (ibid, p. 8). The first 
stage of this argument is to explain how any particular thought can be 
said to have semantic content. Davidson's first point is that all thought 
is parasitic on belief, since to think about anything at all is to 
entertain an indefinite background system of beliefs which relate in 
various ways to the particular thought. 
The system of such beliefs identifies a thought by 
locating it in a logical and epistemic space .... We may 
say, summarizing the last two paragraphs, that a 
thought is defined by a system of beliefs, but is 
itself autonomous with respect to belief. (ibid, p. 9). 
The next stage involves a somewhat more complex argument whose 
details 
are most fully developed in a number of other articles (Cf. 
Davidson, 1973; 
Davidson, 1974a; Davidson, 1974b). Briefly, it is argued that the attribution 
of beliefs to or by a third person depends upon one's ability 
to 
0 
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successfully interpret the other's behaviour (linguistic or otherwise), 
since behaviour is the overt expression of desires, beliefs, etc. This 
further limits the possibility of interpretation to those whose beliefs, 
desires, etc. do not differ too radically from one's own, since a radical 
difference would make the whole process of interpretation impossible. 
Davidson concludes: 
All this strongly suggests that the attribution of 
desires and beliefs (and other thoughts) must go hand 
in hand with, the interpretation of speech, that 
neither the theory of decision nor of interpretation 
can be successfully developed without the other. 
(Davidson, 1975 ,p . 15). 
The reason that 'speech' now appears as the key factor in interpretation 
and attribution of thought is that: 
without speech we cannot make the fine distinctions 
between thoughts that are essential to the 
explanations we can sometimes confidently supply. 
(ibid, p. 15). 
Semantics is thus not merely parasitic upon belief systems, but upon 
linguistic systems. In espousing such a theory, Davidson is allying himself 
with the Wittgensteinian thesis of 'meaning as use', and applying the 
insight of Wittgenstein's language-game perspective to a theory of radical 
interpretation. In the absence of possible discourse between the two 
parties involved (actor and interpretor) the possible "attributions and 
consequent explanations of actions will be seriously underdetermined, " 
(ibid, p. 16). 
For some philosophers, (e. g. Armstrong, 1973) the underdetermination 
of attributable beliefs does not in itself pose a serious problem, and is 
in fact only to be expected in cases where we are concerned with the 
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behaviour of other species. After all, both Armstrong and Davidson insist 
that the success of radical interpretation depends upon the degree to 
which we can attribute thoughts similar to our own (i. e. some degree of 
isomorphism between the beliefs of the actor and the interpretor is 
necessary to any process of interpretation). Why, asks Armstrong, should 
we even expect our concepts to 'map' directly onto those of, say, a dog? 
The inevitable impossibility of precision in belief attribution is for 
Armstrong no serious philosophical problem at all: 
In saying that the dog believes that his master is at 
the door we are, or should be, attributing to the dog 
a belief whose exact content we do not know but 
which can be obtained by substituting salva veritate 
in the proposition 'that his master is at the door'. 
(Armstrong, 1973, p. 26 - cited in S. Stitch, 1979). 
The problem for Armstrong lies not in the question of whether other 
animals can be attributed thoughts and beliefs in general, but in our lack 
of sufficient knowledge which makes our interpretation of other species' 
behaviour always more underdetermined than that of our own. However, one 
can still use existing terminology from one's own linguistic repertoire to 
approximate to the supposed thoughts of the species under interpretation, 
as in the above quote. Unlike Davidson, Armstrong asserts that some sort 
of behavioural interpretation can go forward somewhat ahead of a full 
animal psychology, whereas for Davidson this is not an'option. Where 
Armstrong thinks that our knowledge of the psychology of other species is 
imperfect, Davidson thinks that it can never even get off the ground. 
The opposing views of Davidson and Armstrong are examined 
by 
Stephen Stitch in his article Do_ Animals Rave Beliefs? (Stitch, 1979) with 
a view to deciding whether the indeterminacy of specific 
belief attribution 
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is as serious as Davidson believes it to be. Rather disappointingly, 
however, after a careful analysis of both viewpoints, Stitch concludes: 
So the question we are now asking amounts to asking, 
how central to our concept of belief is the having of 
specifiable content. Is a belief-like state which 
lacks a specifiable content simply a somewhat 
peculiar belief, or is it, in virtue of lacking 
content, no belief at all? The answer I would urge is 
that there is no answer. (Stitch, 1979, p. 27). 
The reason for such diplomatic but unhelpful caution is Stitch's view that 
there are no clearly necessary or contingent features intrinsic to the 
definition of the concept of 'belief'. The argument between Davidson and 
Armstrong therefore becomes, in Stitch's view, one of post facto 
definition. Armstrong regards 'hazy' beliefs as inevitable at this stage of 
our knowledge of other species; Stitch thinks it merely raises the 
question of definition; Davidson thinks, it grounds for denying mental 
states altogether for other species, since "many alternative systems of 
attribution, many alternative explanations, will be equally justified by the 
available data. " (Davidson, 1975, p. 16). The final stage of Davidson's 
argument is compressed into the last few paragraphs of his article, and 
centres once more an the role of belief. 
Davidson argues that membership of a speech community and 
involvement in the interpretation of others' speech is necessary to having 
the concept of belief. It is the concept of belief which is then claimed to 
be necessary for any kind of thought: 
Can a creature have a belief if it does not have the 
concept of belief? It seems to me it cannot, and for 
this reason. Someone cannot have a belief unless he 
understands the possibility of being mistaken, and 
this requires grasping the contrast between truth 
and error - true belief and false belief. But this 
contrast, I have argued, can emerge only in the 
context of interpretation, which alone forces us 
to 
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the idea of an objective, public truth. (Davidson, 1975, 
p. 22). 
Up until this point Davidson has argued that all thought is parasitic upon 
a background structure of beliefs. The ascription of thoughts by a third 
person to a non-linguistic creature would always be 'hazy' or 
underdetermined because sophisticated communication is necessary to pin 
down particular beliefs and thoughts with a sufficient degree of accuracy. 
At this point Davidson and Armstrong could still be reconciled. However, 
Davidson goes further, arguing that a notion of truth/falsity comes from 
membership of a linguistic community and publicly shared standards of 
truth, from which one gains the general concept of belief. 
At this point it becomes clear that Davidson's model of thought is 
essentially linguistic: i. e. all beliefs are uttered or silent statements of 
a proposition to oneself or others. To have a belief, for Davidson, is to 
entertain a statement of the form 'I believe X' where 'X' is filled in by 
some propositional clause describing a supposed state of affairs in the 
world. Clearly, in such a case the individual must have language in order 
to entertain such propositions, and they must possess the concept of 
true/false belief. It therefore becomes finally clear that Davidson's whole 
theory of thought is bound to show a necessary link to language, since - 
although never explicitly stated - his model of thought is propositional. 
Though I agree with his reasoning to the conclusion that propositional 
thought necessitates the individual's grasp of the concept of true/false 
belief, and that this in turn comes from being an active interpretor and 
member of a speech community, I would challenge the implicit premise 
(unsuppported by further argument) that all thought is necessarily 
propositional in form whether uttered publicly or not. 
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The above analysis of Davidson justifies my characterisation of him 
as 'neo-Cartesian' as regards his view of our relation to other species and 
what we can say about their mental lives. Malcolm's analysis of Descartes 
cited above also concludes that the implicit model of thought is 
propositional, and therefore necessarily exclusive of non-linguistic 
creatures. Malcolm argues that one should distinguish between "thinking P" 
and "having the thought 'that P" or "believing P" and "having the belief 
'that P' ". Malcolm argues that whereas the second version in each case is 
necessarily propositional, the wirst is not. He claims that writers such as 
Descartes and Davidson overlook this distinction and urges that "We need 
to avoid identifying thoughts with their linguistic expression" 
(Malcolm, 1977, p. 55). He concludes: 
It is the prejudice of philosophers that only 
propositional thoughts belong to consciousness which 
stands _. 
in the way of our perceiving the continuity of 
consciousness between human and animal life. 
(ibid, p. 57). 
Though I am in complete agreement with Malcolm's conclusion, I am not 
altogether convinced of the strength of the argument which he presents as 
a counter to the Descartes/Davidson position. I believe that further 
support for the position which Malcolm, Armstrong and i myself wish to 
defend can be gained by bringing in considerations from evolutionary 
theory. What I need to show is that there are behaviourally significant 
modes of thought which are non-propositional in form. This idea is, in my 
opinion, not merely possible, but a necessary postulate of evolutionary 
theory. If this can be shown, then Davidson's neo-Cartesian position about 
the necessary connection of thought and talk will be shown to be a special 
case applying to a subset of 'thought' in general. The way will then be 
opened to extend the concept of mind and resultant forms of behavioural 
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explanation to species other than our own, irrespective of their capacity 
for linguistic expression. 
The publication in 1859 of Darwin's Ori; Zin qS ecies was as much a 
milestone in philosophical thought as it was in the history of the natural 
sciences. The reason is that for the first time there existed a theory 
capable of placing human history in an all-embracing framework whose 
terms were within the range of natural science. Hence, at least 
potentially, the need for non-naturalistic metaphysical explanations of the 
origin and continuing course of human history were made redundant: the 
promise was that, given time and research, vast areas of. knowledge 
previously confined to the realms of myth and religious explanation could 
be brought within the scope of the natural sciences. Not since the 
emergence of mathematically-based science in the Enlightenment had there 
been such a prospect for the furtherance of knowledge. 
Philosophy, however, deals not so much with contending theories from 
an empirical perspective (since this is the job of the scientist proper) 
but with the credentials and logical compatability of contending theories 
aspiring to the title of 'knowledge'. Since evolutionary theory is logically 
compatible with any number of other theories within philosophy, its impact 
has been perhaps less than it deserves. Despite this, several philosophers 
have made an attempt to put forward and develop a case for the 
significance of evolutionary theory to philosophical topics centring on the 
philosophy of mind and related areas (Cf. Hooker, 1987; Crook, 1980; 
Seitelberger, 1984; Kaspar, 1984; Campbell, 1982). 
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The modern evolutionary approach to the philosophy of mind typical Ly 
employs the vocabulary and descriptive technique of information-processing 
theory. Obviously drawing on theories of computer and artificial 
intelligence, this approach is employed since its terms are 'neutral' as 
regards the kind of thing which might be a candidate for possessing a 
mind. That is, it is essentially a functionalist approach, allowing for the 
possibility that minds could be instantiated in any kind of 'hardware' 
system capable of sustaining the requisite functions. The first important 
philosophical consequence of such an approach is therefore the rejection 
of all substance dualist (Cartesian) theories of mind, along with any other 
forms of theory which postulate non-naturalistic elements or properties of 
elements in their descriptions. Though I must accept the logical constraint 
that Cartesian dualism as a theory of mind is logically immune to any 
form of empirical argument, I would contend that the 'expanding 
neurosciences and ethology show increasing evidence for the thesis that 
mental phenomena are in some way identifiable with or explicable in terms 
of changes in the organism's brain states and CNS. Any philosophical 
attack on modern dualist theories of mind (e. g. the dualism put forward by 
Eccles and Popper, 1977) must therefore be made in terms of plausibility, 
since as far as I can see there can be no form of a priori knockdown 
argument against the substance dualist. The naturalist position does, 
however, coincide with experimental data on the effects of drugs and 
lesions on certain areas of the brain, and the relation of these changes 
of physical state to the subject's subjective psychological experience. The 
dualist may reply to such empirical evidence with some form of 
interactionist theory, but this merely complicates their case further 
without removing the central questions concerning causal relations between 
physical and supposedly non-physical substance. The naturalist stance has 
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parsimony on its side, and an affinity to the well-established body of 
theory and experimentation in all existing areas of natural science. In 
short I believe that the onus is on the dualist to produce some reason 
why, now that there exists a naturalist theory for the existence of mind, 
one should not accept it. As one of the strongest recent advocates of the 
naturalist approach to the philosophy of mind has put it: 
In the absence of solid evidence for the separate 
existence of the mind, the appeal of substance 
dualism fades. (Church land, 1986, p. 321). 
(For further discussion of the claims and counter-claims of substance 
dualists and physicalists Cf: Churchland, P. S., 1986, especially pp. 317-335). I 
will therefore offer no further argument at this stage than that already 
given above, and state that as a rough definition of the evolutionary 
approach to mind, it is taken to be the subjective experience of as-yet 
imperfectly understood processes occurring in the physical organism, due 
to the evolved structures and capacities of the brain and CNS. 
The theory of evolution by natural selection states that all species 
of life on this planet have evolved from historically earlier forms. 
Whatever characteristics an extant species displays have come about as a 
result of a process of genetic inheritance and change across generations, 
whereby historically later forms have evolved from their ancestors. If one 
defines 'behaviour' in the general terms of the interaction of organisms 
with their environment, then evolutionary theory tells us that the 
behavioural capacities of all organisms owe their form to the capacities 
of phylogenetically earlier species, from which they have evolved. Although 
it is notoriously misleading to suggest that the facts of evolution point 
to any 'line' or 'direction' of development (since this suggests that 
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natural history has a teleological structure) one may nevertheless a-~emnt 
some generalisations concerning the course of evolution so far. his 
work Th. Evolution at Human Consciousness JH Crook discusses the 
theories of the biologist LT Hobhouse (Cf. Hobhouse, 1915), who like many 
late nineteenth century thinkers was inspired by the promise of Darwinian 
theory: 
In posing the question as to whether there is some 
constant direction from lower to higher states of 
biological organization, Hobhouse concluded that the 
one consistent change of this type lies in the growth 
of mind. (Crook, 1980, P. 17) . 
Though I would be wary of any attempt to characterise the general 
evolutionary process as displaying any particular line of development 
across time for the reason noted above, I do find the line of thought 
suggested by Hobhouse and Crook sympathetic to my own argument here. 
Mind .... is known by its functions. The function which 
modern philosophy seized upon as expressing the vital 
essence of Mind was that of bringing things together 
so that they have a bearing upon one another. Where 
there is Mind there is order and system, correlation 
and proportion, a harmonising of forces and an 
interconnection of parts. " (Hobhouse, cited in 
Crook, 1980, p. 18) . 
Whether or not one takes exception to the teleological tenor of Hobhouse's 
thought, it is interesting to note how at the turn of the century mind was 
already being identified with and explained in terms of an organism's 
capacity for what would nowadays be termed 'information-processing'. 
Modern theorists have reached similar conclusions to that of Hobhouse - 
for example Robert Kaspar: "the characteristic of the process of evolution 
is a permanent increase in order" (Kaspar, 1984, p. 51). The same line again 
is taken up by Franz Seitelberger: 
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The general function of nervous systems, therefore, is 
the processing and integration of information for the 
formulation of instructions which meet the needs of 
the situation and of the organism with regard to 
adaptive behaviour and survival in the environment, 
.... In the course of evolution these characteristics 
became more and more clearly expressed. 
(Seitelberger, 1984, p. 125). 
Having begun with such a general characterisation of the origin of 
mind, one can go on to dis-i-f ish between different species according to 
their capacities for entering into different kinds of informational 
exchange via behavioural interaction with their environment. Some 
organisms, though well adapted to their environmental niche in terms of 
their behavioural repertoire, show no capacity for reacting to novel 
informational inputs. Their behavioural response is fixed by the 
information coded for in their DNA and their nervous system is incapable 
of modifying future behaviour in response to past experience. In short, 
such organisms show no capacity for learning. Their behaviour is 
explicable within a model of genetically heritable responses to a limited 
range of enironmental stimuli: 
Such organisms have evolved their complex response 
repertoires as the means whereby they can relate to 
stimuli impinging from outside, either through direct 
tactile contact or at a short distance, by vibration 
or chemo-sensory means. Behaviour here is a 
genetically programmed capacity for an adaptive 
response to the environment. (Crook, 1980, p. 21). 
However, other organisms evolve locomotive capacities, with the result that 
"one end is the front and the other the back" (ibid, p, 21). Such an 
elementary feature of morphology has drastic consequences for the 
resultant development of the organism's behaviour-regulating systems. 
The consequence of having a front end is that stimuli 
tend to make their impact there first. It is thus 
that the 'head' as bearer of an impressive array of 
receptor organs (sight, sound, odour) has evolved. 
And 
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to integrate this bombardment of sense stimulation 
and to organize responses to them, the ganglion oý this segment (often plus several additional ones) becomes greatly enlarged to form the brain. in 
vertebrates the brain is the much expanded front end 
of the spinal cord. (ibid, p. 22). 
Thus, as the organism evolves novel behavioural capacities for interaction 
with the environment, there is a corresponding 'demand' or selective 
pressure for the evolution of more complex information-processing 
capacities to organise and integrate the informational novelties with 
further appropriate behavioural response. Once the autocatalytic nature of 
such a process is grasped, it becomes clear that to speak of 'behaviour' 
and 'morphology' as if they were in fact distinct and separable features of 
an organism is a theoretical falsification of the true complexity of 
evolutionary development. (It is the tendency to create such isolated 
theoretical schemes for the description of organisms which spurs much of 
the work of Piaget, who insists on the importance of grasping the 
necessary relation between behaviour and morphology, and taking a 
theoretical stance which links behavioural change and morphological 
evolutionary development. See, for example Piaget, 1979 & 1980) 
The point of this brief excursion into evolutionary theory is that it 
soon becomes clear that non-linguistic species of organism may 
nevertheless have sophisticated ways of organising the information 
provided by their physical senses. This information is then integrated 
with other sources, such as hereditary information coded for in their 
genes and memory traces held in their nervous system. All of this is 
further integrated with ongoing behavioural interaction with the present 
environment. Traditionally the term 'concept' is used within analytic 
philosophy to denote an individual's grasp and use of certain linguistic 
-265- 
units or ideas whose formulation and expression is necessarily achieved 
through the subject's use of language. However, I see no reason why it 
should be so restricted. I believe that it may also be reasonably used to 
denote any example of relatively complex information processing carried 
out by an organism in integrative behavioural response to the environment. 
Such a non-linguistic and essentially functionalist definition of 'concept' 
is employed by CA Hooker in the following passage: 
To possess a concept is to possess a requisite 
structure in the mind-brain that can act in the 
appropriate ways as a factor in the information 
processing. For to possess a concept is, roughly, to 
be able to classify in certain ways, relate 
classifications in certain ways, reason in certain 
ways .... and on the present view these processes are 
transformations in the total information flow, they 
are to be construed as information processings. 
(Hooker, 1975, p. 2) . 
In an attempt to place the phenomenon of human consciousness within an 
evolutionary perspective, JH Crook lists those aspects of consciousness 
which he regards as being typical of an 'advanced' organism. They are: an 
increased capacity to store past events in memory; awareness through 
introspection; re-representation of the past for comparison with the 
present; discriminatory planning and foresight; and finally a series of 
different levels of information 'screening' so that the flood of novel 
information at any one time does not swamp the system's receptors 
(Crook, 1980, p. 24)". Such processes clearly increase the 'adaptive potential' 
of the organism for novel and appropriate responses to immediate and 
possible future environmental exigencies. Crook goes on in the same 
chapter to offer a view of 'mind' and non-linguistic concepts which is in 
line with those already quoted above from Hobhouse and Hooker, and which I 
am suggesting show a greater awareness of developments in the empirical 
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sciences, rather than relying on traditional usage as is perhaps the case 
within the analytic tradition of philosophy. 
The interpretation of 'mind' as information processing 
with a self-monitoring facility called consciousness 
goes a long way towards resolving the problem of body-mind interaction which Popper and Eccles (1978) 
have recently revived. (Crook, 1980, p. 28). 
Consciousness is not always a patterning in words. While the inner metaphors of sensory experience are, 
as Jaynes (1976) affirms, verbal, consciousness is 
clearly not confined to linguistic themes. (ibid, p. 30). 
Hooker also recognises the relevance of his approach to contemporary 
issues in the philosophy of mind, and the effect of limiting one's 
definition of 'thought' in precisely the way in which my analysis of 
Davidson has brought out: 
Only when all 'thought' in the general sense of the 
term, is viewed as covert talking in a language -a 
view apparently widely (if often tacitly) held today 
- does prelinguistic intuition take on a mysterious, 
ad hoc character. (Hooker, 1975, p. 3). 
Further to these arguments about the definitional scope of such terms as 
'mind' and 'concept', and in support of my thesis that at least some forms 
of thought are non- or pre-linguistic, I would offer the following two 
related arguments. These both rely on deductive reasoning from general 
evolutionary theory, and on empirical evidence which backs up the 
deductive reasoning. In my opinion they raise insoluble problems for 
Davidson's view of language and thought as inseparable, and point to the 
necessity for the incorporation of certain aspects of empirical knowledge 
into areas of philosophical speculation. 
The first of these arguments is the 'ontogenetic argument', and points 
to the facts of individual development in human infants. Observation of 
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pre-linguistic behaviour, coupled to reasoning about how and when language 
is acquired seem to lead to the conclusion that an infant's menia! 
development and the rudiments of conceptual thought precede acquisi*ion of 
language. This evidence, apparently in contradiction to the thesis of 
Davidson and others highlighted above, is examined by Gerard O'Br en 
(O'Brien, 1987). O'Brien is attacking the philosophical position he labels 
'Psychological Nominalism' which he defines as: "the claim that all 
perceptual awareness is preceded by the acquisition of, and mediated 
through, language. " (O'Brien, 1987, p. 51). This view is chiefly attributed to 
Wilfrid Sellars, Richard Rorty and Paul Churchland, though it is also the 
position of Davidson which I have analysed above. O'Brien makes this clear 
in the following passage: 
The picture that Sellars, Rorty and Churchland conjure 
up, then, in embracing the thesis of psychological 
nominalism is one in which the developing child prior 
to language acquisition is conscious of nothing but a 
complete 'blur'. As the child acquires its first few 
words it begins to become dimly aware of some 
ambient structure. This awareness increases 
proportionally with the development of language.... In 
sum then, according to the thesis of psychological 
nominalism, perceptual awareness and language develop 
in a parallel fashion: the ontogenesis of the former 
crucially depends on the acquisition of the latter. 
(ibid, pp. 54 /55) . 
O'Brien then proceeds to cite empirical evidence which contradicts the 
thesis of psychological nominalism. This is based on experiments in self- 
recognition, in which infants were presented with mirrors, having 
first 
had a visible mark surreptitiously placed on some part of their 
face. The 
point of the experiment was to see if the infants would 
be able to use the 
mirror as a mirror; to examine themselves and the mark on 
their face. The 
results of the experiment showed that infants displayed some 
degree of 
self-directed behaviour by using the mirror appropriately 
during the first 
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year of life, and prominently so by the age of eighteen months. The use of 
the first person pronoun does not normally occur, however, until around 
twenty four months. O'Brien concludes: 
Consequently, perceptual development in infancy is 
not solely mediated by the acquisition of language: to 
reiterate, children are pre-Linguistically aware. As a 
result, therefore, we must posit the existence otf 
conceptual structures underlying the perceptual 
awareness of young children which are not acquired in 
a linguistic fashion. Psychological nominalism as 
originally propounded by Wilfrid Sellars appears 
untenable. (ibid, p. 59). 
Further to this specific example of empirical data, I would urge the thesis 
of pre-linguistic conceptual development from theoretical considerations 
about ontogenetic development. A human infant's behaviour may in the 
earliest stages be confined to a range of reflexive actions geared towards 
a narrow group of goals (e. g. food, warmth, maternal comforting, avoidance 
of pain, etc. ). But this early repertoire soon develops and ad-lusts to 
specific features of the environment, these features becoming incorporated 
into the infant's development through exploration and 'Learning, Thus, if 
'conceptual thought' is posited on the evidence of behaviour which displays 
an ability to integrate and manipulate one's perceptual data in certain 
logical, essentially beneficial or advantageous ways, then I would urge 
that there is clear evidence of such mental states in the behaviour of the 
pre-linguistic infant. Not only this, but I would argue that it is difficult 
to see how an infant could ever begin to become linguistically adept 
unless it already possessed certain pre-linguistic mental structures. 
If 
natural language is a system of formalised symbolic expression and 
representation of one's thoughts, it would seem necessarily true that some 
rudiments of thought must exist prior to the process of language 
learning 
by any individual. If infantile 'thought' prior to language acquisition were 
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just the 'booming, buzzing blur' in which the psychological nominalist 
would have us believe, then it would appear impossible for such creatures 
to ever get off the ground as far as language acquisition is concerned. 
Even before one begins to consider the theoretical implications of a 
Gricean account of the necessary extra-linguistic features of being 
involved in linguistic communication, it seems that such confused creatures 
as pre-linguistic infants supposedly are could never begin to grasp the 
significance and structure of language at all. 
On Davidon's account it would appear that one must already be a 
language user in order to recognise any language as such (since to be pre- 
linguistic is to be 'thoughtless' and therefore incapable of any form of 
recognition or systematic assimilation of information). Such an argument 
would also seem to apply to possible amelioration of existing language 
users: if conceptual capacity is necessarily limited to linguistic ability 
and vice versa, an account of intellectual development would appear to be 
at the least problematic. The thesis that language and thought are two 
sides of the same process is surely brought into question by the 
occurrence of urges to express feelings or ideas for which adequate 
linguistic formulations may be lacking, suggesting that conceptual 
development and mental life in general may at times outstrip certain 
specific areas of vocabulary and linguistic competence. (The strict 
identification of thought and talk makes the notion of searching for 'le 
mot Juste' incomprehensible. ) To sum up, consideration of human ontogenesis 
points to the conclusion that perceptual awareness and even elementary 
forms of conceptual development are neither continuous nor identifiable 
with linguistic development. To insist on a theory of mind which limits 
the use of the term 'mind' to purely linguistic abilities therefore appears 
-270- 
to be a false and unnecessarily narrow theoretical approach, and one which 
is in obvious contradiction to deducible and observable facts about 
individual development. 
The second argument against the view of Davidson and the other 
psychological nominalists is based not on considerations of individual 
development, but on considerations of phylogenetic (i. e. species-ancestral) 
development. Once again coming from evolutionary theory, it could be 
introduced under the slogan 'Natura non facit saltus' ('Nature doesn't take 
leaps'). Simply, the theory asserts a principle of psychological continuity 
across evolutionary time and evolving species. The principle is stated in 
an article by G Matthews as follows: 
The Principle of Psychological Continuity is the 
principle that psychological acts, states and 
functions in lower animals model those in higher 
animals. .. For any 
given psychological state, act or 
function, i, if a given animal belongs to some 
species other than the lowest one and that animal is 
capable of ?, then there is an animal of some lower 
species such that the lower animal is capable of some 
psychological state, act or function, ? ', and I' is a 
model of t. (Xatthews, 1978, p437). 
Matthews cites Aristotle as an intellectual forerunner for such a concept 
of the relations of species and their capacities, and once again the arch- 
enemy of such views and the father of modern opposition to the principle 
of psychological continuity is Descartes: 
Yet modern thought offers a very important threat to 
the Principle of Psychological Continuity. It is 
Descartes' concept of mind.... according to Descartes, 
despite the apparent continuity between human beings 
and lower animals, human beings are conscious whereas 
non-human animals are mere machines, automata. 
(ibid, p. 441). 
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In my opinion, the thesis which Matthews is putting forward here is the 
inevitable philosophical outcome of the acceptance of the naturalistic 
account of the origin of species offered by Darwinian evolutionary theory. 
If man is a product of evolution, then the capacities he possesses are the 
result of a gradual process of change stretching back through his 
phylogenetic ancestry. Present-day capacities - morphological, mental, and 
behavioural - are inseparably tied by a history of development from 
earlier forms. Such a thesis is taken for granted in the case of 
morphology, but often denied in the case of the behavioural or mental 
capacities of man. Such a denial, however, is an implicit denial of the 
general application of evolutionary theory, and without further argument, 
constitutes an arbitrary rejection in one area of the implications of a 
theory whose credentials go unquestioned in other areas. The 'commitment' 
to acceptance of evolutionary theory and its implications in all areas is 
recognised by Hooker, who also espouses the principle of psychological 
continuity in the article already referred to above: 
The leading motif here is the commitment to 
theorising humans as a natural species, to seeing 
humans first as part of nature. An important part of 
this commitment is therefore to theorising cognition 
as a natural capacity, one 'grading back' into the 
more generalised abilities of other species. 
(Hooker, 1987, p. 8). 
judgement, risk and optimising all 'grade back' to 
more elementary operations. And present capacities 
can be understood as outcomes of selection because 
belief-forming processes are directly related to, and 
tested by their outcome. (There is no inherent 
linguistic bias, since there is no a priori 
commitment to the forms which cognitive states 
take 
or to the channel characteristics of epistemic 
sources). (ibid, p. 22). 
It would seem from the considerations I have 
layed out above that the 
phylogenetic argument from evolutionary theory also provides 
grounds for 
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rejecting the thesis of psychological nominalism. Whatever the capacities 
that linguistic man has, they did not appear simultaneously ex n-bilo. Such 
a view was available to Descartes, since his theory of mind was grounded 
in an ultimately theological doctrine about possession of a soul. Once one 
accepts the post-Darwinian story of man as one species among many, and 
the latest product of a continuous chain of gradual evolutionary 
development, this carries further philosophical commitments of relevance 
to philosophy of mind. Unless there had been some prior development of 
pre-linguistic perceptual awareness and rudimentary conceptual abilities 
geared to the coordination of behaviour to pertinent environmental 
features, our species-ancestral line would simply have become extinct long 
before our own appearance on the planet. 
This argument applies not only to our own species' ancestry, but also 
to the other extant species. Except for those species that inhabit a very 
stable and isolated environmental niche, some degree of active, updated 
coordination of behaviour and integration of information is required if the 
species is simply going to survive. Simpler organisms may survive 
by 
evolving only a small repertoire of innate behavioural responses well- 
tuned by constant and consistent adaptation to environmental pressures. 
The price paid for this method of survival is the risk of sudden and 
complete extinction due to rapid environmental change 
(such as that 
brought about by man's intervention in otherwise undisturbed ecological 
systems), and consequently only a few species can perhaps afford 
the long- 
term risks of such a somnambulant existence. 
For the rest - and this 
certainly includes all mammals - the ability 
to assimilate and respond to 
information concerning the environment in complex and advantageous 
ways 
is the price demanded by their informationally-rich and 
varied habitat. 
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The biological advantage of being able to 'mentalise' or 'represent' the 
features of the'external world in some way is recognised by evolutionary 
theorists: 
Glancing at the animal kingdom as a whole it is 
apparent that biologically simple organisms regulate 
their transactions with the environment primarily 
through a genetic endowment of relatively inflexible 
action patterns. The addition of learning skills and 
the intelligent construction of knowledge through 
exploration gradually becomes a predominant feature 
of the transactional style... . With increased capacity for learning and intellectual functioning the concept 
replaces the percept as the controller of schematic 
behaviour. (Crook, 1980, pp. 32/33) . 
Having argued against the psychological nominalist thesis, I feel 
bound to end this discussion on a note of caution which will perhaps 
redress the balance to some extent. To say that the a priori denial of a 
mental life to human infants or other species is an untenable position is 
not, as some appear to think, to open the flood-gates and allow anything 
at all to be ascribed to dumb creatures. In chapter two of Brainstorms 
(Dennett, 1978) Daniel Dennett attempts to offer a functionalist account of 
mind, in which the possession of a 'print-out facility' (i. e. the ability to 
communicate in some language) also appears to be ,a prerequisite for 
awareness of any kind. At least, Dennett argues, without some means of 
two-way linguistic communication we cannot even begin the process of 
inferring and ascribing mental life to others. However, in the course of 
explaining his own position Dennett makes what I believe to be an 
unfounded criticism of Thomas Nagel's seminal paper "fit is. it like ta 
he a. b, &t? " (Nagel, 1979). In this paper Nagel forwards the argument 
that 
there are no a priori reasons for denying subjective states of awareness 
to creatures such as bats, though - in view of the very 
different 
perceptual apparatus they have been furnished by evolution - we as 
humans 
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may not be able at all to imagine what kind of mental life a bat has. 
Beyond the mere ascription of 'consciousness' the specific phenomenal 
features of a bat's mental life must remain alien to us. As far as Nagel is 
concerned, however, this merely reflects the limitation of our own powers 
of imagination, and does not constitute any grounds for withholding our 
ascription of a mental life to such species. (Cf. Nagel, 19? 9, especially 
p. 168. ) Nagel's basic intuition is that it is like being something to be a 
bat, though not to be a brick or a hamburger. Nagel's argument thus aligns 
him with others such as Matthews who espouse some thesis of psychological 
continuity between species. Dennett, however, takes exception to this 
ascription of mental life to creatures which lack the all-important factor 
of linguistic communication: 
Nonhuman, nonverbal creatures have no print-out 
faculties, or at best very rudimentary and 
unexpressive print-out faculties, yet some 
philosophers - notably Nagel - insist that full- 
blown, phenomenological consciousness is as much 
their blessing as ours. (Dennett, 1978, p. 152). 
Since Rennett is attempting to give a functionalist account of essentially 
human consciousness, which he describes as "full-blown, introspective, 
inner-world, phenomenological consciousness" (ibid, p. 149) it would appear 
that Dennett is accusing Nagel of a patently false position. He appears to 
be accusing Nagel of attributing consciousness to a bat of a kind 
comparable to our own, since Dennett describes both human and a bat's 
supposed consciousness as 'full-blown, phenomenological consciousness'. 
However, Nagel is at pains to point out that whatever consciousness a bat 
may have, it is surely of such a different order that - beyond the mere 
ascription of its existence - we cannot even begin to conceive of it. 
Dennett's 'Village Verificationist' stance as regards the ascription of 
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consciousness to others seems to lead him mistakenly into interpreting -he 
ascription of consciousness to others as an all-or-nothing affair, If I am 
correct in portraying Nagel's position as coinciding with the 'evolutionary 
perspective' outlined above, then consciousness is being pcaited as a 
matter of degree or richness as regards different species. If 'full-blown' 
is some measure of human consciousness, then that of a bat is far from 
such a state, and to use the same terms to describe the two sets of 
phenomena is misleading of Dennett. 
Although Nagel may not be guilty of the crime of which Dennett 
apparently accuses him, there are others whose innocence would be harder 
to prove. In his article 'Self-Awareness in. Primates' (Gallup, 1979) GG 
Gallup also presents empirical evidence in support of the thesis that 
there is a degree of psychological continuity between humans and other 
species. Using the same experiment as described above in the case of human 
infant development, Gallup discovered that Chimpanzees are the only other 
known species able to use a mirror as a mirror. However, such a discovery 
merely paints to the fact (as in the human case) that there is behavioural 
evidence for some degree of perceptual awareness and conceptual thought in 
the creature. Thus, such data would seem to suggest that - in some 
respects at least - the inner states of an adult Chimpanzee are comparable 
in terms of conceptual ability to those of an eighteen month old human 
infant. If Gallup were to end his article with such a conclusion, I would 
find no fault with it. But he then goes on to extrapolate from the 
evidence of self-recognition capacities to speculate about far more 
complex concepts such as 'the self' and 'identity'. This line of reasoning 
leads him to state that: 
In principle, once you can conceive of yourself, you 
can begin to think about yourself. Once you can 
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become the object of your own attention, you can 
begin to contemplate your own existence. 
(Gallup, 19? 9, p. 421). 
Such reasoning is, in my view, already fallacious, since I can see no 
necessary logical connection between the ability to recognise one's own 
image and the possession of such abstract concepts as 'existence'. The 
falseness of Gallup's reasoning becomes more obvious in the next lines: 
If you can contemplate your own existence, then it is 
a fairly simple and maybe even logical next step to 
begin contemplating your nonexistence.... In principle 
it ought to be possible to educate the chimpanzee 
about its inevitable demise, but at least one 
psychologist has already expressed hesitation about 
doing so. (ibid, p. 421). 
Though I applaud the moral conscience of such researchers, I am not so 
impressed by their reasoning about the logical implications of the 
behavioural evidence they have gathered. To argue merely from a creature's 
ability to apparently conceptualise about certain visual stimuli and the 
significance of an object before it, to the worry that it is potentially 
capable of entertaining concepts such as personal existence, life and 
death, is in my view to commit the fallacy which Dennett falsely 
attributes to Nagel. It is to conflate evidence for certain specific forms 
of conscious awareness with those elements typically known from human 
consciousness. In short, it is to ignore once again the evolutionary 
perspective regarding the likely comparative mental lives of different 
species. Consciousness is not an all-or-nothing affair, but will differ 
from one species to another in terms of richness and specific features. 
Behavioural evidence of some aspects of consciousness as it is known to 
ourselves does not imply actual or potential possession of all aspects of 
consciousness (as it is known to us), however tempting it may 
be to 
speculate on such an inference. To return to an earlier example: to 
be 
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touched by the maternal behaviour of an adult Chimpanzee with her baby is 
to recognise and ascribe sufficiently similar feelings at work. It is not, 
however, to attribute to the Chimpanzee the 'full-blown, phenomenal 
experience' of a human mother, which would be simplistic anthropomorphism 
as opposed to adopting a truly evolutionary perspective. It may be that in 
many cases, as Nagel suggests, we cannot even begin to imagine the real 
nature of a species' psychological experience. But, as Nagel and others 
have been at pains to point out, this is in itself no reason to erect an a 
priori barrier between our own species and others, as if any question of 
behavioural inference and the ascription of some form of inner mental life 
were in every case invalid or nonsensical. Such a prejudicial stance is 
exemplified by the neo-Cartesian views I have discussed above, and which I 
have tried to expose as untenable in the light of empirical evidence and 
deductive reasoning from evolutionary theory. 
One of the main philosophical claims which I have argued is implied 
by acceptance of the Darwinian theory of evolution is that substance or 
Cartesian dualist theories of mind are ruled out as redundant and 
implausible (though logically possible) metaphysical views, There is 
another form of dualism, however, whose defenders find no fault with the 
evolutionary claim that mental processes are in some sense identical with 
physical processes instantiated in an evolved neurophysiological structure, 
Such theorists, whilst accepting a monistic materialist metaphysics, 
nevertheless deny the physicalist thesis that all explanatory terms and 
descriptions of phenomena including those of first person consciousness 
can ultimately be captured within the third person stance and causal 
relations vocabulary of the natural sciences model. The phenomena which 
they deny being in principle or practice amenable to the physicalist 
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programme of reduction are characteristics of the mental such 3s 
intentionality (Cf. Searle, 1983; Malcolm, 1982) and qualia (Cf. tia, el, 19i9; 
Jackson, 1982). 
In response to the worries raised by the 'ineffable' nature of such aspects 
of first person phenomenal experience, the most promising attempt to 
construct a plausible materialist account of the mind is functionalism. One 
of the staunchest defenders of the functionalist programme is Daniel 
Dennett, whose work has already been cited above. In this same text, 
Dennett offers a definition of the functionalist standpoint vis-a-vis the 
mental, and how the project of functionalist translation of existing 
mentalistic terms is to be carried out: 
The content (in this sense) of a particular vehicle 
of information, a particular information-bearing event 
or state, is and must be a function of its function 
in the system.... The content of a psychological state 
or event is a function of its function, and its 
function is - in the end, must be -a function of the 
structure of the state or event and the systems of 
which it is a part. (Dennett, 1978, p. 1(53) . 
Though such a model satisfies the materialist stance of a naturalist 
evolutionary theory of mind, it does raise further problems. The most 
damaging of these, in my view, is that the functionalist account of mind 
may serve as the basis for the claims of epiphenomenalism. Since 
functionalism insists that psychological phenomena are identical with or 
instantiated in physical systems, it may be argued that such systems 
function in the way they do because of the sufficient causal connections 
and succession of -causally antecedent system states. Such a view would 
render the whole consideration of consciousness in the human or any other 
species a redundant question, since it is argued that what is necessary to 
understand and describe behaviour is not any knowledge of ýirst person 
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phenomenal experience (since this is causally inoperative) but rather a 
complete science of the physical properties of the neurological 'hardware' 
possessed by the organism. 
Some functionalists (e. g. Dennett, 1982) claim that from the 
functionalist point of view, a human and a chess-playing comput er may be 
regarded as equivalent, in the sense that although the specific 
computations involved in playing may be different for the two, and 
instantiated in very different kinds of 'hardware', the overall functions 
in terms of relations of informational input and output are equivalent. 
(i. e. No matter how they So about it, both humans and computers play 
recognisable games of chess. ) Thus, not only is the (for some) all- 
important distinction between conscious and non-conscious entities blurred 
or rendered irrelevant, but it can be further argued that the conscious 
states of the human are causally (and therefore explanatorily) superfluous. 
Just as the computer performs its functions through its possession of 
appropriate causal relations and events occurring in its system, allowing 
it to make the kind of functional relations of informational in- and 
output which constitute following the rules and tactics of a chess game, 
so it can be argued that in the human case it is the physically causal 
relations of states and events in the individual's neural system which 
enable the individual to play chess, and that behavioural explanation 
should refer only to such third person observable phenomena. 
(Functionalism is thus aligned with Behaviourism as far as its 
implications for behavioural explanation are concerned. ) Any attendant 
phenomenal experiences of the subject, such as conscious planning, 
deliberation, frustration, excitement, inspiration, etc. which constitute the 
subjective experience of playing the game are just the epiphenomenal froth 
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on top of the brain's alpha waves. It would therefore appear that the 
attempt to capture the properties of human mental experience in terms of a 
'neutral' vocabulary of materialist descriptive terms results in explaining 
away mental phenomena. The redundancy of the mental under a functionalist 
explanation thus leads to the position of epiphenomenalism, and an 
apparent evolutionary puzzle, which is recognised in an article by J 
Belloff: 
That consciousness should have arisen at all becomes 
all the more' puzzling when we consider how far 
adaptive behaviour can go without the benefit of 
sentience.... And, since consciousness confers no 
biological advantages, one may speculate that, given a 
slightly different twist at some earlier point of the 
phylogenetic sequence, evolution could just as well 
have culminated in a race of wholly insentient 
automata! (Bellof f , 1965 ,p . 48) . 
The topic I wish to focus on finally is whether $elloff's puzzle about the 
evolution of consciousness and his imagined alternative natural history 
are really plausible philosophical positions in the light of evolutionary 
theory. Although I can see no knockdown argument against the 
epiphenomenalist position (i. e. I accept its logical possibility, as in the 
case of Cartesian dualism) I believe that the onus is once again on the 
epi phenomenalist to prove their thesis or disprove mine, since I will 
argue that there is more evidence in support of my own position, and that 
the epiphenomenalist story goes against a very basic intuition about the 
nature of our own behay. iour and its explanation. I will therefore side with 
the 'anti-reductionist lobby' in their intuitions about explaining at least 
some instances of behaviour by reference to phenomenal experiences of the 
subject, rather than by reference to third person observable changes of 
state in the individual's brain and CNS. 
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The central argument of the epiphenomena list position is sometimes 
implicit and sometimes explicitly stated. In his article 'Epiphenomenal 
Qualia' Frank Jackson states it in the following way: 
No amount of physical information about another 
logically entails that he or she is conscious or feels 
anything at all. Consequently there is a possible 
world with organisms exactly like us in every 
physical respect (and remember that includes 
functional states, physical history, et al. ) but which 
differ from us profoundly in that they have no 
conscious mental life at all. (Jackson, 1982, p. 130). 
Thus we are told that there could be organisms capable of passing the 
most rigorous form of Turing Test, which would nevertheless lack the 
experience of any kind of inner mental life whatsoever. From this it is an 
obvious deduction that, in our own case, mental properties may therefore 
be redundant as far as causation or explanation of behaviour is concerned. 
However, it seems to me that the epiphenomenalist wins the argument a 
little too easily here - in fact I believe that the position outlined in 
the above quote from Jackson begs the very question at issue. 
In a discussion of this question, Terence Horgan (Horgan, 1987) also 
points out that the epiphenomenalist position rests on a piece of dubious 
deductive reasoning. Horgan concentrates on arguments about the supposed 
possibility of individuals who have 'inverted spectrum qualia' or who lack 
the qualia of v4. sual perception altogether. (A version of this argument can 
be found in Block and Fodor, 1972). Horgan's argument is to draw a 
distinction between 'imaginability' and 'metaphysical possibility'. Just 
because we can imagine something as logically possible does not mean that 
we are therefore bound to accepting it as metaphysically possible in some 
actual world. The criterion of imaginability is too weak for this, since it 
only guarantees logical possibility - i. e. X is imaginable if it 
does not 
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imply any form of logical contradiction. Horgan concludes the relevant 
section of his paper thus: 
So the upshot is this. If one has an argument for the 
metaphysical impossibility of the above-described 
inverted spectrum and absent-qualia scenarios, then 
one will be able to handle the seeming imaginability 
of these scenarios in either of two ways. Either one 
can cleave to a stringent notion of imaginability 
which suffices for metaphysical possibility, and then 
deny that the scenarios are really imaginable; or else 
one can adopt a more liberal notion of imaginability, 
and then claim that these scenarios are 
metaphysically impossible despite being imaginable. 
(Horgan, 1 987 ,p .5 00). 
The fallacy of the epiphenomenalist's argument is that although 
metaphysical possibility necessarily implies logical possibility, logical 
possibility does not necessarily imply metaphysical possibility. Just 
because the inverted or absent qualia scenarios are 'imaginable' does not 
mean that they are in fact possible in any world. Thus, though I may agree 
with the logical possibility of Belloff's imagined alternative natural 
history, this does not carry the further stipulation that I am bound to 
accept it as actually (i. e. metaphysically) possible. The point about 
Belloff's and other epiphenomenalist arguments is that they beg the 
question by stating that there is a possible world of insentient automata 
whose behaviour is identical to our own, and that it therefore follows that 
consciousness is causally inoperative and not essential to explaining 
behaviour. However, it is only logical possibilty which is required as a 
criterion for imaginability, and not metaphysical possibility, which is the 
kind assumed in the various epiphenomenalist arguments about creatures 
which lack qualia or consciousness of any form. 
Thus, one can follow Horgan's lind of argument, and either adopt a 
liberal or a stringent notion of imaginability, neither of which will 
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commit one to accepting the actual possibility of the imagined alternative 
worlds. But this is to leave out a further side of the argument: what 
reason have I for doubting whether the imagined worlds are, after all, 
metaphysically possible? The initial response to this question must be 
one's intuitions. Again, Horgan expresses the natural response to the 
thesis of epiphenomenalism: 
Denying the causal efficacy of all our qualia is, I 
submit, just too much. Epiphenomenalism concerning 
qualia should be an utter last resort, to be embraced 
only if all viable alternatives prove to be even more 
paradoxical and untenable than epiphenomenalism 
itself. So unless and until that point is reached, I 
think it is reasonable to adopt the assumption that 
qualia normally are causally efficacious. (ibid, p. 504). 
Beyond this intuitive response to the thesis of epiphenomenalism, I would 
offer a further argument from evolutionary epistemology. As already stated 
above, one can distinguish between djfferent organisms in terms of their 
relative ablities to assimilate information from their environment, and to 
integrate this into future behaviour patterns (i. e. in terms of the 
creatures' ability to learn during its lifetime). The obvious aspect of 
specifically human thought which figures in discussions of behaviour is 
the ability to make abstractions from particular experiences, and to relate 
these via the use of symbols, to form further chains of reasoning. Thus, 
individual percepts take on a new and wider significance once they have 
been incorporated into a symbolic concept, through which they can be 
further rationalised. The importance of this aspect of human thought is 
discussed by Crook: 
symbolization of events in the perceptual continuum 
provides the units for a pictorial logic from which 
the abstraction of grammar eventually emerged as a 
concomitant of sound production in the development of 
verbal communication ..... An animal capable of 
symbolization can carry away from a situation an 
inner trace that stands for the response it may make 
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when it next encounters the situation. A central 
process comes to function as a substitute for actual 
sensory cues. (Crook, 1980, p. 34). 
The importance of the ability to literally 're - present' the external 
world to oneself through remembered perceptual experience, plus the 
linking of such experiences with anticipated future events via their 
symbolic manipulation is recognised by other evolutionary theorists, who 
also make specific reference to the effect that such an ability may have 
on human behaviour: 
object-like constructs are possible as images which 
are moved in imaginative action in order to once 
again be modularly distributed and revolved like 
concrete sensory data .... This also seems to be the 
exit through which human beings leave the domain of 
the accidentally determined evolutionary happening, 
and try to find their way as the 'first freedman of 
nature". (Seitelberger, 1984, p. 143). 
It seems to me that this is generally the reason why 
man, who is able to detach himself from ratiomorphic 
thinking, is the only being who can theoretically 
think and need not remain in the grip of the 
phenomenon itself. He can reach a level of 
abstraction and comprehend connections of a causal 
nature which cannot be deduced from direct 
perception. (Kaspar, 1984, p. 61). 
The central point of such passages is that the individual organism is able 
to 'carry off' some form of record of past events, abstracted from their 
particular time and place of occurrence, and thus to combine them with 
future" events and, in the case of humans at least, with imagined possible 
future scenarios of the individual's own making. (This is captured in the 
German verb 'to imagine' which is sich vorstellen: literally 'to place 
before oneself'. ) Thus, the organism which represents the world to itself 
in some form of consciousness gains a certain degree of autonomy from the 
stimulus-response mode of behavioural interaction to which non-conscious 
beings are tied. The important factor then is the ability to represent the 
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external world in some form of phenomenal consciousness, in which events 
are registered by some mode of subjective experience of phenomenal 
properties. The epiphenomenalist may argue at this point that, since I side 
with some version of a mind/brain identity thesis, it may not be the 
phenomenal properties of the inner representational states themselves 
which are of significance, but the physical states within the organism's 
neural system to which such phenomenal states correspond. Once again, the 
phenomenal properties themselves may be causally and explanatorily 
redundant. 
In reply to this, I would return to an earlier point about what it is 
to have a certain thought. Davidson and others have described thoughts as 
being 'located in epistemic space' by their logico-semantic relations to 
the totality of other thoughts with which they share some semantic aspect, 
or beliefs on which they depend for their meaning. A thought is also 
(according to the evolutionary account) a state or event in the physical 
structure of the organism's neuronal system, and it must therefore also be 
'located in functional space' by its actual and potential causal relations 
to the rest of the organism's physical system. The epiphenomena list's 
position comes down to the argument that the location of a thought in 
functional space, by its causal relations to the rest of the physical 
system, is prior to its location within a logico-semantic network of 
representational phenomena within consciousness. In other words, the 
structure of the mind is dependent upon and wholly explicable in terms of 
the structure of the brain. This position is, i-a my view, invalid 
for the 
following two reasons. 
6 
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Firstly, it ignores the strength and meaning of the mind/brain 
identity theory offered by the naturalist account of mind. The 
epiphenomenalist suggests that one can investigate and describe the 
physical system of the brain without at the same time having explained 
something about the mind, and vice versa. But this would only be true if 
the two were contingently related, rather than two aspects of the same 
thing. This is just what the epiphenomenalist in fact presupposes - which 
is why they hold that one could have two identical physical systems which 
nevertheless differed radically in terms of their subjective propertEies of 
qualia (see above quotep. 281). If, as I am arguing, the brain and the mind 
are merely two different aspects of the same thing, then the events and 
properties which fall under one side of the description cannot be said to 
be causally, explanatorily or in any way whatsoever 'prior' to the events 
and properties of the system seen from its other aspect. To use a common 
analogy, it is not the electrostatic discharge to earth of atmospheric 
particles which causes the bolt of lightning; rather it is the bolt of 
lightning. There is no question of relations of priority between the 
discharge and the lightning, since their relation is one of identity, and 
priority would require them to be distinct events. In the same way, certain 
kinds of physical system don't just happen to have or cause certain kinds 
of mental phenomena; rather they are certain kinds of mental phenomena. 
Once again, it becomes clear that the thesis of epiphenomenal-Ism relies on 
the assumption that the physical and the mental are 'detachable' from each 
other, and one can therefore have the one without the other, with no effect 
on the properties of either. This, I have argued, is paraded as the 
conclusion of epiphenomenalism, whereas it is in fact its unsupported 
first premise, and one which is certainly not in line with common 
intuition or capable of standing unsupported by further argument. 
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The second argument against the epiphenomenalist comes from the 
existence of qualia and the properties of thought which allow them to take 
on logico-semantic relations in our minds. The whole idea of 
'representation' which, it was argued above, is essential to explaining the 
behavioural capacities of some species, presupposes a mental life in which 
the world is 'internalised' by the organism via some form of mental 
process. It follows from the mind/brain identity theory that for some 
kinds of physical states in an organism there are two sets of 
corresponding properties. There are the physical properties of the state 
viewed as part of the organism's nervous system, and there are the 
phenomenal properties of the state as it appears to the organism in its 
mind. For a thought to have the epistemic relations that it has, it must 
be physically possible in the sense that the system must be capable of 
instantiating the sufficient causal relations which correspond to the 
epistemic relations experienced in thought. But that it becomes so related 
in thought is a function of its phenomenal properties, and the logico- 
semantic relations which these properties suggest or reveal. This is not 
to deny that physical properties of the organism's nervous system can have 
an effect on the mental capacity, and put limitations on the 
representational ability (e. g. through the effect of lesions, drugs or other 
forms of physico-chemical imbalance, or of metabolic processes such as 
ageing, etc. ). What I am asserting here, however, which the epiphenomenalist 
denies, is that the kinds of epistemic relations which occur in the mind 
and which are referred to as constituting a logico-semantic as opposed to 
a causal system would not and could not occur if there were no qualia, or 
if the mental properties of certain brain states were different in the way 
envisaged in inverted qualia and similar imaginary cases. (This is not to 
deny that non-conscious systems can be built which are functionally 
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equivalent if not identical to conscious systems, as in the example of the 
chess-playing computer. However, the nature of the causally functional 
properties of such a system are determined by a human designer, and it 
can therefore be said to mechanically instantiate a 'derived 
representational capacity' which, in my opinion, is still initially 
dependent upon the designer's mental capacities. The same would hold for 
existing forms of so-called 'artificial i_ which function because 
their causal connections have been carefully designed via hard- and 
software architecture to emulate the informational responses of a 
conscious being. ) In such cases, there are no 'logico-semantic' relations 
within the machine. What is present are causal relations within the 
hard/software which are functionally equivalent, to epistemic relations 
experienced by the designers of chess machines. To summarise, what I am 
asserting is that in some (but not necessarily all) cases, our behaviour 
and that of some other species would not be the same if we lacked or had 
a different set of phenomenal properties as a result of our interaction 
with the physical world. To state an obvious case, it is not that we react 
to a stimulus in a certain way and it is painful, but because it is 
painful. The possession of a mind confers the ability to manipulate 
internal representations of reality, removing us from the exigencies of the 
immediate sensory world, and thus opening the way for behaviour which is 
planned, experienced and purposeful. To put it crudely, we no longer have 
to bump into things to find out or learn new facts about them. 
Having said this, I do not wish to imply that linguistic ability has 
no resultant effect both on cognition patterns and behaviour. 
The 
appearance of language obviously furthers the symbolic and conceptual 
capacities which I have stressed above as being so essential 
to 
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'intelligent' forms of behaviour. The individual becomes linked to a common 
source of knowledge, so that potentially every member of the linguistic 
community can tap into the knowledge resources of the group as a whole. At 
this stage, the concept mediated through linguistic symbols takes over 
from first hand experience as the most important factor in guiding and 
shaping the individual's behavioural development, and the existence of a 
linguistic system becomes the central factor in determining the logico- 
semantic significance which further personal experiences are going to take 
on during the individual's life. After all, how much of our behaviour do we 
owe to the shaping force of first hand experience, and how much of it is 
due to culturally-derived knowledge of specific facts, or customs and 
social rituals which govern our behaviour and provide us with social codes 
and an identity? The process of informational exchange within this 
linguistic community is Lamarckian and not Darwinian, since new forms can 
be acquired and passed on during an individual's lifetime, can be passed 
on to non-genetically related individuals, and can become extinct for 
generations, only to be rediscovered later and incorporated into the life 
of the community once more. None of these forms of informational exchange 
are possible within the range of phenomena governed by Darwinian theory. 
The storage sites for information become progressively externalised from 
particular individuals, in the sense that the record of experience and 
thought may be held in some semi-permanent form by the production of 
cultural artifacts, whereas the storage site for information within 
Darwinian evolution is limited to an individual, or at the most a 
genetically related line of individuals. 
It is because of the above views concerning the importance of 
conceptual thought in shaping the behaviour of individuals, that 
I reject 
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the sociobiological thesis that the social behaviour of human beings can 
be sufficiently explained within the methodological and theoretical 
framework of Darwinian theory and the biological sciences. To attempt to 
derive a full explanation of human behaviour from a knowledge of the sum 
characteristics of individual genetic endowments must be futile, since no 
individual can be fully explained except in terms of the social group to 
which they belong and from which they have derived the conceptual scheme 
which governs their interpretation of the world and the judged 
appropriateness of certain responses. This in turn demands an appreciation 
not of the sum biological characteristics of the group, but of its social 
history, and the ascendance and decline of the major concepts and leading 
symbols throughout its history. This is not to deny that there will be 
certain 'biological' constraints upon any social group, since some forms of 
behaviour will have a detrimental effect and can therefore be described as 
'biologically disadvantageous'. What I do reject is the sociobiological 
assertion that all forms of behaviour are rigorously governed by their 
outcome in terms of maximising biological fitness potential of individuals 
or groups, and that such a theoretical stance can therefore be adopted as 
sufficient for analysing behaviour in general. Moreover, the processes by 
which information is acquired by individuals via linguistic communication 
and culture is not Darwinian, and differs in every major respect from the 
genetic process of information acquisition. It cannot therefore be made 
analogous to or brought within the theoretical scope of the biological 
sciences. Contrary to the assertions of the sociobiological texts, the key 
to understanding human behaviour lies not in any appreciation of relative 
genetic advantages, but in the appreciation of social history and the 
effects of social environment on individual psychological development. Our 
conduct in the world is not regulated by our genes and their derived 
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physical structures, but by our possession of certain concepts, ani týe; r 
effects on our interpretation of the world presented to us in phenomenal 
consciousness. it is not what our ancient cave-dwelling ancss±ors saw and 
experienced which counts, but what we curs? lves now believe, and the 
processes of belief acquisition, social change, and cultural dissemination 
of information differ from those processes by which DNA is selected and 
replicated. The gap between biology and the social sciences can no doubt 
be usefully narrowed by a willingness to participate in interdisciplinary 
exchanges of information; but it can never be closed entirely by a grand 
theoretical synthesis. The positivist dream of constructing a seamless 
fabric of scientific theory, on which the tapestry of human knowledge 
could be embroidered, remains as elusive as ever. 
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